William C. Pierce

William Beason Morrison was convicted of second degree murder in Polk County and, nearly three years later, filed a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence on grounds that he had been denied a speedy trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion, and the District Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court held that the speedy-trial issue could have been raised on direct appeal and was therefore barred in post-conviction proceedings, while the ineffective-counsel claim was unsupported by specific factual allegations and failed to show gross incompetence that eliminated a substantial defense.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was an appeal from a final judgment dissolving the marriage of Roger and Winifred Harloff, which required the husband to pay weekly child support and alimony, transfer his interest in the marital home as lump-sum alimony, maintain health insurance for the three minor children, pay a portion of income over $5,000 as additional alimony, and irrevocably change the beneficiaries on his life insurance policies to the three minor sons. The husband challenged only the life-insurance beneficiary requirement, arguing it lacked any time limit. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that a court may properly require a divorced parent to maintain life insurance as security for child-support obligations, with the provision subject to later modification once a child reaches majority or becomes self-supporting. The court found the remaining issues on appeal to be without merit.

family law

This case involved a lawsuit by Evah Biel against R.E. Rutland for injuries she sustained when she tripped over his dog while attending a church function at his home. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on liability in Biel's favor under Florida Statute section 767.01, which imposes liability on dog owners for damages caused by their dogs. The appellate court reversed that ruling, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to assumption of risk and proximate causation because Biel had seen the dog before stepping backward. The court also held that the statute does not apply where the dog takes no affirmative or aggressive action toward the injured party.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Preston Chester's appeal from a conviction in the Hillsborough County Criminal Court of Record for breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony. Chester argued that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to present alibi testimony at trial. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in excluding the testimony because Chester failed to comply with the notice requirements of CrPR 3.200. The court also noted that the proposed testimony was based on hearsay rather than personal knowledge and that a claim of inadequate representation by counsel could not be raised for the first time on direct appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In this negligence case, Willie Lee Moore sued the City of St. Petersburg after falling into a sinkhole in an alley behind his home, which he alleged resulted from the city's failure to maintain its sewer system in good repair, causing erosion and a cave-in. The trial court entered judgment for the city notwithstanding a jury verdict in Moore's favor. The appellate court affirmed, holding that operation of a sewage disposal system is a governmental function for which the city enjoys immunity from tort liability absent a direct transaction or confrontation between the plaintiff and city agents or employees, and that no such privity or special duty was shown. The court also noted the absence of evidence that the city had actual or constructive notice of the defect, though it emphasized that governmental immunity is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time rather than as an affirmative defense.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In White v. State, three defendants were convicted of rape in Florida, with one pleading guilty and receiving a 10-year sentence while the other two were sentenced to 20 and 30 years after trial. They appealed, arguing that the trial violated Florida's speedy trial rule by occurring after 180 days from their arrest. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendants' own requests for continuances and extensions tolled the running of the speedy trial period, bringing the trial within the required timeframe.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Robert Caivano was charged with both possession of cocaine and sale of cocaine based on the same April 1971 transaction. He was convicted on both counts and received two concurrent three-year sentences. The appellate court held that the charges represented two aspects of a single transaction, so only one sentence could be imposed for the highest offense. The court affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with that rule. Other issues raised on appeal were rejected as meritless.

criminal law

The case involved John Walsingham's conviction for manslaughter after he accidentally shot and killed his five-year-old son with a rifle in his home. The court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding the evidence insufficient to prove culpable negligence under Florida Statute § 782.07. Walsingham had warned his children to remain in the living room while he examined his new gun in the bedroom, the weapon discharged unexpectedly across his legs or hands with no evidence of reckless handling, and the son had followed his grandfather into the hallway. Although Walsingham had been drinking, the court held that intoxication alone could not establish wanton or reckless conduct.

criminal lawguns

The case involved a claim by Lester Friedman against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for uninsured motorist coverage under a policy issued to Jeanne Veenschoten, whose car Friedman was driving when it collided with another vehicle on January 30, 1972, resulting in his injuries. State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the policy's stated coverage period ended on January 8, 1972, prior to the accident. The trial court denied the motion, but the District Court of Appeal granted certiorari and quashed the denial, ruling that the policy provided no coverage for the accident. The court reasoned that the policy's clear and unambiguous language fixed the coverage period from January 8, 1971, to January 8, 1972, and that neither the February 8, 1971 countersignature date nor Florida Statute § 624.0224 altered that duration.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this Florida divorce case, ex-husband Richard Morris sought to end weekly alimony payments of $25 after his ex-wife's death, arguing the original 1969 property settlement agreement created periodic alimony that terminated upon death rather than a fixed lump-sum award. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss the executrix's contempt motion and ruled the award was lump-sum alimony of $5,200 payable in 208 installments, requiring continued payments. The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the award was not lump-sum alimony because the total amount was not fixed and was contingent on the ex-wife's remarriage, so it did not vest as a property right that survived her death. The court concluded Morris's motion to dismiss should have been granted.

family lawproperty

This case involved an appeal by Donald Lee Cook of his conviction for armed robbery after he entered a convenience store, pointed a shotgun at the cashier, and took money. Cook did not deny committing the acts but claimed insanity due to a prior head injury causing psychomotor epilepsy and blackouts, supported by testimony from two psychiatrists; the State rebutted with its own expert who found no evidence of epilepsy or psychosis and concluded Cook knew right from wrong. The trial court submitted the sanity issue to the jury under the M'Naghten Rule, which found him sane, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that conflicting evidence created a jury question, the presumption of sanity was overcome by sufficient testimony, and there was no basis to abandon the established insanity test or find fundamental error in not directing a verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

This 1973 Florida appellate decision arose from a divorce case in which the trial court awarded the wife attorneys' fees that included $1,000 for services performed during a prior appeal, plus $3,000 for trial-level work, and denied costs for two depositions. The District Court of Appeal held that the $1,000 appellate fee award was improper because the wife had not filed the required motion in the appellate court under the applicable rules, and therefore the trial court lacked authority to award such fees. It affirmed the $3,000 trial-court fee, finding that the amount was supported by the record, the trial judge's familiarity with the case, and competent evidence despite the expert witness's limited review. The court also remanded for the trial judge to reconsider taxing the deposition costs, noting that such costs may be allowed if the depositions served a useful purpose even if not introduced at trial.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between homeowner Calvin Merkle and contractor Rice Construction Company over a written agreement to build a residence that included a clause requiring arbitration of any disagreements. Merkle sued to have the arbitration provision declared null and void, alleging the contract was invalid because the architect who prepared the plans was unregistered and the drawings were not proper architectural plans. Rice moved to dismiss the complaint, citing the Florida Arbitration Code. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Florida Statutes Chapter 682 expressly validates and enforces written arbitration agreements in contracts, requiring disputes to be resolved through the agreed arbitration process rather than litigation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Wade Kilgore, who was charged in separate informations with second-degree murder and carrying a concealed firearm. The trial court, without any motion from the parties, ordered the two cases tried jointly before a single jury over the defendant's objection and later refused to recess the trial after defense counsel's young son was injured, forcing proceedings to continue late into the night. The court also denied a requested jury instruction on self-defense. The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the convictions, holding that consolidation of separate criminal charges requires a proper motion by a party and a court order under the applicable procedural rule, and that compelling the trial to proceed under the circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion that deprived the defendant of a fair trial with effective counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joseph Waller, Jr., a civil rights activist who was convicted in municipal court for violating St. Petersburg city ordinances against destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the peace after ripping a mural from City Hall. He was later prosecuted and convicted in state court for grand larceny based on the same acts. The Florida District Court of Appeal initially affirmed the state conviction, but the U.S. Supreme Court remanded for consideration of double jeopardy. On remand and further proceedings, the trial court convicted Waller of grand larceny, and this court affirmed, reasoning that the municipal ordinance violations were not necessarily included offenses within the state grand larceny charge and thus did not bar the state prosecution under double jeopardy principles.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a car accident in which John Wilder sued Gladys Wright and her insurer, Colonial Penn, for negligence and sought attorney's fees under Florida Statute § 627.428 after obtaining a jury verdict in his favor. The trial court denied the fee request, and Wilder appealed. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that the statute—which awards fees when judgment is rendered against an insurer in favor of an insured or named beneficiary—does not apply to a direct tort liability action where insurance coverage is not disputed. The court reasoned that the statute's purpose is to discourage insurers from contesting valid claims by their own insureds and to reimburse successful insureds for enforcement costs, not to provide fees in third-party negligence suits on the merits of liability. The opinion distinguished prior cases that involved coverage disputes or assignments of policy rights.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved an appeal by the executor of Ruth DeWitts estate from a partial summary judgment granted to Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company on the issue of punitive damages in a negligence action, leaving only compensatory damages for trial. The appellate court first resolved a jurisdictional question, holding that a motion for rehearing of a partial summary judgment tolls the time for filing an appeal under the applicable Florida rules of civil procedure. On the merits, the court initially affirmed the trial courts ruling that there was insufficient evidence of gross or reckless conduct to support punitive damages as a matter of law. Upon rehearing, however, the court reversed that portion of its decision, concluding that the evidence raised a jury question on punitive damages and remanding for further proceedings consistent with a recent precedent.

proceduretorts & liability

In Bouden v. Walker, the dispute centered on the proper calculation of commissions under a one-year employment contract between Rosemary Bouden and John Walker, specifically how to deduct a five percent freight allowance from gross profits before or after dividing the profit by three for Walker's one-third share. The trial court awarded Walker the sums due under his preferred interpretation, and the District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed this judgment. The appellate court reasoned that the contract language was ambiguous, that such ambiguity should be construed against the party who drafted the contract (Bouden), and that the construction should be reasonable and equitable to the parties, rejecting Bouden's method as unjust.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Edward Cawthon suing court-appointed psychiatrists and a layperson for alleged negligence in a cursory mental competency examination that led to an incorrect incompetency adjudication and resulting damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds that court-appointed examiners are immune from negligence actions arising from judicial proceedings and that the pleading did not allege intentional infliction of emotional distress. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that absolute privilege or immunity applies to actions from judicial proceedings, including those by court-appointed competency committees, and noting that the complaint did not claim the examiners failed to conduct any examination or did so for an improper purpose.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Worley v. Phillips, attorneys Phillips and Rambo sued their former client Worley for $1,500 in fees after he discharged them without cause while handling a corporate dissolution matter under a 20% contingency fee agreement. The attorneys had performed services including filing a complaint and participating in settlement talks before the discharge, and they later sued in a separate action without filing a charging lien in the underlying case. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict for the attorneys, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that under Florida law, the attorneys could recover in an independent suit even though the contingency had not fully occurred during their representation, as the contingency occurred before they filed their fee action, and the absence of a charging lien did not bar the separate proceeding. The jury's finding of wrongful discharge was supported by competent evidence.

procedure