This case involves Continental Airlines suing travel agency Mundo Travel Corp. and its CEO for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation after the defendants allegedly engaged in 288 instances of prohibited 'point-beyond' or 'throwaway' ticketing that violated Continental's fare policies. The defendants, acting as Continental's agents under an Airlines Reporting Corporation Agent Reporting Agreement (ARA), moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the ARA's terms did not incorporate or enforce the separate fare policies as contractual obligations and that certain fraud claims could proceed independently while others failed to state a cognizable claim under Virginia law chosen by the parties. The decision rested on the complaint's factual allegations, the plain language of the ARA limiting its scope to ARC traffic documents, and the distinction between contractual duties and tort claims for misrepresentation.
This case concerns a contract dispute over an Option Agreement granting Pappas (later assigned to plaintiff CFM) the right to purchase a television station license or related interests from defendant MTC, which had acquired rights under a promissory note subject to FCC ownership rules prohibiting common control of multiple stations in one area. The court addressed plaintiff’s motion to strike the designation of MTC’s expert witness on FCC matters and to exclude his testimony and report. The court granted the motion in part by excluding the expert’s opinions on legal conclusions, such as whether entities may lawfully hold ownership interests, how FCC factors apply to the facts, or how the FCC would likely decide any issues, because such testimony invades the court’s role as the sole arbiter of law. The court denied the motion in part by allowing the expert’s non-legal testimony explaining FCC administrative processes and practices, finding it potentially relevant to issues like specific performance and that relevance could not be fully assessed pretrial. The motions to strike the expert designation and report entirely were denied.
This case involves the shooting death of Eric Foster by Fresno police officer Russell Cornelison after Foster fled following a series of armed robberies in which he was identified as the suspect driving a white truck. Plaintiffs, Foster's parents and minor children, brought claims including under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force and related state-law claims against the city and officers. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine dispute of material fact on the constitutional claims because the officer's actions in releasing a police dog and firing shots were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the suspect's non-compliance, flight, and the known risk he was armed. The court also dismissed derivative claims such as negligent supervision and noted that excessive force allegations must be analyzed under the Fourth rather than Fourteenth Amendment.
In this case, pro se petitioner Gregory Kevin English sought to quash an IRS summons issued to his credit union for financial records related to his 2001 and 2003 tax liabilities, while the government moved to dismiss the petition and enforce the summons. The court dismissed the named IRS agent as respondent and substituted the United States as the proper party, denied the petition to quash, and granted enforcement of the summons. The reasoning centered on the petitioner's failure to properly serve process on the government, the summons meeting the Powell factors for good-faith enforcement (legitimate purpose, relevance, records not already in IRS possession, and no criminal referral), and the petitioner's lack of opposition to the government's showing. The magistrate judge's findings were adopted after de novo review.
The case arose after a homeowner's property was destroyed by fire, leading to disputes with Allstate Indemnity Co. over policy limits for reconstruction, contents, and temporary living expenses, as well as alleged misrepresentations by the insurer and its agent about consolidating coverages. The plaintiff sued both Allstate (for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and negligent misrepresentation) and agent Anderson (for breach of contract and negligence) in state court. The court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss all claims against Anderson, holding that he was fraudulently joined because, as an employee-agent rather than an independent broker or dual agent with a special relationship to the insured, California law provided no basis for liability against him. With the non-diverse defendant removed, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand and retained the case under diversity jurisdiction.
This case concerned a Subaru franchisee bringing a class action against the national distributor, alleging that compensation rates for parts used in warranty repairs violated California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and constituted unlawful or unfair business practices under the Unfair Competition Law. The court had previously dismissed the Song-Beverly claims after determining that the distributor had designated and authorized the plaintiff as an independent service and repair facility through its conduct and contracts. On the remaining UCL claims, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary adjudication, finding no unlawful conduct because the distributor's warranty service contracts included good faith discounts on parts reimbursement as permitted by the Act. The court reasoned that this statutory safe harbor for compliant contractual arrangements precluded liability under the UCL, and the plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing the discounts were not made in good faith.