Howard Francis Corcoran

In Da Silva v. Sanders, plaintiffs who had guaranteed a loan to their corporation sued the SBA after the agency refused to release its lien on their home following nonpayment on a cashier's check issued by NBW; the SBA cross-claimed against NBW for wrongful dishonor. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether, under the District of Columbia's Uniform Commercial Code, NBW could refuse to honor its cashier's check based on fraud or lack of consideration in the underlying transaction when the payee (SBA) was an innocent third party. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and examined two lines of authority on cashier's checks—one treating them as ordinary negotiable instruments subject to personal defenses and the other viewing them as cash equivalents backed by the bank's own credit—while also considering equitable principles under UCC § 1-103. It noted that the case did not involve direct fraud by the payee on the issuing bank and highlighted policy considerations favoring the reliability of cashier's checks for innocent holders.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a former Army soldier who was discharged under less than honorable conditions in 1973 following AWOL charges and administrative proceedings, and who later sought judicial review after multiple unsuccessful applications to the Army Discharge Review Board and Army Board for Correction of Military Records for an upgrade. The plaintiff filed suit in 1983 alleging constitutional and regulatory violations in the original discharge process as well as improper denial of his upgrade requests under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted the Secretary of the Army's motion to dismiss, treated as one for summary judgment, holding that all claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The core reasoning was that the cause of action for the 1973 discharge accrued at that time, more than six years had elapsed before filing despite intervening administrative reviews, and the plaintiff had not yet exhausted remedies before the ABCMR.

procedurefederal power

The case involved a negligence lawsuit filed by plaintiff Nellie Sklagen against Greater Southeast Community Hospital after she slipped and fell in her hospital room in 1982, alleging improper maintenance of a wet bathroom floor that caused her back injury. The defendant moved to compel the plaintiff to sign a medical authorization form waiving the physician-patient privilege and allowing access to her pre-incident treatment records from various physicians and hospitals. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff had waived the privilege by placing her physical condition at issue in the lawsuit and by selectively producing only post-incident records. The court reasoned that it would be unfair to permit the plaintiff to shield potentially damaging pre-incident materials while disclosing favorable ones, and that the authorization merely facilitated informal ex parte interviews with witnesses outside the formal discovery rules.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Heffez sued WMATA, two Metro Transit Police officers, and a subway station attendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus injunctive relief, alleging verbal and physical assaults, unlawful arrest, and Fifth Amendment violations during incidents in August and September 1982, with claims brought under common law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. WMATA moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b), arguing that Section 80 of the WMATA Compact barred common-law tort claims for governmental functions like police operations and that the Eleventh Amendment barred constitutional claims. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing common-law tort claims against WMATA based on the officers' actions because operating the transit police is a governmental function under the Compact, but allowing claims based on the station attendant's proprietary functions; it also dismissed all § 1983 claims against WMATA on the ground that WMATA is not a suable "person" under the statute as an arm of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court further dismissed certain common-law claims against the station attendant individually and specified which counts remained viable against which defendants.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned Impro Products' application for attorneys' fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act after it prevailed in an earlier suit against the Secretary of Agriculture. In the underlying action, the company challenged a 1960s government test of its animal biologic product and a journal article describing the test results as false and misleading, ultimately obtaining an injunction barring further distribution of the article without corrections. The court granted the fee request, holding that the government's litigation position was not substantially justified because the article contained inaccuracies and the agency delayed raising defenses until late in the proceedings. The award was reduced to exclude time spent on unnecessary or redundant work and to conform hourly rates to the Act's guidelines.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Nicaraguan citizens, U.S. members of Congress, and Florida residents suing President Reagan and other federal officials over alleged U.S.-sponsored paramilitary raids and training activities in Nicaragua and Florida. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated international law, the U.S. Constitution's war powers clause, statutes like the War Powers Resolution and Boland Amendment, and state nuisance law, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the entire action, holding that the claims presented a non-justiciable political question. The core reasoning was that the dispute raised significant factual and policy issues lacking judicially discoverable or manageable standards, and resolving it would improperly interfere with the Executive and Legislative branches' authority over foreign policy and national security under separation of powers principles.

federal powercivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Foster, defendant Bobby T. Foster filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his convictions for possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, possession of a firearm by a felon, and related offenses, arguing that the evidence was obtained through an illegal detention by a WMATA transit police officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a timely suppression motion. The court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the officer lacked statutory authority to detain Foster outside Metro property and that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, rendering the seizure of the shotgun a fruit of the illegal detention. The court concluded that the failure to move to suppress the evidence constituted ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment, requiring vacatur of the conviction and sentence. The opinion analyzes the officer's actions, the scope of WMATA police authority under the Compact, and the application of Fourth Amendment standards to the facts.

criminal lawproceduregunscivil rights

This case involves a lawsuit by two plaintiff associations—the Unit Owners Association and the Tenant Association—against a developer and its partners over alleged defects and failures to rehabilitate a residential property converted from apartments to condominiums in Washington, D.C. The plaintiffs asserted five counts, including breach of contract, negligence, breach of implied and express warranties, and statutory warranties under D.C. Code. Defendants moved for a more definite statement on certain allegations and to dismiss Counts II, III, and V (as to one plaintiff) under Rule 12. The court denied the motion for a more definite statement, finding the complaint provided sufficient notice under federal pleading standards, and denied dismissal of Counts II and III, allowing negligence and implied warranty claims to proceed based on duties arising from the parties' relationship. It granted dismissal of Count V only as to the Tenant Association, which conceded it lacked standing under the statute.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a minority-owned architectural and engineering firm suing the United States International Development-Cooperation Agency and several of its officials for alleged racial discrimination in the administration and termination of a government contract for services in Guinea, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Thirteenth Amendment, and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred claims against the agency, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants and that service of process was insufficient, among other procedural deficiencies.

civil rightsfederal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a class action by Indian tribes and individuals holding lands in trust or restricted status, seeking to compel federal officials to comply with Section 2 of Public Law 96-217, which required the Secretary of the Interior, after consulting the Attorney General, to submit legislative proposals to Congress by June 30, 1981, for resolving pre-1966 money damage claims deemed inappropriate for litigation. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had identified many such claims but had neither pursued litigation nor submitted the required proposals, leaving the claims at risk of extinguishment under the statute of limitations extended to December 31, 1982. The court certified the class, rejected the government's motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and granted permanent injunctive relief ordering the defendants to prepare and submit the legislative proposals. The core reasoning was that the statute imposed a mandatory, non-discretionary duty on the executive branch that had been violated, causing concrete injury to the plaintiff class, and that judicial review was available under the Administrative Procedure Act without implicating political question or other justiciability barriers.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involved a former employee suing his employer for allegedly violating the collective bargaining agreement by terminating his employment after he did not return from leave. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding the action time-barred. The plaintiff had pursued a grievance through the four-step process, which was denied in November 1980, but filed suit in May 1982. The applicable statute of limitations for such claims is the 90-day period for challenging arbitration awards under D.C. law, which began running when the grievance process concluded, even though arbitration was not available due to the plaintiff's short tenure.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Miller v. Barry, the plaintiff sought damages from a D.C. police officer and municipal defendants after a brief arrest and detention stemming from a traffic violation, claiming violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Bivens action. The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction, reasoning that the constitutional claims were not wholly insubstantial or frivolous and thus jurisdiction exists to decide the merits. It granted dismissal as to Mayor Barry and the District of Columbia, holding that respondeat superior liability is unavailable against municipalities or supervisors in either § 1983 or Bivens claims.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved two employees of the United States Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home who sued the agency for breaching their union's collective bargaining agreement by refusing to process grievances over a discharge and a suspension. Plaintiffs sought monetary relief and an order compelling use of the agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) for contract disputes involving the federal government. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 creates an exclusive scheme for federal-sector labor relations, with grievances resolved through the Federal Labor Relations Authority and arbitration, and no role for district courts. The absence of any jurisdictional grant to district courts, in contrast to the private-sector Labor Management Relations Act, showed Congress's intent to bar such actions. Plaintiffs could not circumvent this framework by framing the claim as an ordinary contract suit.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a union (Local 639) seeking to enforce an arbitrator's subpoenas in D.C. Superior Court under the District of Columbia Uniform Arbitration Act against non-parties (including Seagram Sales Corp.) to obtain information about a liquor company's business termination and possible succession, in connection with a pending grievance under a master collective bargaining agreement and a related NLRB unfair labor practice charge. The defendants removed the action to federal district court, arguing that the underlying labor dispute implicated federal law under the National Labor Relations Act and Section 301 of the LMRA. The court granted the union's motion to remand, holding that the complaint on its face raised only a state-law claim for subpoena enforcement and presented no federal question, that preemption by the NLRB was an affirmative defense insufficient to create removal jurisdiction, and that Section 301 did not apply because the defendants were not parties to the collective bargaining agreement or arbitration.

labor & employmentprocedure

In this case, a construction safety inspector sued his employer and others involved in the Washington Metro project after contracting silicosis from exposure to silica dust, alleging willful, wanton, reckless, and negligent misconduct in violation of safety regulations, and seeking punitive damages in addition to an earlier $118,000 award under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). The employer moved to dismiss, arguing that the LHWCA’s exclusive liability provision in § 905(a) barred any further common-law tort action against it. The court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that the Act provides the sole remedy for covered work-related injuries. The core reasoning was that § 905(a) bars tort claims unless the employer acted with specific intent to injure the employee, so allegations of gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct fall short, and claims for punitive damages are likewise precluded by the statute’s exclusivity.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case concerns a contract dispute arising from the construction of an extension to the Dirksen Senate Office Building, where subcontractor Vermont Marble Company (VMC) abandoned its stonework obligations roughly 20 months into the project and sued prime contractor Baltimore Contractors, Inc. (BCI) for a declaratory judgment and quantum meruit recovery, asserting a right to rescind due to delays in site preparation. BCI defended on the basis of the subcontract terms, including a rider that replaced the standard no-damage-for-delay clause and required VMC to submit specific delay claims for transmission to the Architect of the Capitol. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court analyzed the prime contract milestones, the negotiated subcontract provisions on delays and suspensions, the factual timeline showing the site eventually became ready for VMC's work, and VMC's failure to properly pursue contractual remedies before abandoning the project. The court determined that VMC had no valid basis to rescind and was in breach, while leaving the amount of damages owed to BCI for trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Reddy Communications, Inc. (RCI) seeking to enjoin Environmental Action Foundation (EAF) from using its registered service mark 'Reddy Kilowatt' in EAF's publications critical of electric utilities. The court denied the injunction, finding no service mark infringement under the Lanham Act. The reasoning centered on evidence that the mark had come to represent the utilities and electricity to the public rather than RCI's advertising services, and there was no competition between the parties that would cause confusion.

business & regulatory

The case concerned a defendant stopped for an illegible temporary license tag on a rented vehicle in Washington, D.C., who was arrested after police observed an unlicensed pistol in the glove compartment during the stop. The vehicle was impounded because the tags were invalid and could not lawfully remain on the street, leading to a standard inventory search of the car, including its locked trunk, that revealed additional loaded weapons and heroin inside a flight bag. The court held the initial stop and arrest lawful, the impoundment justified under local law, and the inventory search proper under precedents such as South Dakota v. Opperman to protect property and avoid disputes, while addressing the scope of searching closed containers as consistent with the caretaking function given the facts. The opinion did not rely on safety concerns for the search justification.

criminal lawprocedureguns

In this consolidated FOIA action, plaintiffs sought disclosure of all NSA records pertaining to them after exhausting administrative remedies. The NSA moved for summary judgment, asserting exemptions under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for properly classified national security information and (b)(3) in conjunction with Pub. L. No. 86-36 to protect intelligence sources, methods, and agency functions. After reviewing detailed public and in camera affidavits describing the documents and the harms of disclosure, the court determined that further in camera review of the records themselves was unnecessary and that the materials logically fell within both exemptions. The court therefore granted the NSA's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion.

civil rightsfederal power

This case concerns a federal employee who filed a Title VII complaint alleging race and age discrimination in promotions, prevailed at the administrative level with a retroactive promotion and back pay, and then sued in district court seeking attorney's fees for work performed both administratively and in the lawsuit. The court addressed whether Title VII permits fee awards for administrative victories and, if so, whether the agency or only a district court may grant them. Relying on precedents such as Fischer v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation and Parker v. Califano, along with sovereign immunity rules and legislative history, the opinion analyzed the language of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(k) and 2000e-16 to determine the availability and forum for such fees.

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal powerprocedure