The case concerned the termination of the plaintiff's SSI disability benefits by the Secretary, which the court had previously reversed on summary judgment because the plaintiff qualified as a 'grandfatheree' under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(E) and the Secretary had not shown material medical improvement or prior error as required by Finnegan v. Matthews. Plaintiff then moved for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) and (b). The court held that fees are available even for pro bono representation because Congress intended awards based on market rates without regard to the actual fee arrangement, and that the Secretary's position was not substantially justified (and was taken in bad faith) due to conscious disregard of controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. It therefore granted fees under both subsections and awarded $2,925 while denying expenses.
The case Swift Transportation, Inc. v. John involved a prior district court decision and injunction at 546 F.Supp. 1185. After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mandate remanding the matter on grounds that the appeal had become moot, the district court acted on that directive. It therefore vacated its earlier ruling and dissolved the injunction. The reasoning rests solely on following the appellate mandate due to mootness of the appeal.
The EEOC sued Borden's, Inc. under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after the company closed its Phoenix dairy and denied severance pay to fourteen employees who were at least fifty-five years old and eligible for retirement under the terms of renewed collective bargaining agreements. The agreements' severance formula excluded those eligible for normal or early retirement pensions, and no employees over fifty-five received severance pay. The court granted summary judgment to the EEOC on a disparate impact theory, finding that the facially neutral retirement-eligibility criterion fell more harshly on older workers, while rejecting a discriminatory treatment claim and a bona fide employee benefit plan defense. It awarded the affected employees the severance amounts plus prejudgment interest but denied injunctive relief because the dairy operation had permanently closed.
This case concerns whether the Navajo Tribal Court has civil jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants Swift Transportation and its employee in a personal injury and property damage suit arising from a 1980 car accident on a U.S. highway within the Navajo Reservation. The non-Indian plaintiffs filed a federal action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the tribal court proceedings, after which the tribal defendants moved to dismiss on jurisdictional and sovereign immunity grounds. The court denied the motions to dismiss and issued a preliminary injunction, holding that the tribe lacks inherent sovereignty to assert civil jurisdiction over non-members for such incidents. The ruling was based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, limits on tribal powers under precedents such as Montana v. United States, and the absence of any congressional delegation of authority.
This case involved private car companies challenging Arizona's 1981 property tax assessments on their rail cars, claiming they violated the federal 4R Act by discriminating against rail transportation property compared to other commercial and industrial property. The court decided that the assessments did not violate the Act, denying relief to the plaintiffs and ordering payment of the taxes plus interest. The reasoning was that Arizona's statutory scheme, using a weighted mean of assessment ratios from other property classes, resulted in ratios for rail property that did not exceed the others by at least 5%, and this method was appropriate for a de jure discrimination claim under the Act.
The case involved a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Charlie Lee Evans after his state convictions for rape and kidnapping were affirmed on appeal. Evans claimed he was denied due process because the trial court failed to hold a hearing on his competency to waive counsel despite evidence raising doubts and because the record did not show a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The court granted the petition, concluding that substantial evidence of potential incompetence required a sua sponte competency hearing under Ninth Circuit standards adapted from cases like Sieling v. Eyman and that the record lacked sufficient information showing Evans understood the nature of the charges, possible penalties, and risks of self-representation as required by precedents like Johnson v. Zerbst.
