District Court, D. Nebraska — appointed by Richard Nixon
Graham v. Knutzen
District Court, D. Nebraska · 1972-10-13 · cited 13×
This case involved three Omaha public school students and their mothers who sued the school superintendent, board members, and principals, alleging that the district's suspension policies under Sections 6.7 and 3.28e violated due process by allowing extended suspensions without prior notice, hearings, or clear standards, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed extensive evidence on the individual suspensions and the overall system, finding that while school officials have authority to remove disruptive students, the existing procedures required amendments to ensure timely written notice of reasons, duration, and return conditions, along with prompt investigations and decisions. The court therefore ordered the board to submit revised procedures within ten days for approval but dismissed all other claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, noting that the students' suspensions had ended and no systematic constitutional violations were proven beyond the need for procedural improvements.
civil rightsprocedure
Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hospital, Omaha, Nebraska
District Court, D. Nebraska · 1972-09-05 · cited 8×
The case involved parents suing a children's hospital and two doctors after their son died while under the defendants' care in 1970, alleging that the defendants' negligent diagnosis and treatment caused the child to suffer and that the parents, who witnessed this suffering, incurred their own physical and emotional injuries as a result. The plaintiffs brought the action under general tort principles rather than Nebraska's Wrongful Death Act. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that Nebraska law does not recognize a cause of action for bystanders' recovery of damages for mental or emotional distress from witnessing negligence inflicted on another absent physical impact, presence in the zone of danger, or fear for one's own safety. The court reached this conclusion after reviewing Nebraska precedents limiting recovery for mental anguish, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions, and the absence of any indication that the state supreme court would adopt a broader foreseeability-based rule.
torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare
Bricklayers, Masons, Marble & Tile Setters, Protective & Benevolent Union No. 7 v. Lueder Construction Co.
District Court, D. Nebraska · 1972-07-24 · cited 10×
The case involved a dispute between the Bricklayers Union and Lueder Construction Company over assignment of work installing precast concrete wall panels on a project, after the company gave the work to carpenters instead of bricklayers. The union sought a preliminary injunction to force compliance with an award from the National Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, which had assigned the work to the bricklayers under Article IX of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court granted the injunction, ordering the company to abide by the award. The core reasoning was that federal courts have jurisdiction under Section 301 of the LMRA to enforce collective bargaining agreements and binding arbitration awards, and that mandatory injunctions to compel compliance with such awards are permissible and do not run afoul of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's restrictions on labor injunctions.
labor & employmentprocedure
Dielen v. Levine
District Court, D. Nebraska · 1972-06-27 · cited 5×
In Dielen v. Levine, the plaintiff tenant challenged the constitutionality of Nebraska’s Landlord Lien Law after the defendant landlord summarily seized and held the tenant’s property for unpaid rent without prior notice or a hearing. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the state statutes (Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 41-124 through 41-126) violated the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The decision rested on Supreme Court precedents requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard before depriving a person of property interests. The court also confirmed its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that the landlord acted under color of state law when using the statutory procedures.
civil rightspropertyprocedure
Nanfito v. TEKSEED HYBRID COMPANY
District Court, D. Nebraska · 1972-03-27 · cited 7×
The case concerned claims by the administrator of Alice C. Major's estate against Tekseed Hybrid Company and its directors, alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, along with state-law fraud, deceit, undue influence, and negligent misrepresentation in connection with a 1968 merger between Tekseed and Tek Annex and a related stock restriction agreement; the plaintiff sought damages or rescission, while defendants counterclaimed for specific performance. The court noted that the merger exchange ratio was based solely on book value per share, with minimal consideration given to earnings history or future potential, and that directors had consulted the company's accountant but did not provide shareholders with interpretations of the information or opinions on ramifications. It found no evidence of fraud or intent to defraud, observed that federal securities law requires full disclosure of material facts to ordinary investors but does not mandate expert analysis or predictions, and referenced possible negligence-based recovery under Eighth Circuit precedent while noting the shareholder's failure to exercise statutory appraisal rights.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Nanfito v. TEKSEED HYBRID COMPANY
District Court, D. Nebraska · 1972-02-15
This case involves a dispute over a 1968 corporate merger between Tekseed Hybrid Company and Tek Annex Company, both Subchapter S corporations, where the plaintiff, as administrator of shareholder Alice C. Major's estate, alleged that the individual defendant officers, directors, and controlling stockholders breached their fiduciary duties by setting the stock exchange ratio solely on book value without considering the active company's earnings history versus the dormant company's status, and failed to disclose this to Major, violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on liability against the individual defendants. The court overruled the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendants breached any duty of care or acted with fraudulent intent, making summary judgment inappropriate under either a negligence or stricter fraud standard, and noting that additional facts were needed before liability could be determined as a matter of law.
business & regulatoryprocedure