In People v. Taylor, the defendant appealed his conviction for marijuana possession under Health and Safety Code section 11530 after parole officers entered his apartment, conducted a search, and discovered marijuana hidden in a pillow. The defendant argued that the warrantless entry violated Penal Code section 844 and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The court affirmed the probation order, holding that the officers' actions did not amount to a breaking under section 844 because the door was ajar and swung open after a knock, the codefendant impliedly consented to their entry, and parolees have severely restricted civil rights that permit such searches by parole officers. The court also found the evidence sufficient, as the trial court's weighing of credibility and facts could not be disturbed on appeal.
This case involved a bank seeking to recover a deficiency balance from a guarantor after conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on property securing a promissory note. The court held that the bank could not recover the deficiency from the guarantor. The reasoning was based on equitable estoppel principles, as the bank's choice of nonjudicial sale eliminated the guarantor's subrogation rights against the principal debtor, and section 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure bars deficiency judgments following such sales.
The case involved a railroad employee's lawsuit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for knee injuries sustained while working as a yardman on two occasions in 1962 and 1963, allegedly due to rough terrain and oil/grease on the employer's property. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant after instructing the jury on proximate cause using the standard common-law definition from BAJI No. 104. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the instruction was erroneous because FELA adopts a distinct and lighter causation standard under which employer negligence need only have played any part, even the slightest, in causing the injury, as articulated in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. The common-law instruction imposed a heavier burden than FELA permits and was not rendered harmless by other instructions or the evidence in this case.
This case was an appeal by an insurer in a subrogation action against tenants who negligently caused fire damage to a leased building, seeking recovery of repair payments made to the insured lessors under a fire insurance policy and lease indemnity clause. The trial court ruled for the tenants by excluding evidence of the payments and granting judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the insurer failed to produce the original policy. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in requiring proof of the policy's contents as a prerequisite to the subrogation claim, reasoning that the tenants had not pursued discovery or subpoena of the policy and that precedent did not support mandating such evidence for a prima facie case.
The case involved a defendant convicted of two counts of armed robbery who raised defenses of prior conviction and double jeopardy on count I, and violations of speedy trial rights and due process on count III, stemming from procedural irregularities in plea proceedings, waivers, and multiple dismissals and refilings of charges. The court reversed the conviction on count I, holding that the prosecution's successive dismissals and unexcused refilings caused excessive and inexcusable delay that infringed the defendant's right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, even absent a statutory time limit. It affirmed the conviction on count III but modified the judgment to strike language regarding the defendant being armed, as that element was already the basis for first-degree robbery. The evidence of guilt was not disputed.
The case involved plaintiff Rogers suing defendant Fidelity for breach of an insurance contract covering his stamps and coins after a theft loss, with Fidelity arguing that Rogers failed to comply with an inventory record-keeping requirement in paragraph 8 of a policy rider. The trial court found that Rogers had performed all required conditions and awarded him damages, rejecting Fidelity's defense. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the rider's second page containing paragraph 8 was not incorporated into the contract because its stapled and physically obscured presentation made it effectively unreadable and unknown to Rogers at the time of policy delivery.
