The case involved an employee suing his employer for breach of contract after the employer refused to approve a $46,000 lump-sum workers' compensation settlement negotiated by the insurer, and also challenging the constitutionality of the statute requiring employer approval of such settlements. The trial court dismissed the entire suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal of the breach of contract claim on grounds that it was a workers' compensation matter within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Office of Workers' Compensation hearing officers, but reversed on the constitutional issue, holding that only courts have authority to decide the constitutionality of statutes.
In this case, plaintiff Johnnie Mae Townsend and her husband sued Westinghouse Elevator Corporation and building owner Arkla after Townsend allegedly suffered back injuries when an elevator floor dropped slightly as she entered it at her workplace in 1987. The plaintiffs asserted claims under theories of strict liability and negligence, alleging a defect in the elevator or improper maintenance, while the defendants maintained that the incident resulted from normal elevator leveling functions. The district court rejected the claims after finding no unreasonable risk of harm or negligence, and the Court of Appeal of Louisiana affirmed that judgment. The appellate court reasoned that expert testimony established the elevator's movement was within normal operational limits of three inches, lay witness accounts were unreliable, and the circumstances did not support application of res ipsa loquitur or indicate any breach of duty by the defendants.
In Dubin v. Dubin, a former husband sought to cancel a judgment lien recorded against him in favor of his ex-wife following his Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge. The judgment stemmed from damages awarded to the ex-wife for impairment to her credit and emotional harm caused by the husband's failure to timely pay debts as required by their divorce judgment's alimony provisions. The trial court denied cancellation, classifying the judgment as arising from a tort proceeding involving willful negligence. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the underlying obligation was a passive breach of contract rather than a tort, making the judgment eligible for cancellation under Louisiana law after bankruptcy discharge.
This case involved real estate brokers Lally Lally suing homeowners Mr. and Mrs. Dossat for a sales commission after the owners rejected a purchase offer obtained under a written listing agreement for property in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. The trial court dismissed the suit on an exception of no cause of action, finding the contract invalid because it was not signed by the brokers and because the commission rate was uncertain. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that the agreement was an employment contract for services that need not be signed by the agents and that acceptance could be shown by their performance, while the stated commission rate of the regular 4-5% was sufficiently definite to support the claim. The decision relied on Civil Code provisions regarding implied consent and precedent distinguishing service contracts from those affecting title to real estate.
This case involves a workers' compensation claim by Myrtle R. Jacobson, who was injured in a fall while working as a welder for Higgins Industries, resulting in alleged permanent disability from a dislocated coccyx. The insurance carrier paid compensation for 50 weeks before stopping payments on the ground of full recovery and denied further liability. The trial court awarded maximum compensation for 400 weeks at $20 per week (subject to credit for amounts already paid), and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning that medical testimony established the plaintiff's inability to work as a welder and that her refusal of coccyx removal surgery was not unreasonable in light of her prior unsuccessful operation and expert testimony on surgical risks.
This case involved a beneficiary's lawsuit against an industrial life insurance company to recover the face value of a policy on the life of the insured, who died from syphilitic heart disease (a venereal disease) two years after the policy was issued. The insurer denied the claim based on a policy provision excluding coverage for death from venereal diseases. The trial court ruled for the beneficiary, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the insurer was not liable. The court reasoned that the incontestability clause specifically referenced exceptions for limited diseases, the exclusion for venereal diseases was stated clearly and without ambiguity immediately following the clause, and prior precedents barring similar defenses did not apply because those policies presented ambiguities not present here.