John Powers Crowley

This case involved class action claims by Cenco security holders alleging that the company and others falsified financial statements through inventory manipulation and altered sales figures from 1970 to 1975, in violation of federal securities laws and common law. The opinion addresses a joint petition for attorneys' fees and expenses following a $3.5 million settlement with the company's auditors, Seidman & Seidman. The court applied the lodestar method, considering factors including the contingent nature of the action, quality of services, and benefits to the class, and awarded fees with multipliers of 4 for the lead firm and 2 for the others, plus paralegal costs and expenses, noting the total fees were under 17% of the recovery.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case originated from a 1966 complaint against the Chicago Housing Authority alleging operation of a racially discriminatory public housing system. After years of litigation resulting in findings of liability against CHA, plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Act of 1976 for work performed by lead counsel. The court granted the motion, awarding $375,375, determining that the case remained pending at the time the Act took effect due to ongoing remedial proceedings, thus allowing fees under the statute.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved a challenge by displaced residents and a community organization to the City of Chicago's use of federal Community Development Block Grant funds for a commercial redevelopment project, seeking to enjoin the expenditure and obtain a declaratory judgment against HUD's approval. Plaintiffs argued that the City's relocation plans failed to ensure a reasonable opportunity for them to remain in the immediate neighborhood, violating the Housing and Community Development Act, the Uniform Relocation Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act, and that HUD's approval was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the relevant statutes do not require comparable replacement housing to be located in the immediate neighborhood and that the City's application otherwise satisfied statutory requirements. The decision rested on the conclusion that HUD's approval of the plans, which provided assurances of comparable dwellings without the neighborhood restriction, was not arbitrary or capricious.

federal powerenvironmentproperty

In Black v. Brown, a prisoner at Illinois State Penitentiary sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging that he was placed in punitive isolation and then long-term segregation without timely notice of charges or an opportunity to be heard after an incident in which he ran in the yard in response to a shouted command. After remand from the Seventh Circuit, the district court awarded the plaintiff $5,000 in damages for violations of procedural due process and excessive punishment. The court found that the plaintiff had been held in isolation for 12 days before learning of the charges against him and in segregation for 18 months with no hearing, and that this combined punishment was disproportionate to the minor offense of running in the yard.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case arose from the discharge of raw sewage by the City and Sanitary District of Hammond, Indiana, into Lake Michigan, which allegedly polluted Chicago beaches and prompted multiple lawsuits by Illinois plaintiffs. The complaints asserted claims under federal common law of nuisance as well as Illinois common and statutory law for nuisance and trespass. Following the Supreme Court's decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the court dismissed the federal common law counts but denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the state-law claims. It held that Illinois law could apply to the out-of-state pollution under principles of choice of law and that the federal court had jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims, even across state lines.

environmenttorts & liability

This case originated in 1966 as a class action by thousands of Black public housing tenants and applicants against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and later the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause through racially discriminatory site selection and tenant assignment practices that concentrated public housing in Black neighborhoods. The court previously found CHA and HUD liable for these unconstitutional actions and issued multiple orders and supplemental decrees requiring construction of public housing in predominantly white areas to remedy segregation patterns, though implementation was delayed by years of appeals and litigation. In this opinion, the court addresses a proposed consent decree negotiated between the plaintiffs and HUD, which outlines a plan to deliver relief including specific housing sites in designated census tracts across the Chicago metropolitan area. The decision incorporates prior findings of liability and authorizes the decree's implementation to fulfill the plaintiffs' entitlement to effective remedial measures.

civil rights

The case involved William Witherspoon's petition for attorney's fees and costs after he prevailed in a 1976 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and subsequently obtained a contempt judgment against several defendants in 1978 for violating the court's order. The defendants opposed the fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arguing that special circumstances existed because the plaintiff's counsel from Jenner & Block provided pro bono services and the Illinois Department of Corrections faced budgetary constraints. The court granted the petition for $2,423.79 in fees, holding that no special circumstances justified denial since the statute encourages enforcement of civil rights through fee awards, serves a deterrent purpose, and does not limit recovery based on counsel's pro bono status or a defendant's financial limitations.

civil rightsprocedure

This case is a § 1983 action alleging that an erroneous age designation by Illinois officials caused the plaintiff to be classified as mentally retarded, resulting in inadequate treatment and unconstitutional conditions while he was housed in the Arthur J. Audy Home, Elgin State Mental Hospital, and Chester State Mental Hospital. Defendants Cook County and Albert Neely moved for summary judgment, contending that the five-year statute of limitations under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 16 barred the claims filed in 1977 and 1978. The court held that the minority tolling provision did not extend the period because suit was not filed within two years of the plaintiff's eighteenth birthday, but found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff qualified as incompetent under the tolling statute in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 83, § 22, precluding summary judgment. The court also granted the plaintiff's motion requiring defendants to pay reasonable fees for an expert witness deposition.

civil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Keller, the defendant was indicted for theft and fraudulent use of credit cards under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1708 after a traffic stop led to discovery of stolen cards in his possession. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop for a single license plate violation was a pretext to search for other crimes and that the subsequent search exceeded permissible bounds. The court granted the motion to suppress. It reasoned that an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence, the officer's admitted subjective motive tainted the stop and all derivative evidence, and intervening events like failure to produce a license did not remove the taint from the initial illegal action.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Dansberry, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his wallet by a Chicago police officer working part-time as a Sears security guard, which led to his federal indictment for mail fraud in obtaining unemployment benefits under a false name. The search occurred after the officer detained Dansberry and a companion during a suspected credit card theft at the store, discovered dual identification, and relayed information to responding police officers, resulting in an arrest and further investigation. The court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the officer was acting in an official capacity or exercising state authority when detaining and searching the defendant, making the Fourth Amendment applicable even though the officer was off-duty and employed by a private store. The decision rested on the officer's continuous duty to enforce the law, his use of police powers, and the involvement of state interests in criminal apprehension, rendering the search an unconstitutional governmental action.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involves the People of the State of Illinois suing the Sanitary District of Hammond, Indiana, alleging that Hammond unlawfully dumped raw sewage into Lake Michigan, causing injury, with one count based on federal common law nuisance and the others on Illinois state law. After the defendant removed the case from state court to federal court, the plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the federal claim was not separate and independent from the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) as interpreted in American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn. The court denied the motion to remand, reasoning that the presence of a federal question claim brought the entire action within federal jurisdiction under § 1441(a) and (b), allowing the state claims to proceed under pendent jurisdiction since they arose from a common nucleus of operative fact, and that Finn's restrictions did not apply.

procedureenvironment

Four petroleum companies operating gasoline loading terminals in Illinois sued the EPA and its officials, seeking to nullify the Administrator's Notices of Violation under the Clean Air Act for alleged breaches of Illinois Rule 205(b)(1) in the approved state implementation plan. The companies claimed compliance via submerged loading pipes as authorized by state permits and argued the EPA lacked authority to reinterpret the rule or revoke permits without following statutory amendment procedures. The EPA moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that pre-enforcement review of Notices of Violation was unavailable. The court denied the motion, holding that the Notices constituted final agency action subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act because they required no further agency steps before enforcement and the Clean Air Act did not clearly preclude review in this context. Jurisdiction existed due to the presumption favoring judicial review of final agency actions, the questions raised about the Administrator's statutory authority, and the direct harm to the plaintiffs from delayed review.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Williams v. Franzen, a prisoner at Stateville Correctional Center sued Illinois Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his transfer from protective custody to the Segregation Unit without notice or a hearing violated his due process rights, and seeking reassignment, an explanation, and damages. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the monetary damages claims, ruling that the complaint failed to allege personal involvement or knowledge by the supervisory defendants as required under § 1983, and that one defendant was not even in his position at the time of the transfer. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss and for summary judgment as to the claims for injunctive relief, holding that Illinois prison regulations create a protected liberty interest against placement in disciplinary segregation absent a finding of major misconduct, which triggers due process protections under precedents like Wolff v. McDonnell and Stringer v. Rowe. The defendants' evidence that the transfer was due to overcrowding did not address the due process claim.

civil rightscriminal law

This case involved claims by Chicago neighborhood residents and community groups that the Veterans Administration violated the Fair Housing Act through its administration of home mortgage guarantees, which allegedly contributed to unlawful racial steering, solicitation, and rapid racial transition in Marquette Park. Count I asserted that the VA failed to meet its affirmative duties under the Act when running its loan program, while Count II alleged direct participation in discriminatory practices. The court denied the VA's motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. It reasoned that the plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing requirements by alleging concrete injuries traceable to the VA's conduct and redressable by relief, drawing on Supreme Court precedent, and that the VA's statutory loan obligations did not override its Fair Housing Act responsibilities.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved Medical Laboratory Automation, Inc. suing Labcon, Inc. for infringing U.S. Patent No. 3,853,217 on a packaging system for disposable pipette tips using stacking trays with specific nesting and wall features. Labcon counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the patent was invalid. The court granted Labcon's motion for summary judgment, holding the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of prior art structures, including a co-pending patent application by another MLA employee and other cited patents like Cooke. The court noted that the patent was not entitled to the usual presumption of validity since the most pertinent prior art had not been considered during prosecution, and that only legal analysis was required for resolution.

business & regulatory

The case involved a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Thomas Stewart, who was convicted in Illinois state court of armed robbery, challenging his conviction on the basis that his retained attorney provided ineffective assistance due to multiple conflicts of interest. The court denied the respondents' motion for summary judgment and granted Stewart's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It applied the standard from Cuyler v. Sullivan, determining that the attorney, who led an organization involved in the robbery and represented a co-defendant, had an actual conflict that adversely affected his performance at trial, and that Stewart had not knowingly waived his Sixth Amendment rights since the conflicts were not disclosed and he lacked full information at the time. The court independently reviewed the mixed questions of law and fact, presuming the state courts' historical findings correct but concluding that no valid waiver occurred.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involved a mother's challenge to the Social Security Administration's denial of surviving child's benefits for her daughter under the Social Security Act, based on the deceased father's account. The court reviewed whether the child qualified as a "child" under the Act by determining if she could inherit from the father under Illinois law, including a 1978 probate amendment allowing paternity to be established by clear and convincing evidence. The court decided that the ALJ and Appeals Council had failed to consider the applicable statutory provision and that the evidence, including oral acknowledgments and support payments, met the required standard. It therefore reversed the denial and ordered the benefits paid directly, without remand. The decision focused on the retroactive application of state inheritance rules to Social Security eligibility and the proper evaluation of secondary evidence for paternity.

federal powerfamily lawproperty

The case was a products liability action in which the plaintiff alleged that a bottle of lacquer thinner exploded and caused her personal injury. Count II of the complaint claimed that the defendants, including manufacturer Ashland Chemical Company, fraudulently induced the purchase and use of the product through false statements on the label. Ashland moved for summary judgment on that count, asserting it had no role in preparing or affixing the labels. The court granted the motion, holding that silence or concealment amounts to fraud only under special circumstances such as a fiduciary duty or active contribution to the misrepresentation, none of which were present here, and that Ashland's general product-related duties did not create a duty to correct labels prepared by others.

torts & liability

Bernard Garman sued New York Life Insurance Company under an employee health insurance policy, seeking reimbursement for his son's treatment at the Elan One psychiatric facility after the insurer denied the claim. The case centered on whether Elan One met the policy's definition of a hospital and whether psychotherapy sessions conducted under a doctor's supervision were covered. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court denied both motions, holding that factual issues remained about the parties' intent, the policy's application to psychiatric facilities, and whether the insurer's denial supported a claim for punitive damages.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns consolidated lawsuits filed in 1966 by black public housing tenants and applicants against the Chicago Housing Authority, alleging intentional racial discrimination in tenant assignments and site selections that violated the Equal Protection Clause and federal civil rights statutes. After granting summary judgment to plaintiffs in 1969, the district court issued a detailed judgment order requiring nondiscriminatory site selection, limits on project sizes and locations, and efforts to build housing in white areas of Chicago. Over the following decade, compliance was minimal despite multiple court orders and a special master's review, leading plaintiffs to move for appointment of a receiver to enforce the remedies. The special master found that CHA bore significant responsibility for delays due to bureaucratic inefficiencies but did not recommend a receiver, citing some recent acceptance of required steps and external obstacles, while plaintiffs argued that CHA had made no progress under the 1979 modified order.

civil rightsprocedure