In Gellhaus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., former Wal-Mart assistant manager Pam Gellhaus sued the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging she was a non-exempt employee entitled to overtime pay for routinely working 50-70 hours per week. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gellhaus qualified as an exempt executive employee. The court granted the motion, dismissing the claim after finding that Gellhaus's duties met the FLSA executive exemption criteria: she supervised and disciplined up to 100 employees, evaluated their performance, made recommendations on hiring and pay that were given particular weight, and received a salary exceeding $455 per week. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Wal-Mart was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the exemption issue.
In Moore v. Bis Salamis, Inc., the plaintiff sued his employer BSI and the owners/operators of the Thunder Horse offshore oil facility for injuries from chemical exposure and a fall, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and negligence. The defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, prompting the plaintiff's motion to remand to state court. The court denied remand, concluding it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the Thunder Horse is a fixed work platform, not a vessel, so the claims arise under federal OCSLA rather than the Jones Act.
This case involved Judith Finnicum suing Wyeth and Schwarz, the former manufacturers of brand-name metoclopramide (Reglan), for negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty, fraud, and related claims under Texas law after she developed tardive dyskinesia allegedly caused by long-term use of generic metoclopramide. Finnicum stipulated that she never ingested any version of the drug produced by the defendants, who had stopped manufacturing it years earlier. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling that they owed no duty to warn users of generic versions of the drug made by other companies. The core reasoning relied on Texas precedents holding that brand-name manufacturers cannot be held liable for injuries from products they did not manufacture or distribute, as extending liability based solely on physicians' reliance on brand-name warnings would stretch foreseeability too far.
The case involved plaintiff Christopher Whiddon suing Chase Home Finance after Chase allegedly failed to obtain required fire and windstorm insurance on his home, leaving it uninsured when Hurricane Rita caused over $80,000 in damage in 2005; Whiddon asserted claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, common law fraud, negligence, and breach of contract. The court granted Chase's motion to dismiss the DTPA and negligence claims, finding them barred by the applicable statutes of limitations as evident on the face of the pleadings. It denied dismissal of the fraud and breach of contract claims but ordered Whiddon to file an amended complaint within thirty days that alleged those claims with greater particularity under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), noting that amendment could potentially cure the deficiencies.
In Martin v. J.A.M. Distributing Co., plaintiff Richard C. Martin, an African-American bobtail and transport driver, sued his employer alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under Section 1981, Title VII, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act after receiving a two-day suspension for cross-contaminating products and later being terminated for unexcused absences. Defendant J.A.M. moved for summary judgment, contending that Martin could not establish a prima facie case or show that its legitimate reasons for the adverse actions were pretextual. The court denied the motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Martin was treated less favorably than a similarly situated Caucasian coworker and whether his termination was motivated in part by his internal complaint of disparate treatment.
The case involved Chapter 13 debtors Ronald and Sharon Ferrell who appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of their post-dismissal motions, including requests to alter or amend the dismissal order, obtain relief from an earlier agreed order, impose sanctions on the trustee, and reinstate their case. The bankruptcy court had dismissed the case after the trustee filed a certificate of non-compliance because the Ferrells failed to make required plan payments under an agreed order that provided for automatic dismissal without further hearing upon default. The district court affirmed, holding that the agreed order explicitly authorized dismissal for missed payments, that the trustee had no duty to advise the debtors about modification rights under 11 U.S.C. § 1329, and that cause existed for dismissal under § 1307(c)(6) due to the payment defaults.