The case involved a hardware store owner whose building and contents were destroyed by fire in 1959; he sought to recover on fire insurance policies issued by New Amsterdam, Continental, and Federal through an agent, after the agent attempted to cancel or reduce those policies and obtain replacement coverage from Lloyd’s and Transit without the owner’s knowledge or consent. The court held that New Amsterdam, Continental, and Federal remained liable for the full agreed losses on the building and contents, while Lloyd’s and Transit had no liability, and denied a statutory bad-faith penalty but awarded interest. The core reasoning was that the agent and his agency were not authorized to act for the owner in making policy changes, the owner never received or knew of the new policies, and the original policies therefore remained in force at the time of the loss. Summary judgment was granted accordingly, with recognition of the mortgagee’s and a creditor’s interests.
The case involved defendant Elmer Gerson, who had been placed on federal probation in 1955, was later incarcerated in Ohio state prison for a prior offense, and then committed multiple interstate check fraud violations in several states. After pleading guilty to eight counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and admitting a probation violation, he received a total five-year sentence that included revocation of his probation and a one-year term for that violation. In 1961, Gerson filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing that the probation revocation sentence was illegal because it occurred after the probation term had expired. The court denied the motion, holding that the probation period was tolled during Gerson's state incarceration because he was unavailable for supervision and the rehabilitative purposes of the Probation Act could not be fulfilled while he was in prison.
This case involved Mr. Wiggins seeking a refund of a $1,608.12 penalty assessed by the IRS under Section 2707(a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code for the Appalachian Zinc Co.'s failure to withhold and pay over income and FICA taxes in 1949. The court had to determine if Wiggins, as president and treasurer, was a responsible "person" under a duty to collect and pay the taxes and whether his failure was willful. The court ruled in favor of Wiggins, concluding that he had delegated the relevant duties to a bookkeeper and there was insufficient evidence of a conscious failure to pay the taxes despite knowledge of their due status. Therefore, the judgment was entered for the plaintiff.
This case involves an antitrust lawsuit filed by R. J. Coulter Funeral Home, Inc. against Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc. and others seeking injunctive relief and damages under federal antitrust laws. Cosmopolitan moved to quash service and dismiss the case for improper venue under 15 U.S.C. § 22, arguing it was not an inhabitant of the district, could not be found there, and did not transact business there. The court denied the motion, holding that venue was proper because Cosmopolitan had transacted business in the district within the relevant period, including fulfilling prior obligations, and that the antitrust venue statute permits suit in a district where the alleged violations occurred even if the defendant has since ceased operations there. The decision relied on Supreme Court precedents interpreting the phrase "transacts business" liberally to prevent corporations from evading accountability by retreating from the district after causing harm.
This case involved a declaratory judgment action by Roofire Alarm Company against Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc., a nonprofit corporation that tests fire-warning devices for stock fire insurance companies. Roofire sought to compel the defendant to approve its carbon dioxide capsule-based fire alarm or to alter its testing standards, which the device had failed to meet, including a requirement that the warning sound last at least three minutes. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit, holding that the defendant functions as a private business league serving its members rather than the public, that approval is not a right, and that courts do not interfere with a corporation's internal discretion in setting standards that are not shown to be unreasonable or violative of public policy.
In La Ferry v. Ajax Truck Rentals, third-party defendant Betty Thompson moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing that it failed to state a claim and that Tennessee law does not allow contribution between joint tort-feasors until a common liability is established. The court first held that the complaint was sufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which permits pleading conclusions rather than detailed facts. It then analyzed Tennessee precedent, distinguishing indemnification claims (as in Cohen v. Noel) from contribution claims (as in Davis v. Broad St. Garage and Vaughn v. Gill), and concluded that the third-party action sought indemnification rather than contribution, so the common-liability requirement did not apply. The court further noted that the right to indemnification or contribution arises at the same time as the underlying claim and that third-party practice is a permissible procedural mechanism to enforce it. The motion to dismiss was denied.
