In Ramirez v. City of Omaha, two Mexican-American men sued the City of Omaha alleging national origin discrimination in the firefighter hiring process under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VII, specifically challenging their rejection based on statements made during polygraph examinations as well as the overall selection criteria including written tests, physical exams, interviews, and background reviews. The district court, after a bench trial, entered judgment for the defendants and found no unlawful discrimination. The core reasoning rested on undisputed facts about the multi-stage process and applicant flow statistics from the 1976-1978 eligible list, which showed Hispanic candidates were referred and hired at rates comparable to or higher than non-Hispanics, with no evidence of disparate impact or treatment under prevailing Title VII standards.
The case involved a South Dakota corporation suing its former Nebraska sales representative to enforce noncompetition and secrecy clauses in an employment contract after the employee left to join a competitor. The defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending the noncompetition provisions were invalid under South Dakota statute referenced in the contract. The court denied the motion, holding that Nebraska law controls because the contract was executed and to be performed in Nebraska, where such agreements are generally enforceable absent violation of public policy, and scheduled a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction.
This tax refund case involved plaintiffs David and his wife Kavich seeking recovery of additional federal income taxes assessed and paid for tax years 1969 through 1972 after the IRS disallowed claimed deductions. The deductions at issue primarily concerned payments on personal guarantees David Kavich had made for debts of National Carpets, Inc. (a corporation in which he held a one-third ownership interest), along with related legal fees, payroll taxes, and loans connected to that company. The court held that the taxpayers were not entitled to business bad debt deductions under IRC § 166 because the guarantees were not created in the course of Kavich's trade or business (his separate furniture store) but instead related to his investment in the undercapitalized corporation, and any claimed collateral business benefits did not establish the required proximate relationship at the time the guarantees were extended. The court therefore upheld the disallowance of the refund claims.
This case involved a claim by Willie L. Metcalf, a black employee at Omaha Steel Castings Co., that the company violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by terminating him because of his race after he left his shift early without permission due to illness. Following a bench trial, the court found that Metcalf had established a prima facie case of discrimination but that the employer had articulated and proven a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge—walking off the job without permission—and that Metcalf had not shown this reason was pretextual. The court also determined that statistical evidence regarding workforce composition was inconclusive and therefore dismissed the complaint. Prior administrative findings and an arbitration ruling had similarly upheld the termination as justified.
In Parker v. Parratt, petitioners Willis Parker and Armstead Pierce sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after their joint state-court convictions for kidnapping and rape, arguing that their shared court-appointed counsel created a conflict of interest that denied them effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. The court applied the standard from Cuyler v. Sullivan, finding that the co-defendants' positions were sufficiently different—particularly regarding evidence of consent and injuries inflicted—that counsel's joint representation created an actual conflict. It determined that Pierce was adversely affected by the conflict because his more credible consent defense could not be fully pursued without harming Parker's case, while the effect on Parker was de minimis. Accordingly, the court granted habeas relief to Pierce but denied it to Parker.
This case is an interpleader action over the proceeds of a Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance policy issued to Terrence Alan Dulek, with the former wife Bonnie Lynn Dulek and the insured’s parents as competing claimants. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether Bonnie was the lawful spouse at the time of the insured’s death. Under 38 U.S.C. § 770(a), federal law distributes such proceeds first to a designated beneficiary, then to the widow or widower, and only then to parents. The court determined that the April 20, 1979, divorce decree from Sarpy County, Nebraska, expressly provided that it would not become final until six months after entry, and the insured died on May 28, 1979, before that period elapsed; therefore Bonnie remained the lawful spouse and took priority as widow. The separation agreement and other facts did not alter this outcome under the federal statutory order of distribution.
