John M. Ferren

This case involves disciplinary proceedings against attorney David H. Safavian after his federal convictions for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 and making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Following an initial conviction that was reversed on appeal and a subsequent conviction that was affirmed, the Board on Professional Responsibility determined that the offenses constituted crimes of moral turpitude per se under D.C. Code § 11-2503(a) and recommended disbarment. The court adopted the recommendation, ordering disbarment and specifying that for reinstatement purposes the disbarment period runs from the date of Safavian's first affidavit in 2006 but excludes the interval when his interim suspension had been lifted. The ruling rests on the principle that obstruction of justice inherently involves moral turpitude, triggering mandatory disbarment when any conviction meets that standard, while allowing credit for periods of actual suspension consistent with standard nunc pro tunc practices.

criminal law

The case involved Andre M. Jones's appeal from his bench-trial conviction for misdemeanor assault on a police officer under D.C. Code § 22-405(b), arising from a July 2008 encounter in which police officers pursued a suspect near Jones's home, he yelled profanities and refused orders to stay on the sidewalk, and accounts differed over whether he shoved an officer or took a fighting stance. Jones argued that the conviction might rest on invalid legal theories, including noncriminal conduct such as shouting or failing to comply with orders. The court remanded the case to the trial court for clarification of the verdict, citing the conflicting witness accounts, the government's presentation of three theories of guilt (two of which could not support conviction), the absence of an explicit credibility finding or specific factual findings by the trial judge, and the need to ensure the conviction rested only on conduct meeting the statutory requirement of active opposition to an officer's duties.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gilmore v. Atlantic Services Group, the petitioner sought review of an OAH decision upholding DOES's denial of unemployment benefits, which had initially found he voluntarily quit without good cause due to job abandonment after failing to report to work following a brief incarceration. OAH affirmed on alternate grounds, determining that the claimant's three days of no-call/no-show constituted misconduct under D.C. regulations. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that OAH's findings were flawed because they failed to clearly distinguish between gross and simple misconduct, relied on unadmitted evidence regarding employer policies, did not resolve inconsistencies in testimony about whether the employer was notified of the incarceration, and lacked a precise statement of any applicable job abandonment rule.

labor & employment

The case involved Percy Jordan's convictions for first-degree felony murder while armed with aggravating circumstances, second-degree murder while armed, robbery of a senior citizen, conspiracy to commit robbery, and multiple counts of credit card fraud, stemming from the 2006 robbery and killing of David Rosenbaum during a walk in Northwest D.C. Jordan appealed, claiming errors including the trial court's refusal to clarify the jury instruction on whether "cause" meant physically striking the victim, limits on cross-examining the key eyewitness about his police interrogation, the prosecutor's closing argument allegedly shifting the burden of proof, and the inclusion of an alias in the indictment. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions after finding no merit in these claims, while remanding for amendment of the judgment to account for merged offenses. The court reasoned that the jury instruction was adequate as given, cross-examination was not unduly restricted, the closing argument did not impermissibly shift the burden, and the alias did not prejudice the defense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a District of Columbia government employee who claimed work-related carpal tunnel syndrome and sought temporary total disability benefits through the Disability Compensation Program. After the program denied her claim, she filed multiple hearing applications with the Department of Employment Services (DOES), and an administrative law judge ultimately awarded benefits. The Department of Mental Health appealed, arguing that DOES failed to rule on its motion to dismiss the claim as untimely and that the agency used an incorrect standard of proof for causation. The court reversed and remanded, holding that DOES was required to address the timeliness issue raised in the motion to dismiss and to apply the proper standard without a presumption of compensability under the relevant statute. The court did not reach the sufficiency of the evidence.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Melendez v. United States, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a prohibited weapon, based on evidence that he beat one victim to death and struck another with a baseball bat. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by barring cross-examination of a defense witness, William Luna, regarding potential bias stemming from a New York sentencing order and possible hope of favorable treatment from prosecutors. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court committed no error in limiting the examination of Luna's alleged bias. The decision rested on the conclusion that the proposed line of questioning did not establish a sufficient basis for exploring bias under the circumstances presented.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights