Walter Early Craig

This case was a medical malpractice suit brought by the plaintiff against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that two sympathectomy procedures performed at a military hospital were unnecessary and caused her various injuries. The court decided in favor of the defendant, entering judgment that the plaintiff take nothing on her complaint. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the treating physicians deviated from acceptable medical practice or that any negligence proximately caused her injuries, and the surgeries were performed in accordance with proper medical standards; the court also noted but did not rule on a potential statute of limitations defense.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved claims by several Mexican nationals (some undocumented, some legal residents) and a U.S. citizen minor against the City of Peoria, its police officials, and city leaders for alleged unlawful detentions, arrests, and handovers to Border Patrol based on immigration status. The plaintiffs asserted violations of civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986) and constitutional protections under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any rights violations, conspiracy, pattern of misconduct, or damages, and that officers were protected by qualified immunity. It therefore entered judgment for the defendants on all claims and denied injunctive relief.

immigrationcivil rightscriminal law

This case involved private non-profit Arizona organizations providing family planning services, including abortion counseling and referrals, that had previously received state matching funds under federal Title XX programs but were barred from eligibility by a footnote in a state appropriations bill prohibiting funds to entities offering abortions, abortion procedures, counseling, or referrals. The court held the footnote unconstitutional. It reasoned that the provision was a content-based restriction on protected First Amendment speech regarding abortion information and referrals, which the state could not achieve indirectly through funding conditions after it could not do so directly, and that the footnote's vague terms would chill protected speech without any demonstrated compelling state interest.

abortionfree speech

This case concerns a patent infringement action brought by Saf-Gard Products, Inc. and the patent owner against Service Parts, Inc. and other defendants after liability had already been established on appeal. The court found the patent valid and infringed, determined that the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285, and calculated damages based on the defendant's sales of 325,989 infringing devices between patent issuance and the injunction, using lost profits and a reasonable royalty analysis adjusted for the plaintiff's lost market share and price reductions. It awarded treble damages of $3,650,484 plus interest, credited a prior $200,000 judgment against other defendants, and separately awarded $218,434.41 in attorney fees and costs jointly and severally against the remaining defendants. The unfair competition claims were deemed moot because the award rested solely on the patent statutes.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved property owners near Luke Air Force Base challenging the Air Force's decision to base F-15 aircraft there, alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act due to an inadequate Environmental Impact Statement on noise, air pollution, and accident risks. The court ruled that the Air Force had fully complied with NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act in preparing and circulating the EIS, which included studies, public hearings, agency reviews, and a final statement filed in 1974. Evidence at trial showed no substantial air pollution or accidents harming local residents from the F-15 operations, that noise impacts were not severe compared to prior aircraft, and that most plaintiffs had acquired their properties after the base's long-standing operations began in 1941. The court concluded that the public interest in maintaining Air Force training capabilities outweighed any localized inconveniences to area residents.

environmentfederal powerproperty

In Pettigrew v. Hardy, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after being retried and convicted of second-degree murder, arguing that the retrial violated double jeopardy protections. The case arose when, during the original trial for open murder, the defendant spontaneously referenced passing a polygraph exam in testimony; the trial judge then declared a mistrial over defense objection after offering the option of a bench trial, citing the prejudicial impact on the jury. The court denied the petition, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring the mistrial. It applied the manifest necessity standard from United States v. Perez, concluding that the circumstances warranted the mistrial to serve the ends of public justice without impropriety.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a class action lawsuit by a female employee against Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company and unions (CWA and Local 8519), alleging sex-based pay discrimination between "janitor" and "janitress" job classifications under collective bargaining agreements, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, and the Labor Management Relations Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, primarily arguing that the plaintiff failed to properly defer her EEOC charge to the Arizona state civil rights agency as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), that the national union was not named in the charges, that the Equal Pay Act does not allow damages against unions, and that contractual remedies were not exhausted. The court denied the motions for summary judgment, holding that any deferral defect in the second charge relates back to an earlier properly deferred 1972 charge, that the failure to defer is not a jurisdictional bar to relief, and that other arguments did not warrant dismissal at this stage.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a constitutional challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to subparagraph H of Arizona's Implied Consent Law, A.R.S. § 28-691, which provided that a driver facing license suspension for refusing a chemical test could avoid suspension by pleading guilty without appeal to a related DUI charge. The court ruled that subparagraph H was unconstitutional and void, invoking the severability doctrine while declining to address other provisions of the statute. The core reasoning was that the provision created an impermissible distinction between those who asserted their constitutional rights and those who pleaded guilty, thereby chilling the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, and violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case was a wrongful death action brought by the parents of an eight-year-old boy who died after falling into an abandoned mine shaft while riding a motorcycle in the Lake Mead Recreation Area, which is operated by the National Park Service. The court held the United States liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, concluding that the National Park Service was negligent for failing to adequately warn visitors or secure known dangerous abandoned mines despite its awareness of the risks and some posted notices about motorcycle regulations. The court reasoned that this failure breached the agency's duty to protect the public from such hazards, that the negligence proximately caused the death, and that neither the parents nor the child were contributorily negligent, resulting in a damages award of $135,000.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by a defendant awaiting retrial on a murder charge after his first trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury following about four hours of deliberation. The petitioner argued that a retrial would violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The court treated the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, found that special circumstances justified addressing the double jeopardy claim before the second trial and that state remedies had been exhausted. On the merits, the court held that the mistrial was supported by manifest necessity because the jury foreman indicated no reasonable probability of reaching a verdict, so the trial judge did not abuse discretion in declaring the mistrial. The petition was therefore denied.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a patent infringement action in which Saf-Gard Products, Inc. sued Service Parts, Inc. and several distributors for making and selling radiator accessory kits that allegedly copied the invention in U.S. Patent No. 3,601,181, a continuation patent covering a method and apparatus for purging air from automotive engine cooling systems to reduce cavitation and boiling. The court found the patent valid as to claims 1-3, determined that the defendants had infringed those claims by producing substantially identical products, and concluded that Service Parts, Inc. had also engaged in unfair competition. These rulings rested on detailed findings about the limitations of standard cooling systems, the specific structure and function of the patented accumulator-and-valve design, and the identity between the patented and accused devices. The court entered judgment of validity, infringement, and unfair competition, issued a permanent injunction until the patent's expiration, and retained jurisdiction for a later damages determination.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved Navajo Tribe members, a legal services nonprofit (DNA), and its director Theodore Mitchell suing tribal officials and a Bureau of Indian Affairs representative to block enforcement of orders removing and permanently excluding Mitchell, a non-Navajo, from the reservation, along with a request for damages. The court held that the August 1968 removal and exclusion orders were unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and permanently enjoined their enforcement by the relevant defendants, while denying any damages. The core reasoning was that the tribe's treaty-based exclusion authority constitutes an exercise of self-government powers subject to the Act's restrictions (including the ban on bills of attainder), and the Advisory Committee had acted in a legislative rather than judicial capacity by targeting Mitchell individually for punishment without prior general rules or due process.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In Cochran v. United States, physicians who had formed the Tucson Clinic as a professional corporation under Arizona law sued to recover federal income taxes assessed for 1965 after the IRS sought to treat them as partners rather than corporate employees, including by denying corporate tax treatment for contributions to a profit-sharing plan. The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that the entity was taxable as a corporation under IRC § 7701(a)(3) and that the physicians were corporate employees. The court found that the corporation had been validly organized and operated in compliance with state law and federal corporate tax requirements, holding regular meetings, executing contracts in its name, and maintaining separate formalities. It concluded that the IRS regulations attempting to reclassify the entity as a partnership were invalid because they conflicted with the statute and prior judicial interpretations such as Kintner and Morrissey.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involves claims by a class of indigent Navajo Indians, their legal services organization DNA, its board members, and its non-Indian executive director Mitchell, who was excluded from the Navajo Reservation by order of the Tribal Council's Advisory Committee. The plaintiffs sued tribal and federal officials, alleging that the exclusion and related actions violated their constitutional and statutory rights, and sought injunctive relief and damages. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction after analyzing multiple federal statutes, finding that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for federal questions exceeding the jurisdictional amount and under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, while rejecting jurisdiction under provisions for mandamus and conspiracy claims not involving state action. The core reasoning was that the claims did not require exhaustion of tribal remedies in this instance due to considerations of pendent jurisdiction and the need to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits, allowing all related claims to proceed in federal court.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved taxpayers, as transferees of All-State Cattle Feeding Company, seeking refunds of additional federal income taxes assessed after the corporation liquidated under a plan adopted in February 1960 and sold its operating assets, including previously expensed feed and supplies, within twelve months. The IRS had disallowed nonrecognition treatment under Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code for the portion of the sale proceeds allocated to the unconsumed feed and supplies, treating it as taxable income. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that the gain realized on the sale of those items was not recognized to the corporation. The core reasoning was that Section 337 applies to sales of business property during qualifying liquidations regardless of prior expensing, the feed and supplies were operating assets rather than income, and any resulting tax benefit was a matter for Congress rather than judicial adjustment.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a defendant charged with willful failure to submit to induction into the armed forces under 50 App. U.S.C. § 462, after he was classified I-A by his local Selective Service board despite claiming conscientious objector status based on his Jehovah’s Witness religious beliefs. The board had reviewed his Form 100 and 150 submissions along with other information but declined to change the classification or reopen it after he missed appeal deadlines and provided no new evidence. The court convicted the defendant, holding that exemption is a privilege requiring the registrant to meet procedural requirements for appeal and reopening, that the board's decision was supported by the record, and that prior dismissal of an earlier charge did not bar prosecution for a subsequent refusal to induct.

criminal lawreligious libertyfederal power

This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Kruchten, who pleaded guilty in Arizona state court to first-degree murder and received a death sentence. The petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, a conflict of interest from the same attorney representing both him and a co-defendant, lack of notice about separate counsel, and related due process issues. The court adopted facts and analysis from the companion Janovic case, reviewed evidence including letters and crime details, and found that counsel provided competent representation with no actual conflict because the defendants equally participated in the underlying felony. It rejected arguments for a per se rule requiring separate counsel in state proceedings and denied the petition, holding that no constitutional violation occurred.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a dispute over title to specific parcels of land in Yuma County, Arizona, along the Colorado River, with the United States seeking to quiet title, evict occupants, and recover damages. The defendants claimed possession under leases from the State of Arizona, which intervened asserting ownership of the land as part of the riverbed between the thread of the navigable stream and the easterly ordinary high water mark, confirmed by the Submerged Lands Act. After reviewing historical surveys, river movements since 1874, federal withdrawal orders, and evidence of alluvial deposits, the court determined that the land lies east of the ordinary high water mark and outside the riverbed, concluding that title remains with the United States rather than the State of Arizona.

propertyfederal power

The case concerns a petition by the Salt River Valley Water User’s Association to enlarge the 1910 Kent Decree, which adjudicated certain water appropriation rights on the Salt and Verde Rivers in Arizona, with the United States intervening. The court granted the intervenor’s motion and dismissed the petition without prejudice. It held that the court lacked jurisdiction to enlarge the decree because not all interested parties—specifically, all landowners and appropriators in the Verde River watershed whose rights remained unsettled—had been joined as parties. The reasoning emphasized the interdependent nature of appropriative water rights, requiring all such parties to be before the court simultaneously under precedents like People of State of California v. United States and Rule 23 F.R.Civ.P., as well as the original purpose of the Kent Decree and the United States’ intervention to settle rights across the watershed.

environmentpropertyprocedurefederal power

The case involved plaintiffs suing under the Miller Act for amounts due for labor provided on a federal project before October 1, 1963. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint was untimely as it was filed more than one year after the relevant labor was performed. The court granted the dismissal, reasoning that under 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b), the one-year period begins to run from the last date labor for which the claim is made was furnished, following interpretations from prior cases like United States for the Use and Benefit of General Electric Co. v. Southern Construction Co.

procedurelabor & employmentbusiness & regulatory