The case involved the United States seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Roy Neset for operating unlicensed low-power radio transmissions on frequencies like 88.1 MHz and 88.3 MHz. The court found that the transmissions exceeded the 250 microvolts per meter exemption threshold under 47 C.F.R. § 15.239(b), requiring an FCC license under 47 U.S.C. § 301, which Neset had not obtained. It granted the requested relief, concluding that the defendant had violated the licensing statute and enjoining further unlicensed broadcasts by him and those acting with him. The court rejected statutory challenges under the Paperwork Reduction Act and Administrative Procedure Act due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as such issues must first be raised with the FCC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and found no valid First Amendment defense to the licensing requirement.
This case concerned disputes over which entity could regulate and provide electrical utility service to facilities on the Fort Totten (Devils Lake Sioux) Indian Reservation in North Dakota, pitting the tribe's claimed sovereign authority against the North Dakota Public Service Commission's territorial integrity rules that allocated service areas between utilities like Baker Electric Cooperative and Otter Tail Power Company. The court held that the tribe possesses inherent sovereign power to select a utility provider by resolution or contract for its own businesses and facilities on tribal or trust lands, without being bound by state regulations or facing sanctions for doing so. However, the tribe lacks authority to impose a comprehensive regulatory scheme over all electrical distribution within reservation boundaries, including on fee lands or involving non-Indians. The reasoning drew on federal Indian law precedents limiting tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers (such as Montana v. United States) and noted that the specific power to choose a supplier for tribal properties takes precedence over state law in this context, while broader regulation does not.
The case involved four consolidated appeals by family farmers whose Chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization plans had been confirmed but were later dismissed by the bankruptcy court for failure to pay trustee fees on direct payments made to impaired secured creditors. The district court reversed the dismissals, ruling that the confirmed plans permitted debtors to make such direct payments without incurring trustee fees. The court's reasoning centered on the explicit plan language allowing direct disbursements without fees, the agreement of creditors and the trustee to the confirmed plans, and the impropriety of retroactively requiring fees after completion of payments under those plans.
The case involved an appeal by the Werners from a bankruptcy court order determining that a judgment they held against the Hofmanns was dischargeable in the Hofmanns' bankruptcy. The judgment stemmed from annual agreements for placing cattle on the Hofmanns' land, where the state court awarded the Werners about $33,000 based on contract law for dead or missing cows and calves, despite arguments for fraud and conversion. The district court reviewed the record and found no errors of law or clearly erroneous factual findings by the bankruptcy court, affirming the decision that the judgment did not fall under categories of non-dischargeable claims and dismissing the appeal.
This case involved the Board of Managers of the Bottineau County Water Resource District seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regarding a cease-and-desist order issued for unauthorized discharge of dredged material into wetlands during a flood control project in North Dakota under the Clean Water Act's Section 404 permit process. The Board argued it was not responsible for the violation by its contractor and sought review of the order and the permit application. After the Corps granted a permit, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the cease-and-desist order did not constitute final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act prior to enforcement actions or penalties, consistent with precedents from other circuits. The court found no independent basis for jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act and denied related motions as moot or unnecessary.
This case concerned a challenge by energy companies to the Three Affiliated Tribes' authority to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production and a Native American employment preference requirement on privately owned fee lands in the Northeast Quadrant of the Fort Berthold Reservation, which remained within the reservation's exterior boundaries under prior rulings despite being mostly non-Indian owned. The court held that the employment preference ordinance applies only to contracts where the tribe is a party or guarantor, but the severance tax on minerals beneath patented fee lands is invalid because it exceeds the tribes' inherent sovereignty and is preempted by the state's ad valorem taxing authority over such lands. The court dismissed the action against the tribe, its business council, and tax commission on sovereign immunity grounds but permitted it to proceed against individual defendants, and declined to require exhaustion of tribal remedies as the dispute was not an internal tribal controversy.
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