Paul M. Hawkes

This case involves an appeal by an employer and carrier challenging a judge's award of permanent total disability benefits to a claimant under Florida's workers' compensation law. The court reversed the award and remanded the case because it was unclear whether the judge applied the correct statutory standard for proving entitlement to such benefits when the injury is not one of the enumerated catastrophic injuries. Specifically, the judge's findings referenced the claimant's inability to engage in the "full range of sedentary activities," which aligns with a prior standard rather than the current requirement to show inability to engage in at least sedentary employment within a 50-mile radius. The court directed the judge to apply the proper test from Blake v. Merck & Company, focusing on whether physical restrictions combined with vocational factors preclude at least sedentary employment.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved MVP Health, Inc.'s request for attorney's fees after it prevailed in an administrative challenge against the Agency for Health Care Administration's (AHCA) withdrawal of its home health care facility licensure application. The court reversed the fee award, holding that AHCA was not required to pay fees because its actions were substantially justified under section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The core reasoning was that at the time of the withdrawal, AHCA had a reasonable basis in law and fact due to ongoing litigation over MVP's ownership and imminent loss of accreditation, even though the application was later deemed complete and approvable.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

Eugene McCoskey was arrested for driving under the influence in Florida and petitioned for certiorari after the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, reversed a trial court order allowing him to present evidence of his lack of intent to drive. The appellate court denied the petition, holding that the circuit court had not departed from the essential requirements of law. Florida's DUI statute makes it a general intent crime to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle while impaired or with a prohibited blood or breath alcohol level, and the statute contains no element of intent to drive. Evidence of the defendant's subjective intent, such as calling for a ride and waiting in the car, is irrelevant to the actual physical control element and could confuse the jury or improperly suggest that intent is required.

criminal lawprocedure

In Davis v. State, the defendant pled no contest to charges of lewd or lascivious battery and child abuse by impregnation involving sexual conduct with a minor, then sought to depose the victim before sentencing to gather evidence of consent for potential mitigation under Florida sentencing guidelines. The trial court granted the State's motion for a protective order, ruling that defendants have no right to discovery after a plea but before sentencing. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying a blanket prohibition on post-plea discovery, as Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 permits discovery at critical stages including sentencing, though witness categorization rules like Category A apply primarily to the guilt phase and do not grant an absolute right here. The court affirmed the sentence and denial of the deposition because the error was harmless, as the record already contained sufficient evidence of consent from the victim's statement and the defendant's testimony. The decision clarifies that discovery disputes at sentencing must be evaluated on their merits rather than categorically denied.

criminal lawprocedure

In Sentry Insurance Co. v. Hamlin, a workers' compensation claimant sought benefits after being injured in his employer's parking lot while retrieving personal items from his car during a repossession by his lender. The court reversed the lower tribunal's finding of compensability, determining that the injury did not arise out of the claimant's employment as required by section 440.09, Florida Statutes. The core reasoning was that the claimant was on a purely personal mission with no relationship to his work, so the risks causing the injury were not work-related or created by the employment, even though the incident occurred on the employer's premises during paid time and was implicitly permitted. The court further held that the retrieval did not qualify as an emergency under section 440.092(3) because it was not an objectively recognized exigency under ordinary standards of humanity.

labor & employment

This case concerned a certified teacher whose educator certificate was permanently revoked by the Education Practices Commission under a 2008 amendment to section 1012.795(l)(n), Florida Statutes, which mandated revocation for any conviction of misdemeanor battery on a minor; the revocation was based on a 2006 incident for which the teacher had previously pled guilty but which an earlier Commission decision had found insufficient to warrant discipline. The court reversed the Commission's decision. It held that the legislature did not clearly intend the statute to apply retroactively and that retroactive application would violate constitutional principles by impairing the teacher's vested property interest in the certificate through new legal consequences attached to pre-enactment conduct.

criminal lawprocedureproperty