District Court, S.D. Texas — appointed by Jimmy Carter
Ticor Title Insurance v. Federal Deposit Insurance
District Court, S.D. Texas · 1990-10-26
This case involved Ticor Title Insurance Company's claims against the FDIC and former officers/directors of Northwest Bank & Trust arising from an assignment agreement that entitled Ticor to a share of distributions on a $550,000 promissory note or related collateral in the bankruptcy estate of J.R. McConnell. Ticor alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and good faith, breach of warranty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation after the FDIC received life insurance proceeds from the estate without paying Ticor any portion. The court dismissed the breach of contract claim because the assignment's clear terms required distributions either solely tied to the $550,000 Note or as part of a general unsecured creditor distribution, neither of which occurred when the FDIC's claim was based on unrelated notes. The tort claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Ticor's failure to first file an administrative claim with the FDIC as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed without prejudice for lack of ancillary jurisdiction after the federal claims were resolved.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Garrett v. Coastal Financial Management Co., Inc.
District Court, S.D. Texas · 1990-09-18 · cited 2×
In this case, plaintiffs sued two subsidiaries of a failed savings association (along with another defendant) for breach of contractual and fiduciary duties to maintain insurance on plaintiffs' property, as well as negligence and deceptive trade practices, based on alleged oral or unwritten agreements. The FDIC, acting as receiver for the parent institution, intervened, removed the case to federal court, and moved to dismiss under the D’Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e). The court held that these defenses, which generally bar claims relying on side agreements not reflected in an institution’s written records, apply to claims against wholly-owned subsidiaries of failed institutions. The core reasoning was that regulators must be able to evaluate the financial condition of the parent based on complete written records of all its assets, including subsidiaries, so the motion to dismiss was granted.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Service Merchandise Co. v. Service Jewelry Stores, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Texas · 1990-04-10 · cited 10×
The case involved Service Merchandise Company suing Service Jewelry Stores, Inc. and its owner for using a similar name in their Houston jewelry stores, alleging violations of federal service mark infringement laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a)), Texas dilution statutes, and common law. Plaintiff, which operates hundreds of stores nationwide with registered marks like 'SERVICE MERCHANDISE,' sought a preliminary injunction after defendants opened or planned three local jewelry-focused outlets. The court granted the injunction, permanently enjoining defendants from using 'Service Jewelry' or 'Service Jewelry Store' in their business. The core reasoning centered on the validity and incontestability of plaintiff's marks, a likelihood of consumer confusion from the similar names in overlapping jewelry sales and services, and the broader protections available under Texas law even without direct competition or source confusion.
business & regulatory
Thompson v. Sundholm
District Court, S.D. Texas · 1989-11-01 · cited 1×
The case involved a father seeking federal court enforcement of a Texas state court order granting him visitation rights with his child, against the mother who had obtained an earlier conflicting custody decree in North Carolina state court; the father invoked the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A as the basis for federal jurisdiction. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and awarded Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiff's counsel. The core reasoning was that the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. Thompson established that the PKPA does not create a federal private cause of action and is instead a directive to state courts, that domestic relations matters fall outside federal jurisdiction, and that the plaintiff's further motions were unreasonable once counsel was notified of the controlling precedent.
family lawfederal powerprocedure
Bowser v. McDonald's Corp.
District Court, S.D. Texas · 1989-02-02 · cited 19×
Rosemary Bowser sued McDonald's Corporation in a diversity action under state law for wrongful termination, breach of written and oral employment contracts, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and libel after her 1985 discharge for allegedly failing to follow cash-handling procedures. The court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment. Bowser failed to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on any claim, including that her status as a permanent employee or oral promises created a just-cause requirement, that the employee handbook established contractual due-process rights, or that libelous statements were published to third parties within the limitations period. The court applied the 1986 Supreme Court summary judgment trilogy and held that the plaintiff could not defeat the motions with vague allegations, legal conclusions, or an affidavit contradicting her prior sworn deposition testimony.
labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability
In Re Global Marine, Inc.
District Court, S.D. Texas · 1988-06-29 · cited 9×
This case involved unsecured creditors appealing a bankruptcy court's interim award of over $2.4 million in attorney's fees to Weil, Gotshal & Manges for its joint representation of multiple Chapter 11 debtors, including Global Marine, Inc. and its subsidiary, where the creditors alleged an actual conflict of interest under 11 U.S.C. § 327 due to the parent-subsidiary creditor-debtor relationship. The district court granted the law firm's motion to dismiss the notice of appeal. It held that interim fee awards are interlocutory orders not appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), that no exceptions to the finality rule (such as the collateral order doctrine or Forgay v. Cohen) applied because the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to monitor and adjust for conflicts, and that discretionary leave to appeal was unwarranted under standards like 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) given the absence of a controlling question of law or exceptional circumstances requiring immediate review.
procedurebusiness & regulatory