This case involved debtors who converted their Chapter 13 bankruptcy to Chapter 7 and sought to avoid a creditor's non-purchase money security interest in various household and personal items under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) and Oklahoma exemption law. The bankruptcy court denied the motion without a hearing, allowing exemption only for one television set based on a prior agreement. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the local bankruptcy rule permitted the court to decline a hearing in its discretion and that the bankruptcy court's determination the items were not necessities of life under state law was not clearly erroneous, citing Tenth Circuit precedent requiring case-by-case evaluation.
The case involved an inmate's Section 1983 civil rights complaint challenging the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' decision to raise his security classification from medium to maximum based on a prior escape, which allegedly made him ineligible for certain programs and affected his parole prospects. The plaintiff claimed violations of the ex post facto clause, double jeopardy, equal protection, and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court dismissed the complaint as frivolous, holding that the classification system uses objective criteria and discretionary authority properly delegated to prison officials under state law. It reasoned that inmates have no constitutional right to a particular classification or hearing absent arbitrary action or conditions violating the Constitution, citing precedents such as Meachum v. Fano, and found the process neither arbitrary nor punitive in a constitutional sense.
The case involved a former probationary postal worker who sued the U.S. Postal Service under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleging he was terminated due to an actual or perceived handicap, and seeking reinstatement and back pay. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff did not qualify as a handicapped individual under the Act because he had no substantially limiting impairment and was not regarded as such by his employer. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's slow casing performance stemmed from his refusal to follow training instructions rather than any disability, that any perception of limitation was based on observed performance issues, and that the Act does not require reassignment to a different position as a reasonable accommodation.
In Duncan v. United States, parents of a daughter with Down’s Syndrome sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to enjoin interference with obtaining the “U” Series drug from out of state and to obtain declaratory relief, claiming the drug was essential for their daughter's development and education. The plaintiffs argued that the drug was not a “new drug” under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, that required administrative approval processes were unduly burdensome, and that they were denied equal protection and due process. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that no equal protection violation existed because the statute and agency actions did not single out Down’s Syndrome patients for discriminatory treatment, that the drug met the statutory definition of a new drug requiring an approved new drug application which plaintiffs had not pursued, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to review such matters or grant the requested relief, following precedents such as Rutherford v. United States.
The case involved two corporations seeking tax refunds for 1973-1975 after the IRS treated them as part of a brother-sister controlled group under 26 U.S.C. § 1563, which would limit them to a single surtax exemption; the key dispute was whether one shareholder's 79% ownership met the statute's 80% value test due to a possible control premium. The court held that a prior Tax Court decision for the 1976 tax year collaterally estopped the United States from relitigating whether the 80% value test was satisfied. It reasoned that the parties, facts, law, and issues were identical, and the prior case had necessarily resolved the value question against the government because the taxpayers had to prevail on both the 80% and 50% tests to win. As a result, the court did not address the underlying statutory interpretation of stock value.
The case involved plaintiff T. Clyde Stovall suing U.S. Deputy Marshals John Haynes and Jim Wellman for $100,000 in property damages, alleging they broke the glass and paneling in his back door while executing a Writ of Assistance from a bankruptcy judge on June 24, 1982. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by affidavits stating they did not damage the door, and the plaintiff did not provide counter-evidence despite opportunity. The court granted the motion, dismissing the case with prejudice, reasoning that the defendants were protected by absolute judicial immunity as they were performing ministerial acts executing a valid court writ, and there was no genuine issue of fact regarding the alleged damage.
