The case involved W.H. Breshears, Inc. suing its insurer, Federated Mutual Insurance Company, for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation after an unknown vandal caused approximately 6,500 gallons of gasoline to spill from an aboveground tank in 1990, seeking coverage for cleanup costs and defense against third-party claims under commercial property and liability policies. Federated filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify Breshears. The court granted Federated's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that the Petro Pac Coverage Part excluded land, water, and pollutant extraction from covered property and debris removal; the Commercial General Liability Coverage Part did not apply to the facts; and Breshears could not prove reasonable reliance or resulting damages on any alleged misrepresentations. The court also granted the declaratory judgment and denied Breshears' motion to vacate and for a new trial.
business & regulatoryenvironmentpropertytorts & liability
This case involved a U.S. Postal Service letter carrier discharged in 1983 for falsifying a medical certificate to cover an absence and for unsatisfactory attendance patterns. After the Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the removal, the employee sued claiming the discharge violated the Rehabilitation Act as handicap discrimination based on chronic back issues. Following review of the administrative record and a de novo trial on the discrimination claim, the court found the employee was not a qualified handicapped person under the Act, as his condition did not substantially limit major life activities and he performed all job duties without accommodation requests. The court therefore affirmed the MSPB decision sustaining the discharge for the proven misconduct and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
In Schieler v. United States, the plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act after being injured by lightning while on Moro Rock in Sequoia National Park, claiming the National Park Service negligently failed to provide warnings or safety devices about lightning risks. The case focused on whether the discretionary function exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) barred the claim and deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court held that the exception applied because decisions on warnings and safety measures were discretionary functions entrusted to the Park Service under its broad statutory mission in 16 U.S.C. § 1 to conserve park scenery and resources while providing for public enjoyment. Relying on precedents such as Dalehite v. United States and United States v. Varig Airlines, the court reasoned that the agency's policies minimizing signs absent a demonstrated need, along with its emphasis on preserving natural conditions, involved protected policy judgments rather than mandatory duties.
The United States, through the Attorney General, sued the Fresno Unified School District and its officials, alleging a pattern or practice of sex discrimination in employment that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the 1972 amendments to Title VII had transferred the Attorney General's authority to bring such pattern-or-practice suits against public employers to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, holding that the statutory language and legislative history showed Congress intended a complete transfer of this enforcement power to the EEOC, along with the procedural requirements of section 2000e-5, leaving the Attorney General without authority to proceed independently. The EEOC had no involvement in the case and had not followed those procedures.
This case involved a quiet title action by plaintiff Gendron against the United States seeking to establish ownership of certain California land based on a chain of title tracing back to a 1899 conveyance by C. B. Willingham. The court treated the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment after receiving evidence and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the action was jurisdictionally barred by the 12-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f), as the plaintiff's predecessors knew or should have known of the government's claim by at least 1961; it was also barred by the time limits and non-assignability provisions of Public Law 86-596; and the plaintiff failed to state a claim because the original deed conveyed only New Mexico land and a subsequent state court decree did not validly close the gap in the chain of title.
This case involved claims by Phillip and Nina Hamm, operators of Little Folks Swim School, against former employee William Knocke for using the terms DROWNPROOF and DROWNPROOFING in his competing water survival instruction business, along with related unfair competition and copyright infringement of a motion picture titled 'How to Drownproof Your Child.' The court found that the terms were descriptive of the services' purpose rather than distinctive, so the plaintiffs had no protectable trademark or service mark rights and could not prevent the defendant from using them. It ruled that the plaintiffs owned the copyright in the film and that the defendant had infringed it by retaining and using a copy, ordering him to return all copies and enjoining further use or exhibition. The court also issued injunctions preventing the plaintiffs from claiming exclusive rights in the terms or the techniques and barring the defendant from misrepresenting his services as affiliated with the plaintiffs' school.