The case involved Susan Edwards, who was sentenced to 15 years of probation after pleading no contest to first-degree arson for burning down the marital home during divorce proceedings, with a restitution order of over $312,000 to State Farm Insurance to be paid immediately. The trial court revoked her probation after finding she willfully failed to pay despite having the ability to do so, based on her minimal payments and prior asset disclosures, and sentenced her to 48 months in prison. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the revocation, holding that the State failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Edwards had the present ability to pay the full restitution amount and that the trial court could not delegate the creation of a payment schedule to a probation officer. The court remanded with instructions to reinstate probation and establish a proper payment schedule based on her financial resources and earning ability.
This case involved a dispute between the buyers and sellers of a motel over two promissory notes, one secured by a mortgage, after the buyers defaulted on payments. The sellers obtained a foreclosure judgment and the property was sold at auction, but an earlier judgment was reversed on appeal; on remand the trial court entered a new foreclosure order that included an expired redemption deadline due to a clerical error in the dates. The buyers argued this denied them a meaningful opportunity to redeem the property, while the sellers contended any error was harmless. The appellate court held that the right of redemption is a protected interest in land that cannot be eliminated by such an error, and therefore vacated the redemption provision and remanded for the trial court to allow the buyers fifteen days from the amended judgment to redeem.
This case involved a dispute over alimony payments from a former husband's NASA pension following the dissolution of a 25-year marriage. The former husband sought to terminate or modify the alimony by limiting it to benefits accrued during the marriage, while the former wife petitioned to enforce the formula from the second amended final judgment. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the modification and enforcement of the alimony, reasoning that the formula was proposed and agreed to by the husband as a substitute for immediate lump sum alimony he could not pay, and the parties are bound by their agreement despite later legal developments on pension valuations.
The case involved a corporation that owned buildings in what became the Lake Eola Heights Historic District in Orlando, where the city denied permission to demolish structurally unsound buildings and required their restoration. The owner filed an inverse condemnation action claiming that the historic preservation regulations deprived it of the beneficial use of its property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, but the appellate court reversed, holding that unresolved factual issues existed regarding whether a taking had occurred under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reasoned that the city had not met its burden to show no genuine issues of material fact, listing several questions such as the impact on investment-backed expectations and the owner's ability to earn a reasonable return that needed resolution before determining if a taking occurred.
The case involved Philip Crosby Associates, a management consulting firm operating seminars through its Quality College division in Florida, appealing a final order from the State Board of Independent Colleges and Universities. The Board had determined that Crosby did not need a license because it offered no academic degrees or college credit, but ruled that Crosby could not use the term "college" in its name under Florida statutes restricting that term to accredited or licensed degree-granting institutions. Crosby argued the Board lacked jurisdiction and misinterpreted the law. The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the Board's order, holding that the Board had no regulatory authority over Crosby and that the statute did not prohibit non-degree entities from using the word "college," as such a broad interpretation would lead to absurd results beyond the law's intent to regulate educational institutions.
The case involved a dispute between a contractor and homeowners over a contract to build a home addition, where the contractor sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien after the homeowners withheld progress payments, and the homeowners counterclaimed for damages from alleged defective work and completion costs. The trial court found that both parties breached the contract, awarded the contractor $2,500 in damages and fees while awarding the homeowners $2,500 on their counterclaim, and declined to foreclose the lien since the awards offset. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, reasoning that the contractor failed to adequately prove expenses and lost profits, there was no evidence supporting the homeowners' claimed damages for rain or repairs, and a party breaching by nonpayment cannot recover completion costs in this context.
