The case involved The Mastan Company suing American Custom Homes to collect on delinquent accounts that had been assigned to Mastan by a third party. At trial without a jury, Mastan attempted to introduce business records through the testimony of one of three employee bookkeepers, but the defendant objected on the grounds that the witness was neither the records custodian nor a qualified witness under Florida Statute 92.36. The trial court sustained the objection and entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed, holding that the witness did not qualify because she lacked supervisory authority over the records and an office manager or head bookkeeper would have been needed to properly authenticate them under the statute.
In this case, the Illingworths obtained a money judgment against the Ferrentinos after a car accident involving Eddie Ferrentino, but the Ferrentinos' insurer, American Mutual, refused to defend the suit or pay the judgment based on an exclusionary policy endorsement that barred coverage when Eddie Ferrentino drove. The trial court entered judgments against the insurer in garnishment proceedings and on a cross-claim for attorney's fees, ruling that the insurer was estopped from denying coverage because it failed to respond to an SR-21 form filed with the state and that the exclusion was void under Fla. Stat. § 627.01091 because the insurer had not filed the endorsement form for approval with the insurance commissioner. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the record supported the estoppel finding and that the statute required prior approval of the endorsement form, making the unapproved exclusion ineffective regardless of its specific wording. The court therefore upheld the garnishment and fee awards in favor of the appellees.
The case involved a plaintiff who purchased a new refrigerator in February 1962 from defendant J.W. Whitesides, manufactured by General Motors, and was injured in December 1966 when a latent defect caused the door hinge to fail. She filed suit in April 1967 asserting breach of implied warranty (among other counts later dismissed), but the trial court dismissed the claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the limitations period began to run at the time of the product's purchase and sale rather than when the injury occurred, drawing on precedents from contract and personal injury cases holding that the cause of action accrues upon breach.
The case involved a lawsuit by Elana and Victor Lescard against William Lee Keel for injuries from an automobile collision that occurred in Georgia in 1963. The plaintiffs filed the suit in Florida in 1965, more than two years after the accident, after several prior actions were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the ground that the action was barred by Georgia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida's borrowing statute requires application of the Georgia limitations period to causes of action arising there, consistent with Florida's adherence to the lex loci delicti doctrine for tort claims.
The case involved a negligence lawsuit brought by Marie Elena Reynolds and her husband against the promoters of a wrestling match after she was struck in the face by a whiskey bottle thrown by another spectator. The lower court dismissed the complaint, first giving the plaintiffs 20 days to file an amended complaint and then entering a final dismissal when they failed to do so. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the dismissal, holding that the original complaint failed to state a cause of action because it alleged only general negligence without specifying any particular acts or omissions by the defendants. The court reasoned that promoters of such events owe only a duty of reasonable care to their invitees and are not insurers of safety, citing supporting authority from other states that the duty does not require searching patrons or providing enough employees to prevent all possible injuries from third parties.
In Winkfield v. State, the appellant was convicted of robbery after a jury trial and appealed the trial court's admission of testimony about a similar robbery committed about a month later, which the prosecution introduced to show identity and modus operandi. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was properly admitted under the Williams rule because it was relevant and had probative value in proving material facts in the charged offense. The court reasoned that the similarities in the crimes—such as two perpetrators approaching a delivery truck, one with a gun, and taking wallets from the victim's pockets—established a common scheme and the defendant's involvement, without the evidence being offered solely to demonstrate bad character or propensity. The opinion emphasized that relevancy, not the mere fact of another crime, is the test for admissibility of such evidence.