This case involved Chapter 7 debtors who sought to reopen their bankruptcy case after discharge to avoid a judgment lien on their home that they had not known existed until attempting to refinance six months later. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to reopen based on a strict local rule from In re Hunter limiting lien-avoidance motions to 60 days after the creditors' meeting. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that the fixed deadline functioned as an improper jurisdictional bar that prevented judges from exercising the discretion to reopen cases granted by 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). The court reasoned that Congress had not enacted any statute of limitations for such motions, so equitable doctrines like laches should govern on a case-by-case basis, taking into account factors such as the length and reason for delay and any prejudice to creditors.
This case concerned a Chapter 7 debtor who claimed an exemption for an anticipated 1996 income tax refund shortly after filing his petition, only for the IRS to apply that refund to his unpaid 1991 tax liability. The bankruptcy court ruled that the setoff was impermissible because Section 522(c) protects exempt property from prepetition debts, even though the 1991 liability was dischargeable. On appeal, the district court affirmed, concluding that the exemption provision must take precedence over the setoff rights preserved by Section 553 in order to give effect to all parts of the Bankruptcy Code. The core reasoning was that allowing the IRS setoff would undermine the statutory protection for exempt assets.
This case involved attorneys, chiropractors, and an information supplier challenging Kentucky's KRS 189.635, which limited access to motor vehicle accident reports to parties involved, their insurers, guardians, and news organizations (with restrictions against commercial use), while barring others like lawyers for solicitation purposes. The court held the statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment and enjoined enforcement of the 1994 amendments. It reasoned that the law's selective access to media and insurers failed to protect any asserted privacy interests, as the information could still be publicized, and that restrictions on commercial speech did not sufficiently advance a substantial government interest, consistent with precedents such as Speer v. Miller.
This case involved KFC Corporation seeking damages from former franchisees who continued operating restaurants and using KFC trademarks after the franchise agreements were terminated. The parties stipulated to gross revenues, expenses, unpaid royalties, and related fees during the holdover period. The court awarded KFC 10 percent of the defendants' gross revenues as damages under the Lanham Act to deter infringement, plus $26,445.60 in trebled royalties for the holdover period, and $80,885.30 in attorneys' fees, drawing on precedents like Otis Clapp & Son and Ramada Inns to balance deterrence with avoiding penalties. The reasoning emphasized the defendants' willful conduct, including delays in closing and de-imaging the restaurants, while denying recovery for certain advertising fees not incurred by KFC.
The case concerned a dispute over Medicare reimbursement for a hospital's 1983 loss on defeasance costs, following a prior judgment that ordered the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay the full Medicare portion in the year incurred plus interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(2). Plaintiffs had received partial payments from the Health Care Financing Administration both before and after the judgment, and the parties disagreed on whether those payments should first reduce accrued interest or principal. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the judgment, ruling that the United States Rule requires partial payments to be applied first to interest and rejecting the Secretary's interpretation of the interest statute and regulation that would limit interest based on amounts outstanding only at the filing of the judicial review action.
KFC Corporation sued its franchisees, the Lilleorens and their companies operating KFC restaurants in Washington and Oregon, in the Western District of Kentucky seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the franchise agreements. The defendants moved to dismiss or transfer the case to Oregon on grounds of improper venue and forum non conveniens, but the court denied the motions after finding venue proper due to forum selection clauses in two of the agreements that designated Jefferson County, Kentucky courts. Citing Supreme Court cases Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute and Stewart Organization v. Ricoh, the court reasoned that such clauses must be given considerable weight and upheld unless unfair, that the defendants had not shown misuse of bargaining power or sufficient inconvenience, and that the clauses reflected a legitimate corporate interest in a single forum.
