Miriam A. Vogel

In this case, a commercial landlord and tenant arbitrated a dispute over fair market rental value under a lease renewal, using three real estate brokers as arbitrators. After the panel set the rent at $1.4 million per year in the tenant's favor, the landlord petitioned to vacate the award, alleging the neutral arbitrator failed to disclose prior business dealings between his employer and the tenant or its party arbitrator. The trial court vacated the award based on an appearance of bias from undisclosed relationships and contributions, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the neutral had no personal financial interest, made adequate initial disclosures, and the additional facts did not require vacatur under the disclosure standards for arbitrators. The court reviewed the issue de novo and distinguished the facts from cases involving attorney-arbitrators.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case arose when a law firm's office manager forged the lawyer's signature to open bank accounts, deposited client trust funds, and stole the money, leading the clients to sue the lawyer, who then cross-complained against the banks for negligence in opening and handling the accounts. The banks demurred on the ground that they had no contractual relationship with the lawyer and thus owed him no duty of care. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the cross-complaint against the banks. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the banks' only contracts were with the forger and that no duty extended to the non-customer lawyer whose name was misused, as foreseeability alone does not create liability and any broader duty should be addressed by the Legislature.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a dispute between Jakks Pacific, Inc. and THQ Inc. over the appointment of a neutral arbitrator under their contract for a video game manufacturing venture, after they could not agree on the selection process. Jakks argued that the five candidates nominated by the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6 must make the impartiality disclosures required by section 1281.9 before the parties could select or the court could appoint an arbitrator, and sought to disqualify those who had not done so. The court held that disclosures are not required until a person is actually selected or appointed and notified as the proposed neutral arbitrator. This conclusion followed from the plain language of section 1281.9, which ties the disclosure obligation to when a person "is to serve as a neutral arbitrator" and requires written disclosure within 10 days of notice of the proposed nomination or appointment.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over $44.63 in unpaid overtime wages owed to an off-duty police officer who worked one day on a film production, where the payroll company had used an incorrect formula. After the individual claim settled for $10,500 with the plaintiff designated as the prevailing party, he sought approximately $46,000 in attorney fees under Labor Code provisions authorizing recovery of reasonable fees for wage and pay stub violations. The trial court denied the fee request entirely, citing the small amount in controversy, limited litigation after denial of class certification, and excessive hours billed. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutes entitled the plaintiff to reasonable fees as a matter of right and that the record supported an award of $500 given the straightforward nature of the dispute and lack of any class action.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a challenge to the City of Los Angeles's municipal ordinance authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used to solicit prostitution, after Richard Reinsdorf's Jeep was seized following his 2005 arrest. The trial court ruled in Reinsdorf's favor, finding the ordinance preempted by state law, and awarded him attorney fees. On appeal, the court initially reversed but later reconsidered after the California Supreme Court decided O'Connell v. City of Stockton, which held that a similar Stockton ordinance was preempted. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the Los Angeles ordinance is preempted because it conflicts with or enters a field fully occupied by state law under the California Constitution, as state statutes comprehensively regulate prostitution offenses and vehicle forfeitures. The court also denied additional attorney fees on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether engineers hired through private contracting firms to perform work for the County of Los Angeles qualified as common law employees entitled to civil service protections and retirement benefits under the county's plan. The plaintiffs, who had signed agreements acknowledging they were not county employees and were paid solely by the contractors, filed a class action after the county denied their claims. The trial court ruled against them on threshold issues including statutes of limitations, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the county had properly outsourced the work under its charter and Government Code section 31000. The core reasoning was that the engineers did not qualify as employees under the County Employees Retirement Law because their compensation was not fixed by the board of supervisors, they were not on the county payroll, and the contractors were solely responsible for their pay and benefits.

labor & employment

This case involved a car accident where an unlicensed driver, Anna Litovsky, crashed into plaintiff Paulette Bayer-Bel after two others negligently entrusted the vehicle to her. A jury allocated fault among the parties, including 40 percent to Litovsky of the 40 percent total fault assigned to defendants, and awarded both economic and noneconomic damages. The trial court held all defendants jointly and severally liable for the full judgment, concluding that Proposition 51 did not apply because their liability resembled vicarious responsibility. The Court of Appeal reversed as to Litovsky, holding that her liability for noneconomic damages is several only and limited to her proportional share of fault. The court reasoned that because Litovsky and at least one other defendant were independently acting tortfeasors with primary liability, comparative fault principles under Civil Code section 1431.2 applied to allocate noneconomic damages severally.

torts & liability

This case involved a dependency proceeding in which a mother with a history of drug addiction was arrested in California on Florida warrants while caring for her infant daughter, leading to the child's placement in foster care after testing positive for drugs. The mother requested that her sister in Florida be considered for placement under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, but delays in obtaining a foster care license and completing the process meant the child bonded with her California foster parents over nearly two years. The dependency court terminated the mother's parental rights and selected the foster parents as the prospective adoptive family, prioritizing the child's best interests due to the established bond and the unavailability of timely relative placement. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no error in the process or outcome given the circumstances of the ICPC delays and the child's welfare.

family law

The case involved the City of Los Angeles's attempt to seize and forfeit Richard Reinsdorf's Jeep Cherokee after his arrest for soliciting prostitution, pursuant to a local municipal ordinance authorizing such actions for vehicles used in that offense. Reinsdorf challenged the forfeiture on grounds that the ordinance was preempted by state law, citing a similar ruling from another district, and the trial court ruled in his favor while also awarding attorney's fees. On appeal, after the California Supreme Court decided O'Connell v. City of Stockton, which held that comparable city ordinances were preempted because state law comprehensively regulates the subject and occupies the field, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against the City. The core reasoning was that the Los Angeles ordinance duplicated or contradicted state law by allowing vehicle forfeiture for specific state offenses in an area fully covered by general state statutes, rendering it void under the California Constitution. The court also upheld the fee award but denied additional appellate fees.

criminal law

The case arose after a criminal defendant, convicted following denial of his suppression motion, sought via Pitchess motion and subpoena to obtain from the Commission on Judicial Performance any statements Judge Schwartz had made in response to the defendant's complaint about the judge; the Commission resisted on grounds of confidentiality. The Court of Appeal granted the Commission's petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to quash the subpoena and deny the discovery request. The core reasoning was that article VI, section 18 of the California Constitution expressly authorizes confidentiality rules for Commission investigations, Evidence Code section 1040 protects such official information when confidentiality serves the public interest, and strong policy considerations—including encouraging complaints, protecting judges from unfounded attacks, and preserving judicial independence—outweigh any need for disclosure in a criminal proceeding. The court further held that in-camera review by the trial judge would be equally improper because the records are not discoverable at all.

criminal lawprocedure

In Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., three drivers filed a class action against FedEx alleging they were employees entitled to reimbursement for work-related expenses under Labor Code section 2802 rather than independent contractors, seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Following a trifurcated trial, the court certified a class for the reimbursement claim, found the drivers were employees, ordered FedEx to pay approximately $5 million in reimbursements plus prejudgment interest, granted most requested equitable relief, and awarded about $12.3 million in costs and attorneys' fees. On appeal, the court affirmed the employee classification under section 2802, the class certification order, and the recoverability of fees, but reversed the fee amount for recalculation, reversed two orders limiting reimbursable expenses, and remanded for further proceedings. The core reasoning centered on the terms of the nonnegotiable Operating Agreement, FedEx's control over operations, appearance standards, and service areas, and the drivers' economic dependence on FedEx, which established employee status for expense reimbursement purposes.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Kenneth E. Smith pled no contest to committing a lewd act on his 13-year-old stepdaughter and received probation with conditions that included following all probation department regulations. The Los Angeles County Probation Department maintained a blanket rule barring any section 290 offender from leaving the county, which prevented Smith from traveling for his job as a driver or dispatcher. The trial court denied Smith's motion to modify the condition, relying on the department's policy and the nature of the offense rather than Smith's individual circumstances or employment needs. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that probation conditions must be reasonably related to the crime or future criminality and must serve the goals of public safety and rehabilitation, and that a mass-treatment approach without considering the probationer's particular situation fails those standards. The case was remanded for the trial court to impose a less restrictive travel limitation tailored to Smith or to eliminate the restriction for work purposes.

criminal law

The case concerned whether attempted grand theft auto is a lesser included offense of attempted carjacking, in a prosecution where the defendant was charged with attempted carjacking after entering a victim's truck and brandishing a knife during an altercation before fleeing. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on attempted grand theft auto, and the defendant was convicted of attempted carjacking. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that attempted grand theft auto is not a lesser included offense under either the elements test or the accusatory pleading test. The court reasoned that carjacking requires only an intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the victim of the vehicle, whereas grand theft auto requires an intent to permanently deprive, so the greater offense can be committed without also committing the lesser one.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a no contest clause in Richard D. Colburn’s trust that required his former wife and their children to choose between enforcing rights under a prior marital dissolution judgment (via creditor’s claims or other actions) or accepting the gifts provided in the trust. The former wife and children filed safe harbor petitions under Probate Code section 21320 seeking to avoid triggering the clause while pursuing both the judgment benefits and trust gifts; the trustees opposed the petitions. The trial court ruled that creditor’s claims would violate the no contest clause but that an order to show cause for child support modification would not, leading to appeals by both sides. The Court of Appeal held that both creditor’s claims and the order to show cause would violate the clause because they would frustrate the trust’s dispositive plan, as explicitly contemplated by its terms, and therefore affirmed denial of the safe harbor petitions while reversing the allowance of the order to show cause.

family lawproperty

This case was a class action brought by female attorneys employed by Auxiliary Legal Services, Inc. (ALS) against Los Angeles County and related entities, alleging gender-based wage discrimination in violation of federal and state Equal Pay Acts and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The plaintiffs claimed that ALS was a payrolling scheme creating a two-tier workforce, with predominantly female ALS lawyers receiving lower pay and benefits than predominantly male county counsel lawyers despite performing the same work. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county defendants, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the evidence showed separate applicant pools, merit-based hiring with open competitive exams available to all, gender integration in both groups, and no gender-based barriers or differential treatment within groups; pay differences were attributable to cost savings rather than sex. Unchallenged discovery sanctions further supported findings of no gender discrimination.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved borrowers who sued a federal savings and loan association and its loan officer over allegedly undisclosed high prepayment penalties on two loans secured by real property, asserting claims for fraud, unlawful restraint on alienation, unfair business practices, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the Home Owners' Loan Act and Office of Thrift Supervision regulations expressly preempt any state laws that impose requirements regarding prepayment penalties on federal savings associations. The court reasoned that all of the plaintiffs' claims sought relief that would necessarily regulate the bank's prepayment penalty provisions, rejecting arguments that the claims only incidentally affected lending operations or that the fraud claim against the individual officer was exempt from preemption.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

This case concerns whether the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) preempts a California enforcement action against Capital Research and Management Company and American Funds Distributors for allegedly inadequate disclosures about undisclosed compensation agreements with broker-dealers selling mutual fund shares. The Attorney General sued under state securities statutes (Corporations Code sections 25401 and 25216) seeking injunctions and penalties, while the companies filed a declaratory relief action claiming federal preemption. The trial court found preemption and dismissed the enforcement action, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that NSMIA's savings clause expressly permits state officers to pursue enforcement actions for fraud, deceit, or unlawful conduct by brokers or dealers in securities transactions. The court reasoned that the clause's language and legislative history demonstrate Congress's clear intent to preserve such state authority, applying to both statutory and common-law claims without conflict with federal law.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned whether a bail bond posted by Ranger Insurance Company for defendant Brittany Cook was exonerated as a matter of law because no criminal complaint was filed within 15 days of her original arraignment date. Cook was ordered by the jailor to appear on January 22, 2004, but the prosecutor postponed the date twice due to investigative delays and filed the complaint on March 18, 2004; Cook then failed to appear for a later hearing, leading the trial court to forfeit the bond. Ranger moved to vacate the resulting summary judgment, arguing the court lost jurisdiction after February 6, 2004. The Court of Appeal agreed with Ranger, holding that Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (a), requires the complaint to be filed within 15 days after the arraignment date originally set by the jailor, strictly construing the time limits in favor of the surety and finding the defendant was lawfully required to appear on that initial date.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Anchor Lighting, a commercial customer that did not receive a 10 percent electricity rate reduction, suing Southern California Edison for allegedly violating the Electric Utilities Restructuring Act's provisions for residential and small commercial customers. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The core reasoning was that the CPUC had already approved SCE's cost recovery plan, financing orders, and eligibility criteria (limited to GS-1 customers) in final, irrevocable decisions, so the claims amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on those determinations under Public Utilities Code section 1759, which bars superior court interference with CPUC ratemaking authority.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, homeowners whose property was damaged in the 1994 Northridge earthquake sued Allstate Insurance over unresolved claims under their homeowner’s policy, leading the parties to enter a detailed mediation and arbitration agreement that dismissed the lawsuit and required binding arbitration before a retired judge. The agreement specified that the arbitrator’s decision would be final, not subject to reconsideration or appeal, and issued without a written opinion beyond indicating which party prevailed and the amount owed. After the arbitrator issued a five-page ruling with detailed reasoning, an award of $400,000 on the contract claim, and denial of bad faith and fraud claims, then later entertained a request for reconsideration, the trial court vacated the award and remanded for further proceedings before the same arbitrator. The Court of Appeal treated the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to correct the award by striking the detailed opinion to conform to the agreement and to deny the petition to vacate. The core reasoning was that the parties had expressly limited the arbitrator’s powers and the form of the award, making remand for substantive changes impermissible under the contract and arbitration statutes.

procedurebusiness & regulatory