In this case, surface property owners sued the holder of severed mineral rights and its lessee for declaratory relief, to quiet title, to enjoin trespass, and for damages after the lessee removed sandstone from the land, damaging trees and creating roads. The 1928 deed reserved to the grantor “coal, oil, gas and any and all other minerals,” and the defendants claimed this included sandstone; the plaintiffs contended it did not. The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on their first three counts and dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim, holding that sandstone is a rock or stone rather than a mineral under the deed’s plain language and ordinary definitions. It denied the defendants’ summary-judgment and amendment motions and reserved ruling on damages pending resolution of the remaining claims.
This case involves Patricia Tolliver suing her former employer, Children's Home-Chambliss Shelter, a non-profit shelter for children, for age and sex discrimination, retaliation, and related employment claims, primarily concerning unequal pay and cleaning assignments compared to male employees. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on most claims, including retaliation and those related to cleaning tasks, but denied it on the disparate pay claims. The decision was based on the presence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff was paid less than similarly situated male employees due to sex or age, while finding insufficient evidence to support the other allegations.
Plaintiff Ralph Freeman, a police officer, sued Wal-Mart for damages after a store greeter briefly touched his shoulder while requesting a receipt following activation of the store's EAS alarm; Freeman shoved the greeter, leading to an altercation captured on video that was later publicized and caused him embarrassment, though he suffered no physical injury. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, which Freeman did not oppose. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and that Freeman could not establish the required elements of his claims, including breach of duty, severe emotional injury, or expert proof for negligent infliction of emotional distress, resulting in dismissal of the case.
The case involved Defendant Toney Robinson, who was indicted in April 2010 on charges including possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine after a 2009 search of his residence uncovered 21 grams of crack and firearms; he pleaded guilty in July 2010, but his sentencing occurred after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) took effect in August 2010. The FSA raised the threshold for the five-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams of crack, meaning Robinson would face a 10-year mandatory minimum under the prior law but none under the new thresholds. The court granted Robinson's request to apply the FSA, holding that its reduced mandatory minimums are retroactive to offenders whose conduct predated the Act but who had not yet been sentenced. The reasoning centered on the FSA's purpose to reduce sentencing disparities, the Sentencing Commission's conforming guideline amendments effective for post-enactment sentencings, and indications of congressional intent supporting application to pending cases.
This case involves the U.S. government's motion to garnish assets held by Benton Bancshares, Inc. on behalf of defendant Jimmy L. Goddard, who was convicted of misapplication of bank funds and ordered to pay $1,185,328 in restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The assets, consisting of cash, stock liquidation proceeds, and future dividends, were held jointly by Goddard and his wife in a tenancy by the entirety; Mrs. Goddard intervened and conceded the government's interest but sought to limit it to a share of the property. The court granted the motion in part, authorizing garnishment of one-half of the assets. It reasoned that MVRA restitution liens are treated like tax liens and can reach entireties property, but the non-debtor spouse retains an equal interest, and the government failed to present evidence sufficient to support an equitable adjustment favoring a larger share.
In Taylor v. Duncan, plaintiff Shirley Taylor sued the Office of Representative John J. Duncan, Jr., alleging that her 2009 termination from her position as an assistant staffer violated the Congressional Accountability Act through age and perceived disability discrimination under the incorporated ADEA, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting absolute immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause because some of her duties involved legislative matters. The court denied the motion after converting it to summary judgment, holding that Taylor's core duties consisted of non-legislative constituent services and administrative tasks, that the termination decision was administrative rather than legislative, and that she had presented sufficient evidence of a prima facie case to proceed.
