In this case, plaintiff Teia Twilley sued Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination after she was not hired for a conductor-trainee position. The defendant moved for summary judgment, explaining that it selected other applicants based on their technical experience, heavy-industry background, and safety training, while Twilley's prior work at a restaurant and gift shop did not demonstrate the needed qualities. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext, noting that the employer's reasons were legitimate and that disparities in qualifications were not so stark as to suggest discrimination. It therefore granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that federal courts do not act as a super-personnel department to second-guess business decisions.
In this case, plaintiff Robert Wilcox sued defendant Standard Insurance Company after it terminated his long-term disability benefits under an employer-sponsored group policy, citing a 2000 policy amendment that limited benefits to 12 months for musculoskeletal and connective tissue disorders unless supported by objective neurological evidence. Wilcox brought state-law claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and failure to disclose, seeking past and future benefits, while arguing ERISA did not preempt his claims because the coverage was voluntary. The court held that ERISA governed the plan, which granted Standard discretionary authority to interpret its terms and determine eligibility. Applying the ERISA standard, the court found the administrator’s requirement for objective evidence of nerve-root involvement was not wrong, and Wilcox’s negative EMG studies failed to meet it, so summary judgment was granted to Standard on the benefits claims; all of Wilcox’s pending motions, including for remand, were denied.
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a state conviction and sentence, with objections to a magistrate judge's report recommending that the petition be granted. The court reviewed de novo the record and addressed claims including whether a state Rule 32 court's adoption of a proposed order constituted an adjudication on the merits under AEDPA and whether the petitioner established a prima facie Batson violation based on the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of black venire members. The court concluded that the detailed 67-page state court order qualified as an adjudication despite being proposed by the state, that the petitioner's statistical analysis and comparison to a co-defendant's trial did not constitute new evidence requiring different treatment, and that the petitioner's own strikes of black jurors were irrelevant to the prima facie showing, resulting in partial rejection of the magistrate's recommendations on the Batson issue while upholding other findings on the confession and sentencing claims.
The case involved a dispute over whether a national bank, acting as trustee for multiple trusts including the plaintiff's, breached its fiduciary duties by transferring participations in mortgages from one trust to another, including issuing certificates for the plaintiff's trust. The court held that such self-dealing transactions constituted a breach of the trustee's duty of undivided loyalty to each beneficiary, even when conducted in good faith and at fair prices. However, because the bank demonstrated that the transactions were fair and not improper, the court only surcharged the bank for losses on specific participations (Tyson and Lewis) while relieving it of liability for others.
This case involves lawsuits by cotton goods manufacturers against a tax collector to recover floor and processing taxes paid under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The plaintiffs sought refunds without alleging compliance with statutory provisions (later amended) that required them to prove they had borne the economic burden of the taxes rather than shifting it to customers. The court addressed challenges to the constitutionality of these conditions on recovery, which the plaintiffs argued imposed an impossible burden and deprived them of vested rights. Relying on United States v. Jefferson Electric Manufacturing Company, the court held that the requirements were constitutional under due process principles, as they were not arbitrary and applied equally to similar tax refund claims. The demurrer was sustained, barring recovery absent the required proof.