Samuel Hugh Dillin

In this case, Educational Credit Management Corporation sought to alter or amend a prior court order in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding involving debtors David and Nancy Barnes. ECMC held claims for unpaid student loans, including collection costs calculated under 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(2), which the bankruptcy trustee challenged as unreasonable and potentially unconstitutional under the enabling statute 20 U.S.C. § 1091. The court granted the motion, withdrawing the reference from the bankruptcy court on the constitutional question because it requires interpretation of non-title 11 federal law rather than mere application. The decision relied on 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) and Seventh Circuit precedent requiring district court review for significant issues involving non-bankruptcy statutes. The court also noted that a related bankruptcy ruling on 11 U.S.C. § 506 had been reversed, removing it as a potential basis to avoid the constitutional issue.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

Printpack, Inc. sued a local union, its international affiliate, and the local's president after the union sent a letter to Printpack's customers warning of potential quality issues during contract negotiations and after alleged acts of sabotage at the plant, including pouring sand into equipment and disabling phone lines. The complaint asserted a federal claim for secondary activity under the NLRA, a state-law tortious interference claim, and a state claim for property damage under Indiana's criminal mischief statute. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss only to the extent the NLRA claim was asserted against the individual union president, holding that the statute regulates only labor organizations and not individual members. The court denied the motion in all other respects, finding that the state claims were not subject to preemption or jurisdictional dismissal because the federal claim survived and that the tortious interference allegations against the president stated a viable claim.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involves a patent dispute in which Genentech sought a declaratory judgment that a patent held by the Regents of the University of California was invalid and unenforceable, while UC counterclaimed for infringement. UC moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. The court granted the motion, determining that UC is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity. The core reasoning was that, under the Supreme Court's Seminole Tribe decision, Congress lacks authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity through legislation enacted pursuant to Article I powers such as the patent clause, and no valid abrogation occurred under the Fourteenth Amendment.

federal powerprocedure

The case centered on Genentech's claim that it was an intended third-party beneficiary under a 1978 option agreement between the University of California and Eli Lilly concerning licensing rights to UC's '877 patent on recombinant DNA methods for producing human growth hormone, which stemmed from federally funded research. After UC obtained a waiver allowing an exclusive license to Lilly that eliminated prior sublicensing obligations, Genentech sued for breach of alleged third-party rights alongside related patent issues. The court granted UC's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the third-party beneficiary claim. It reasoned that Genentech provided no evidence of a material change in position based on the original agreement and that contracting parties could modify or rescind terms without third-party consent under applicable contract principles.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In United States v. Thompson, the defendant was charged with income tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for the 1989-1991 tax years after the IRS determined he had understated his taxable income and taxes owed. Thompson, who later filed amended returns through an accountant showing different income figures, filed a pretrial motion seeking IRS documents detailing the government's tax computations and adjustments, which the government argued were protected work product under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). The court granted the motion, holding that the 1993 amendment adding Rule 16(a)(1)(E) requires the government to disclose a written summary of expert testimony—including the bases and reasons for the opinions—taking precedence over the work-product exemption. Because the IRS calculations constituted technical evidence to be presented by an expert witness, the documents forming the foundation of that testimony had to be produced to allow the defendant to prepare for cross-examination.

criminal lawtaxesprocedure

The case was a diversity jurisdiction negligence action arising from a 1993 trailer collision on an Indiana highway, in which plaintiff Baker sued defendant Schafer after the trailer detached from Schafer's vehicle and struck Baker's truck. Schafer moved for summary judgment on the ground that he was acting within the scope of his employment as superintendent of a political subdivision, so that the suit was barred by Baker's failure to give timely notice under the Indiana Tort Claims Act; Baker cross-moved for partial summary judgment on a negligence-per-se theory. The court denied both motions, holding that the causal link between Schafer's governmental duties and the accident was too attenuated to trigger the Act and that Baker could not reasonably have known of any governmental status, while disputed facts also precluded a per-se ruling. The court further noted that Schafer's post-accident conduct reinforced the impression that he was personally liable.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves consolidated multidistrict litigation arising from research arrangements, option agreements, and licenses among the University of California (UC), Genentech, and Eli Lilly related to UC's '877 patent on an intermediate product in recombinant DNA production of human growth hormone. Genentech sued UC and Lilly for a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid or unenforceable and asserted antitrust claims under the Sherman Act along with state law claims stemming from alleged fraud on the PTO, licensing restrictions under a federal Institutional Patent Agreement, and breaches of settlement and option agreements. The court granted in part and denied in part Genentech's motion for leave to further amend its complaint and UC's motion to dismiss counts II-VIII, while reinstating Genentech's Section 1 Sherman Act claim against Lilly on the basis that certain allegations regarding the 1978 option agreement, the 1989 exclusive license, and fraud on the PTO were sufficient to state a claim.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who alleged that his former junior high school teacher sexually molested him in the mid-1970s, leading to repressed memories that resurfaced in 1993 after an accidental encounter, causing emotional distress; he filed suit in 1994 against the teacher and school defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort claims. The court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice. It held that Indiana law does not recognize repressed memory as a disability that tolls the two-year statute of limitations for the state claims, which accrued no later than the plaintiff's twentieth birthday. For the federal claims, the court applied federal common law to determine accrual under the discovery rule, finding that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its cause by the mid-1970s, and that neither state nor federal tolling doctrines (including equitable tolling) extended the period to make the 1994 filing timely given a thirteen-month delay after discovery.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This multidistrict litigation consolidates patent and contract disputes among Eli Lilly, Genentech, and the University of California over recombinant DNA technology patents used to produce human insulin and growth hormone. Lilly moved to amend its pleadings to add a patent misuse defense and sought summary judgment declaring Genentech's patents unenforceable due to alleged misuse in licensing agreements. The court granted the amendments under Rule 15(a) but denied summary judgment, holding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) requires a rule-of-reason analysis of market power and anticompetitive effects rather than a per se finding of misuse for the tying arrangements at issue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned two policies of the Social Security Administration that counted portions of VA benefits paid to a spouse or parent, as well as certain unreimbursed VA medical expense payments, as unearned income to an SSI applicant or recipient, thereby reducing or denying SSI eligibility. Plaintiff Bernice Inman, representing two certified classes of Indiana residents, sued to invalidate the policies and recover withheld benefits. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, declaring the policies invalid under the governing statute. The court reasoned that the SSI statute counts only unearned income actually "received" by the applicant, that the Secretary's interpretations were inconsistent with this requirement and not entitled to deference, and that the cited precedents involved situations where claimants obtained an actual benefit unlike the facts here.

federal powerhealthcare

This multidistrict litigation case involves claims by plaintiffs that they or their decedents suffered injuries or death from taking the prescription antidepressant Prozac, manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co. The court addressed pending motions to dismiss various counts of complaints transferred from California federal courts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively for a more definite statement under Rules 12(e) and 9(b). The court denied dismissal of wrongful death and survival claims in one case, finding them timely under California's one-year statute of limitations; granted in part and denied in part dismissal of a strict products liability claim across cases, applying Comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts; granted dismissal of breach of warranty and fraud claims for failure to state a claim; and denied dismissal or a more definite statement for a negligence claim. The rulings applied the substantive law of the transferor courts and accepted all factual allegations in the complaints as true while construing them liberally in favor of the plaintiffs.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case involved Larry Poston, an African-American Muslim employee, suing Reliable Drug Stores for alleged racial and religious discrimination, including failure to accommodate his religious practices, workplace harassment, termination, and refusal to rehire, under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss the §1981 claims and to strike the jury demand. It dismissed the religious discrimination claims under §1981 because that statute does not cover religion, but held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies retroactively, allowing the racial discrimination claims under §1981 for harassment and termination, and permitting a jury trial.

civil rightslabor & employmentreligious liberty

In this case, Allstate Insurance sought a declaratory judgment that its renters policy provided no coverage for claims against Robert Garnett, a minor, arising from a 1988 car accident caused by underage drinking. The underlying tort suit alleged that Garnett had negligently furnished alcohol to minors in violation of Indiana criminal statutes. The court granted Allstate's motion for summary judgment, holding that the policy's exclusion for bodily injury resulting from a criminal act or omission applied because Garnett's conduct violated the statutes, regardless of his age or whether he was actually prosecuted. The court reasoned that the exclusion focuses on the nature of the act itself rather than the actor's ability to be convicted.

criminal lawtorts & liability

The case concerned Triple G Landfills' challenge to a Fountain County ordinance that required a second layer of local permitting for landfills after state approval from IDEM and imposed detailed siting standards and other restrictions on landfill construction and operation. Triple G sought declaratory relief that the ordinance was invalid on grounds including state-law preemption and improper zoning. The court granted partial summary judgment to Triple G and denied the county's cross-motion, holding the ordinance invalid and unenforceable. The core reasoning was that the ordinance's permit procedures and standards were preempted by comprehensive state regulation of landfills and that the measure functioned as a zoning ordinance adopted without the comprehensive plan required by Indiana statute.

business & regulatoryenvironmentproperty

The case involved a class action by Indiana school districts challenging a 1989 letter from OSERS Assistant Secretary Robert Davila that interpreted the Education of the Handicapped Act to require continued educational services for handicapped students during long-term suspensions or expulsions even when the misconduct was unrelated to their disability. The districts argued the letter effectively created a new legislative rule without the notice-and-comment procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act. Davila maintained it was merely an interpretive statement exempt from those procedures. The court denied Davila's motion to dismiss, granted the districts' motion for summary judgment, and enjoined enforcement of the letter's position in Indiana. It held that the letter constituted an invalid rule under the APA because existing case law, including Honig v. Doe, permitted cessation of services when the conduct was not a manifestation of the disability, making the letter's contrary position a substantive change requiring formal rulemaking.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court's dismissal of an adversary proceeding in which the debtor-in-possession, Sparmal Enterprises, sought to recover allegedly preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547 after its Chapter 11 filing in 1985. The bankruptcy court ruled that the action was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1), and the district court affirmed. The court reasoned that a debtor-in-possession in a liquidating Chapter 11 proceeding functions as a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) and is therefore subject to the same limitations period that applies to an appointed trustee. It distinguished reorganizing Chapter 11 cases where a longer period might apply and found that the debtor's liquidation role made the two-year limit appropriate.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose after a fire started in a vacant building owned by the City of Indianapolis following tax delinquency proceedings, spread to adjacent property owned by Witco Corporation, and caused extensive damage; Witco sued the City alleging negligence in failing to secure the building against vagrants who allegedly started the fire with a cooking pot. The City moved for summary judgment, claiming governmental immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, lack of evidence supporting negligence, and that the claim did not constitute a nuisance. The court denied summary judgment on immunity, finding the City's actions were operational rather than discretionary planning functions under the Peavler planning/operational test, and also denied it on the negligence and res ipsa loquitur issues due to genuine factual disputes. However, the court granted summary judgment on the nuisance claim, holding that the alleged damages stemmed from the fire itself rather than an ongoing unreasonable use of property interfering with neighbors' rights. The decision rested on application of Indiana precedent distinguishing planning from operational acts and on the conclusion that nuisance theory does not encompass a one-time fire event.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

This case involves a Chapter 7 debtor who filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking a determination that certain obligations arising from his state-court divorce decree were dischargeable property settlement debts rather than nondischargeable support obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court recommended, and the district court ordered, abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) in favor of the Hancock Circuit Court, which had concurrent jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that the state court is better positioned to interpret the intent behind its own dissolution agreement, can address dischargeability as a defense in ongoing collection proceedings, and has authority to modify support obligations if circumstances have changed—relief the bankruptcy court cannot provide. The court noted that the divorce documents labeled certain debts and attorney fees as support, but left the ultimate characterization to the state forum.

family lawfederal powerprocedure

This case concerned the computation of the net taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes in the Estate of Edwin M. Ransburg, specifically whether the will and Indiana law required death taxes to be apportioned proportionately among all residuary beneficiaries, including the surviving spouse and a charitable foundation, thereby reducing the marital and charitable deductions under IRC Sections 2056 and 2055. A secondary issue was whether a settlement agreement resolving disputes with the decedent's children constituted a will contest that would further reduce those deductions under Treasury Regulations. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, and denied the defendant's motion for complete summary judgment. It reasoned that the will's tax clause and Indiana's apportionment statute required taxes to be borne by all residuary legatees in proportion, reducing the deductions accordingly, but found that the settlement did not arise from a will controversy and thus did not trigger additional reductions under the regulations.

taxesprocedure

This case concerned Susanna Laffin's appeal of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of her application for widow's disability benefits under the Social Security Act, based on chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and mental impairments including anxiety, memory loss, and reduced concentration. The district court reversed the Secretary's decision. The court held that the administrative law judge failed to give sufficient weight to a neuropsychological report and letters from family members documenting the plaintiff's mental impairments, and did not adequately assess the combined impact of her physical and mental conditions under the applicable regulatory listings for disability. The court further determined that substantial evidence in the record, when viewed as a whole, established that the plaintiff met the stringent criteria for widow's disability benefits requiring inability to engage in any gainful activity.

healthcarefederal power