The case involved a dispute over unpaid sales commissions claimed by a former employee of American Software after her voluntary resignation. The trial court awarded the commissions, ruling that the employment contract's provision forfeiting commissions 30 days after voluntary termination was unconscionable. The appellate court reversed, holding that the provision was enforceable because the contract resulted from arm's-length negotiations between parties of comparable bargaining power, with no unclear or hidden terms, and reflected prevailing industry practices.
The case involved Brian Dennis Shannon's conviction for second degree murder after fatally shooting his girlfriend in what he claimed was an accident during an argument. Shannon appealed on grounds that the standard jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter (CALJIC No. 8.40) was flawed, as it required proof of intent to kill and thus prevented the jury from reducing a killing committed with only implied malice to manslaughter based on heat of passion or sudden quarrel. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding it was bound by California Supreme Court precedent that voluntary manslaughter is a specific intent crime requiring intent to kill. The court acknowledged potential inconsistencies in the rule but stated it lacked authority to depart from that precedent.
The case involved the City of Oakland suing Vemolia McCullough in a drug house abatement action under Health and Safety Code sections 11570 et seq., alleging drug offenses at her property; the trial court entered judgment closing the property for one year and imposing a $1,000 civil penalty, then awarded the city $100,005.48 in postjudgment costs and attorney fees. McCullough appealed only the costs order, arguing that salaries and overhead expenses of city attorneys, legal assistants, and police officers were not recoverable. The Court of Appeal held that Civil Code section 3496 authorizes awards of costs of investigation and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, which includes allocable salaries plus overhead for government employees, as the statute lacks limiting language like "actually incurred" and parallels market-rate fee recoveries in other contexts. The court reduced the award by $4,893.24 to exclude undocumented amounts but affirmed it as modified and directed the parties to bear their own appellate fees and costs.
This case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Marie Bafus, an experienced figure skater, against another skater, Mary Staten, and related parties after Bafus was cut on the arm by Staten's skate blade during a collision in a group practice session. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that primary assumption of risk barred recovery because the injury resulted from an inherent risk of figure skating. The trial court denied the motion, finding a triable issue based on expert testimony that such a collision was not inherent. The appellate court granted a writ of mandate, holding that being cut by another skater's blade is an inherent risk of the sport under Knight v. Jewett, so defendants owed no duty of care, and summary judgment should have been granted.
The case involved the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), a political advocacy organization, seeking a declaration that California's minimum wage laws were unconstitutional as applied to it because they would force ACORN to hire fewer workers and reduce the effectiveness of its advocates. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the defense. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the laws are constitutional as applied because the state's compelling interest in ensuring wages adequate to maintain a decent standard of living justifies any incidental impact on First Amendment freedoms, and this justification applies to as-applied challenges as well as facial ones. ACORN did not demonstrate any basis for amending its complaint.
In People v. Pierce, the defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of selling methamphetamine, and the trial judge imposed upper terms totaling five years in prison by adopting the probation report's aggravating and mitigating factors without further explanation. The Court of Appeal held that this violated the requirement under the California Rules of Court to orally state on the record the reasons for selecting the upper terms, including a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting circumstances in aggravation. Although such errors are often harmless, the court found reversal necessary here because the same judge had repeatedly failed to comply with sentencing rules in prior cases despite multiple appellate warnings. The judgment was therefore reversed with directions to assign the case to a different judge for resentencing.