The case involved plaintiffs Wilfred Smyly and Smyly Hyundai suing Hyundai Motor America over disputes arising from 1986 and 1988 automobile dealership agreements. The central issue was Hyundai's motion to strike the plaintiffs' jury demand based on a jury waiver clause in the contract's standard terms, which were incorporated by reference but not reviewed by Smyly. The court allowed the motion and struck the jury demand. It reasoned that the waiver provision was clearly set out in the contract with a table of contents reference, that Smyly was a sophisticated businessman who intentionally disregarded the standard terms despite knowing they existed and were non-negotiable, and that the agreement was a voluntary bilateral contract provision rather than an unknowing unilateral waiver of a constitutional right.
This case concerned whether net proceeds from a maritime lien recovery action by a defunct Texas corporation, New Terminal Stevedoring, should be credited by the IRS against a responsible officer's personal liability under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 for unpaid withheld employment taxes or instead applied to the corporation's other tax obligations. The court held that the funds must be allocated to reduce the § 6672 trust-fund liability. The core reasoning was that the officer had discovered and preserved the funds through litigation that would otherwise have been lost to junior creditors, creating a higher equity that permitted the court to direct allocation as justice between the parties required, without regard to the voluntary or involuntary character of the payment.
This opinion consolidates three cases under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) and Massachusetts law concerning the right to reimbursement for private school tuition and expenses incurred by parents of handicapped children while administrative and judicial review proceedings determine the appropriateness of a school committee's IEP and placement. The court held that the federal de novo review standard under EAHCA section 1415(e)(2) must govern to prevent inconsistencies with state review, leading to dismissal of pendent state-law claims. It addressed interim payment issues by evaluating irreparable harm for stays or injunctions and noted that ultimate reimbursement depends on a trial court's finding of whether the proposed public IEP was appropriate, as occurred in the Burlington case where the town prevailed after trial.
This case concerned applications for attorney's fees filed by the original plaintiffs and intervenors in a constitutional challenge to a Massachusetts statute mandating parental or judicial consent for minors seeking abortions. The applications under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 were submitted 8 and 30 months after the Supreme Court denied rehearing on its affirmance of the judgment in plaintiffs' favor. The court addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss these applications as untimely or barred by laches, as well as for lack of prosecution by the intervenors. The court concluded that the substantial delays in filing and pursuing the fee requests prejudiced the defendants and warranted dismissal, considering factors such as faded memories and the absence of ongoing negotiations.
The case concerned a dispute between homeowners Allen and Cynthia Morse and their mortgage lender and checking account provider, Mutual Federal Savings & Loan, arising from the bank's issuance of cashier's checks against the plaintiffs' personal checks that later bounced, the bank's addition of the resulting debt to the mortgage without agreement, and its subsequent freezing of the joint checking account, which led to dishonored checks. Based on special jury verdicts on liability, the court found that the bank had no right to attach the mortgage security for Allen's sole debt, that a later promissory note signed by both plaintiffs was valid under Massachusetts law, and that the account freeze constituted an attempted set-off with procedural shortcomings. The court further addressed related state-law claims, including under the Massachusetts consumer protection statute (Chapter 93A), determining damages and liability issues while noting that certain federal claims lacked substance and that pendent jurisdiction had been retained over the state matters.
This case involved claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and Suits in Admiralty Act alleging that the Coast Guard negligently delayed starting and improperly conducted a search and rescue operation after the plaintiffs' boat capsized near Minots Light on July 28, 1974, leading to one death and injuries. The court dismissed the complaints after a bench trial on liability. The core reasoning was that the Coast Guard had no actionable duty to search sooner because the initial report indicated no apparent danger given the calm conditions and likely minor mechanical issue, the search began promptly once misinformation about inexperience and drinking was provided, the search did not worsen the situation, and internal Coast Guard manuals do not define a public standard of care.
