The case was brought by the United States against the Slidell Youth Football Association (SYFA), a nonprofit youth football league in Louisiana, under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.) alleging racial discrimination in public accommodations. The court found that SYFA maintained an all-white membership through a "restrictive membership clause" requiring approval by three-fourths of its voting members (coaches and officers), had no black voting members, and operated with public support including use of public facilities and gate receipts. The court concluded that SYFA did not qualify for the private club exemption because its membership process lacked genuine selectivity, participants had no governance role, and the organization received substantial public benefits; therefore its discriminatory practices violated the Act and must be enjoined.
The case involved a lawsuit by the Louisiana affiliate of NORML and an anonymous plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against federal and state laws that criminalize private possession and use of marijuana by adults, claiming violations of privacy and liberty under the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and equal protection. The district court addressed whether to convene a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, which required determining if the constitutional questions were substantial. The court denied the request, holding that the claims were plainly without merit and thus insubstantial, as no fundamental right to marijuana possession exists in a constitutional zone of privacy, legislatures have authority to regulate drugs for public health and welfare, and distinctions from substances like alcohol are rational rather than arbitrary.
The case involved an appeal from the denial of Social Security disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423 to a plaintiff with a back injury from 1971 that prevented return to his prior unskilled labor jobs; the Secretary found the plaintiff could perform light sedentary work available in the New Orleans area 60-70 miles away. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court held that the 1968 amendment to § 423(d)(2)(A) requires assessing ability to engage in substantial gainful activity in the national economy regardless of local availability or hiring prospects, based on the statute's text, legislative history emphasizing medical factors and uniform national standards, and Fifth Circuit precedents such as King v. Finch.
This case concerns a 1968 Mississippi River collision between the upbound Chotin tow (nine barges pushed by the PAT CHOTIN and JOEY CHOTIN) and the downbound ACBL/BLASKE tow (21 barges pushed by the HUGH C. BLASKE), which damaged multiple barges and their cargo. After a liability-only trial, the court held that the Chotin tow was solely at fault and that the BLASKE tow bore no negligence or unseaworthiness. The court found that the Chotin tow had broken its proper face wires, substituted smaller barge wires, navigated too close to the bank (causing grounding), lost control, and veered into the BLASKE's path, constituting gross negligence that was the sole proximate cause; the BLASKE had followed radio passing agreements and taken appropriate steps to avoid collision. The decision applied principles that one vessel's dominant fault can relieve the other of liability even where minor statutory issues might exist.
This case involves two white plaintiffs suing their all-white union and officials under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, claiming discriminatory hiring hall practices. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that no unlawful discrimination based on race or other protected characteristics occurred. The court granted the motion and dismissed both claims. It reasoned that Title VII explicitly requires discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, which was absent here, and that § 1981 applies only to racial discrimination, as confirmed by precedent allowing white plaintiffs to sue only when they are victims of or advocates against such discrimination. The plaintiffs, being the same race as the defendants and unable to represent affected minorities, presented no evidence of practices tied to protected traits.
The plaintiffs, suing as citizens, taxpayers, and voters, sought to enjoin enforcement of federal statutes funding the Vietnam War on the ground that they violated the Constitution's war powers clause in Article I, Section 8. They requested a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. § 2282 to address the constitutional claims. The court declined to convene such a panel, holding that the issues presented a nonjusticiable political question outside judicial competence. Relying on Baker v. Carr and precedents such as Luftig v. McNamara and Orlando v. Laird, the court reasoned that the Constitution commits war-related decisions to Congress and the Executive, that manageable judicial standards are lacking, and that courts may not second-guess the political branches' mutual participation in military actions.
