Samuel Ray Cummings

In Teague v. Norcold, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that a defective refrigerator manufactured by Norcold caused a fire that destroyed his RV and personal property while he was using the vehicle as temporary housing, leading to claims for products liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and violations of the Texas DTPA. The court ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), granting it in part and denying it in part based on Texas's economic-loss rule. The court held that tort claims seeking recovery for the value of the refrigerator itself were barred by the rule, as it treats the unit as a component part of the RV and limits plaintiffs to contract remedies for such losses, but denied dismissal of tort claims for damage to other property. The court also denied dismissal of the breach-of-warranty and DTPA claims, determining that additional facts were needed to resolve whether the unit was a discrete product or component and to evaluate the warranty issues.

torts & liabilityprocedureproperty

The case involves Panorama Construction suing Farm Credit Services and Heartland Recovery in Texas state court over state-law claims including fraud and tortious interference with contract against Farm Credit, plus a foreclosure action on mechanic's liens against Heartland, after Farm Credit foreclosed on property improved by Panorama and Heartland acquired it. Farm Credit removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, asserting that in-state defendant Heartland had been improperly joined. The court denied Panorama's motion to remand, concluding that Heartland was improperly joined because Panorama could not establish a valid lien claim against it, as Farm Credit's earlier-recorded deeds of trust had priority under Texas rules on mechanic's liens and property conveyances.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

This case involved a dispute over long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed insurance plan. Dr. Bruce Leipzig, an otolaryngologist, sought continued benefits after Principal Life Insurance Company stopped payments following the initial own-occupation period, arguing his eye disorder prevented him from performing surgeries and earning sufficient income in his limited market. Principal determined that Leipzig could perform patient consultations full-time and earn at least two-thirds of his prior earnings, thus not meeting the plan's definition of disability for any gainful occupation or modified duties. The court granted summary judgment to Principal, finding its interpretation of the plan reasonable and not an abuse of discretion, while denying Leipzig's motion and dismissing his breach of fiduciary duty claim. The decision emphasized that local market conditions did not qualify as a disability under the policy terms.

labor & employment

This case involved a dispute between motor carriers Landair and Schneider over liability for a stolen shipment of goods that Wal-Mart had contracted Landair to transport from Mississippi to Texas. Landair subcontracted the job to Schneider, a Wal-Mart-approved carrier, but the shipment was lost en route, causing Wal-Mart to deduct $91,387.70 from Landair's account; Landair then sued Schneider for reimbursement under federal law. The court denied Schneider's motion for summary judgment, which claimed the suit was time-barred by a 9-month deadline in its tariff, and granted Landair's motion, awarding the full amount sought. The ruling rested on the Carmack Amendment's framework imposing near-strict liability on carriers for loss of interstate shipments, the undisputed facts showing Schneider received and lost the goods, and rejection of the timeliness defense.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case was a products liability action brought by a Texas plaintiff after a fatal crash involving a 2005 Saturn van, alleging negligence, strict liability, DTPA violations, and breach of warranty against multiple defendants including General Motors, Saturn, and local Texas dealerships. After the plaintiff settled with and dismissed the Texas defendants, General Motors and Saturn removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds. The plaintiff moved to remand, contending that removal was untimely because the state-court action had commenced more than one year earlier under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5's mailbox rule when the petition was mailed. The court denied remand, holding that the one-year removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is measured from the date the petition was file-stamped in state court under federal procedural standards, not the mailing date, and that the removal notice filed on the anniversary of the file-stamp date was therefore timely.

proceduretorts & liability

In Boyd v. Town of Ransom Canyon, Texas, plaintiffs sought to erect a 65-foot ham radio antenna on residential property and sued the town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after their permit applications were denied and they received citations for violating local Ordinance 56, claiming violations of FCC preemption rules in PRB-1 along with procedural and substantive due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that PRB-1 does not create a private right of action enforceable through § 1983. The court granted the motion to dismiss the § 1983/PRB-1 claims, holding that PRB-1 does not confer a cognizable federal right that plaintiffs could enforce via § 1983 or the Fourteenth Amendment.

civil rightsfederal powerfree speech

This case involves Texas Tech University suing former licensee John Spiegelberg for selling apparel and novelties bearing university marks such as the Double T, Red Raiders, Masked Rider, and Raider Red after his licensing agreement was terminated for nonpayment of royalties. Texas Tech asserted claims including federal and state trademark infringement, unfair competition, dilution, and breach of contract, while Spiegelberg counterclaimed and raised defenses such as functionality and laches. The court granted Texas Tech's motion for summary judgment on its claims and denied Spiegelberg's cross-motion, holding that the marks are distinctive in the relevant market, non-functional, and entitled to protection, with no genuine issues of material fact regarding infringement by the unlicensed sales.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved the United States suing Chevron Pipe Line Company seeking civil penalties after a 2000 crude oil pipeline spill near Snyder, Texas, that discharged approximately 3,000 barrels into an intermittent unnamed tributary and Ennis Creek, which connect downstream to the Brazos River. The court granted Chevron's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The core reasoning was that the affected waters were not "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act or Oil Pollution Act because they were intermittent streams without regular flow, the oil did not reach any navigable-in-fact waters, and the government failed to show the required significant nexus or adjacency under either the plurality or concurring opinions in Rapanos v. United States.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a dispute over whether an insurance company had a duty to defend a university student under a policy issued to the university in connection with a personal injury lawsuit arising from a student event. The plaintiff, a student club president, was brought into the underlying suit as a third-party defendant on the insurer's advice after the injured student sued the university. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied the student's counter-motion, holding that the student did not qualify as an insured under the policy's relevant provisions regarding members or volunteers.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Lamont H. Johnson sued his employer Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Texas alleging gender and age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA, retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention arising from a denied promotion and subsequent demotion. The defendant moved to dismiss only the two state common-law claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, holding that the IIED claim was preempted by the overlapping federal statutory claims and served only as an impermissible gap-filler under Texas law, while the negligent-hiring claim failed because Texas precedent requires an underlying actionable tort by the employee and none remained after dismissal of the IIED claim.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a Texas Tech University law student who sought to deliver a speech and distribute literature expressing religious and political views against homosexuality at a specific campus location, but was directed by university officials to use a designated free speech area or a nearby spot due to traffic and safety concerns under the school's prior grounds use policy. After the student filed a § 1983 lawsuit alleging unconstitutional application of the prior policy and facial invalidity of the amended interim policy, the court analyzed the campus as containing public, limited public, and nonpublic forums. The court held that the speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to public forums on campus, while upholding other regulations as reasonable, viewpoint-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that served significant university interests like safety and maintaining an educational environment; it declined to address vagueness or certain other challenges. The reasoning centered on First Amendment forum doctrine, requiring restrictions in public forums to be narrowly tailored and content-neutral.

free speechcivil rightsreligious liberty

The case involves a pro se prisoner plaintiff who filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against twenty-one prison defendants, alleging mental and emotional abuse, verbal harassment, retaliation for grievances, denial of equal protection, and interference with religious practice, while seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. The plaintiff also moved to consolidate the action with two prior cases, one of which had already been dismissed with prejudice, and later sought voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The court denied both motions and, after screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, malicious, and for failure to state a claim, finding the allegations conclusory without an arguable basis in law or fact and noting the plaintiff's pattern of repetitive filings. The dismissal counts as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedurereligious liberty

In Caudillo v. Lubbock Independent School District, student plaintiffs sought permission from Lubbock ISD to form and advertise a Gay Straight Alliance club by posting fliers, making PA announcements, and holding on-campus meetings at Lubbock High School, after the district had adopted a limited open forum policy triggering the Equal Access Act. The district denied the requests, citing its abstinence-only policy on sexual activity and concerns that the group's activities would conflict with state law and imply school endorsement. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied it to the plaintiffs, holding that the requested activities did not qualify as protected "meetings" under the EAA because they would not be limited to noninstructional time or voluntary attendance, and that the school could prohibit them to avoid material interference with educational activities and to maintain its abstinence policy without risking perceived endorsement.

free speechcivil rights

The case involved a lawsuit filed by WAMCO in Texas state court against Casa Grande Cotton Finance Company, Chickasha Cotton Oil Company, and Michael Hicks in his role as substitute trustee under a deed of trust, following a foreclosure sale. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting fraudulent joinder of Hicks, and Hicks moved to dismiss under Texas Property Code section 51.007 while WAMCO sought remand. The court granted Hicks's motion to dismiss without prejudice and denied the motion to remand. It reasoned that Hicks had filed a verified answer asserting he was named only as trustee, more than 30 days had passed without a verified response from WAMCO as required by the statute, and alternatively the conversion claim against Hicks was barred by the two-year statute of limitations because the recorded foreclosure deed provided constructive notice. As a result, Hicks was deemed fraudulently joined, supporting federal jurisdiction over the remaining claims.

procedureproperty

In Tarbox v. United States Trustee (In re Reed), a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee appealed a bankruptcy court's order denying his request to pay interest on administrative claims, including his own fees, from the petition filing date in a surplus estate under 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that no interest is payable on administrative fees and expenses under that provision. The court reasoned through statutory construction that § 726(a)(5) applies only to claims paid under § 726(a)(1), which references claims under § 507 proven under § 501, and administrative expenses do not fall within this category for interest purposes.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a fatal car accident in which a Coca-Cola van driven by employee DeMarco Upshaw rear-ended a stopped pickup truck on a Texas highway, killing Tammie McDorman and injuring her son Billy Jack Shaw, Jr. The plaintiffs (the victim's estate and family members) sued Coca Cola Enterprises and Texas-Cola Leasing for negligent hiring, negligent entrustment, and exemplary damages, alleging inadequate background checks on Upshaw's prior criminal and driving history. The court granted summary judgment to Texas-Cola Leasing on all claims and dismissed the negligent hiring, negligent entrustment, and exemplary damages claims against the defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact because the background checks returned clear results and any undisclosed history did not establish unfitness to drive. The plaintiffs' remaining respondeat superior claim against Coca Cola Enterprises proceeds to trial.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case was a declaratory judgment action brought by American Automobile Insurance Company against its insured, agent Danny Mayfield, seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify him in four underlying state-court lawsuits alleging fraud and misrepresentation in the sale of Chemical Trust investment contracts that were later revealed to be a Ponzi scheme. The court granted the insurer’s unopposed motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that Mayfield had not met his burden to show the claims potentially fell within the policies’ coverage and that the policies’ exclusions for guarantees of future investment value and for losses arising from the receivership of an entity in which client funds were placed independently barred coverage.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, pro se plaintiff Phillip Thompson, a Texas state prisoner, sued multiple employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation for agreeing to testify in another inmate's lawsuit, failure to protect him from prison gang assaults and threats, and interference with his religious practices; he sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. The court previously dismissed the state agency on sovereign immunity grounds and allowed the individual defendants to move for summary judgment after an evidentiary screening hearing. On the motion, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the remaining claims, finding that Thompson failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on the constitutional violations or to overcome the defendants' qualified immunity defense, particularly as to events after November 2000, and noting that certain supervisory and pre-November claims lacked sufficient factual support.

civil rightscriminal law

This case involved landowners and business operators in west Texas suing the U.S. Air Force and related defendants over the implementation of the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (RBTI), which involved changes to military airspace and construction of training facilities. The plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), arguing insufficient analysis of environmental effects. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment, and struck various extra-record materials. The court reasoned that the defendants had taken a hard look at potential environmental consequences, provided sufficient detail in the FEIS to allow informed consideration of alternatives, and made a decision that was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act.

environmentfederal power

The case concerned a challenge by a Texas landowners' association and individual property owners to the U.S. Air Force's decision to proceed with the Realistic Bomber Training Initiative (Alternative B), which modified military airspace and added training facilities in western Texas. Plaintiffs contended that the Final Environmental Impact Statement failed to meet requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act and sought additional review of prior assessments. The court struck extra-record materials submitted by both sides, denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and granted the defendants' cross-motion, ruling that the Air Force had objectively considered environmental impacts, provided adequate detail for informed decision-making, and that the choice of alternative was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.

environmentfederal power