Peter Collins Dorsey

In Johnson v. Connecticut, plaintiff Carl Johnson, an African American employee of the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch since 2002, alleged that he was passed over for promotion from a temporary per diem Juvenile Detention Transportation Officer position to a full-time role in 2005 because of his race, in violation of Title VII and the Connecticut Fair Employment Act. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the hiring process was nondiscriminatory and that the same-actor inference should apply since the same supervisor hired and declined to promote him. The court denied the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether race was a motivating factor, based on evidence that the hiring panel may not have followed the required guidelines for interviews, rankings, and reviews of personnel files, along with discrepancies in candidate scoring and comments.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this ERISA case, the plaintiff sued her long-term disability insurer alleging that the denial of benefits was influenced by the defendant's structural conflict of interest as both administrator and payer. The dispute centered on a motion to compel the deposition of Susan Barnett, a company employee who prepared the occupational analysis relied upon to terminate benefits. The court granted the motion to compel but limited the scope of questioning to whether Barnett's analysis was affected by a conflict of interest. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff had raised colorable allegations of bias, which could support a showing of good cause to permit discovery outside the administrative record in an arbitrary-and-capricious ERISA review.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case arose from individual investors' state-law claims against Connecticut Community Bank, the custodian of their retirement accounts that had channeled assets to Bernard Madoff's firm, alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, CUTPA violations, theft, and fraud for failing to safeguard assets and misrepresenting account values and due diligence. The bank removed the consolidated action to federal court under SLUSA's removal provision after state-court consolidation. The district court granted the bank's motions for judgment on the pleadings and denied the plaintiffs' motions to remand, holding that the claims were preempted by SLUSA because they concerned alleged misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The court relied on the complaints' allegations that the bank misrepresented the nature and safety of the BLMIS investments and on precedents interpreting SLUSA's "in connection with" requirement broadly.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case concerns the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation's challenge to a Department of the Interior Reconsidered Final Determination that the group did not meet the criteria for federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe under 25 C.F.R. Part 83. The tribe sought review under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming the decision was arbitrary and capricious, tainted by improper political influence in violation of due process, and issued by an official lacking proper authority under the Appointments Clause and Vacancies Reform Act. After addressing evidentiary motions and reviewing the administrative record plus limited extra-record materials, the court denied the tribe's summary judgment motion and granted the cross-motions filed by federal respondents and intervenors. The court held that the agency applied consistent methodologies supported by precedent and evidence, conducted a transparent process, and did not exceed its authority or violate constitutional requirements.

federal powerprocedurecivil rights

Glenda Galin sued the IRS seeking a declaratory judgment that she held at least a 50% equitable ownership interest in Connecticut property and an injunction to stop its auction for her ex-husband's tax liabilities. After the IRS auctioned the property, the government moved to dismiss on grounds of judicial estoppel, citing Galin's prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing in which she represented that she owned no real property and disclosed no interest in the Southbury Property. The court converted the motion to one for summary judgment and granted it, holding that Galin was judicially estopped from asserting an ownership claim because bankruptcy law requires full disclosure of all legal or equitable interests and neither ignorance of the law nor reliance on faulty legal advice excuses the prior inconsistent position.

taxespropertyprocedurefamily law

The case involved three family members whose applications to adjust their status to permanent U.S. residents had been pending since 2004 without final adjudication, primarily due to incomplete FBI name checks and other security screenings. The plaintiffs sought mandamus and injunctive relief to compel the Department of Homeland Security, USCIS, FBI, and other defendants to decide the applications within a set time under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, holding that agencies have a nondiscretionary duty to act within a reasonable time and that a three-year delay without evidence of specific security issues qualified as unreasonable.

immigrationfederal power

This case is a securities class action brought by purchasers of XL Capital Ltd. stock against the company and several executives, alleging violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act (and § 20(a) control-person liability) during the period from November 2001 through October 2003. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants knowingly understated loss reserves in the company's NAC Re reinsurance operations, issued false and misleading statements about the company's financial condition, and thereby inflated the stock price. Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss under the PSLRA pleading standards, and plaintiffs separately moved to preclude certain documents and arguments. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in full, while granting in part and denying in part the motion to preclude. The core reasoning was that the complaint failed to plead with particularity facts constituting strong circumstantial evidence of scienter (conscious misbehavior or recklessness), as required by the PSLRA and Second Circuit precedent, rendering motive-and-opportunity allegations and other circumstantial claims insufficient on their own.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a debt collection law firm that sent a letter and made phone calls attempting to collect on a consumer debt barred by the statute of limitations, prompting the plaintiff to sue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for false threats of litigation and misleading representations, as well as under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). On the defendant's motion for reconsideration of a prior summary judgment ruling, the court evaluated the collection communications under the least-sophisticated-consumer standard and found they violated FDCPA provisions prohibiting threats of action that cannot legally be taken. The court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff on the FDCPA claims under sections 1692e(5), (2)(A), and (10) but reversed on the CUTPA claim, holding there was no contractual privity to support an ascertainable loss. It granted reconsideration in part, denying the CUTPA claim and one FDCPA overshadowing claim while upholding the remaining FDCPA rulings and rejecting the bona fide error defense.

business & regulatory

This case involves a bankruptcy attorney challenging the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4), a provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 that prohibits debt relief agencies from advising assisted persons to incur additional debt in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy. The court, on motions for summary judgment and reconsideration, granted the plaintiff's motion, denied the defendant's, and adhered to its prior ruling that the provision is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The reasoning centered on the provision being overbroad, as it restricts attorneys from providing advice on both lawful and abusive actions, going beyond what is narrowly necessary to serve the government's interest in curbing abusive bankruptcy practices.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Wesley Rodney, a Guyanese citizen and convicted drug offender, seeking to compel the INS (now BICE) to deport him to Guyana immediately while he remained in state prison serving a sentence for narcotics sales until 2014. An immigration judge had issued a final deportation order in 1995, and the INS had lodged a detainer, but planned to take custody and remove him only after his state sentence ended. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the petitioner had no clear right to immediate deportation and the INS had no nondiscretionary duty to remove him before release from state custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3)(B) and § 1231(a)(4)(A), as the removal period does not begin until the alien is released from incarceration. The decision relied on Second Circuit precedent in Duamutef v. INS, which established that mandamus does not lie to compel expedited removal during ongoing state imprisonment.

immigrationcriminal law

The case concerns a bankruptcy attorney who qualifies as a debt relief agency under the Bankruptcy Code and who seeks to advise clients on incurring additional debt in contemplation of filing for bankruptcy. The plaintiff brought a facial First Amendment challenge to 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4), which prohibits such advice, and the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff has Article III standing due to the chilling effect on speech and that the complaint states a plausible claim because the provision restricts attorney-client communications on otherwise lawful conduct. The core reasoning is that, at the pleading stage, the government failed to demonstrate that the restriction is narrowly tailored to prevent abuse, leaving open the possibility that the statute impermissibly burdens protected speech.

free speechfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a trademark infringement, cyberpiracy, false designation of origin, and unfair competition lawsuit filed by Nature's First Inc. against Nature's First Law, Inc. After the defendant failed to respond, the court entered a default judgment awarding damages, fees, and a permanent injunction. The defendant moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) and 60(b) to stay and vacate the judgment, asserting that service of process was never properly effected on its employee or by mail. The court found that the plaintiff's affidavits of service were rebutted by the defendant's evidence showing the employee was not authorized or in charge and that no service occurred, holding that the judgment was void for lack of proper service under Rule 60(b)(4). The court vacated the default judgment and injunction but conditioned relief on the defendant's agreement to accept service through its attorney within seven days.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Davis v. United States, a U.S. Postal Service employee sued the United States and a postal inspector under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, and under Bivens for a Fourth Amendment violation, arising from incidents involving a powdery substance at work that led to her being placed on leave and facing criminal charges. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the FTCA claims against the individual inspector and all Bivens claims but denying dismissal of the FTCA claims against the United States, while granting leave to amend the malicious prosecution claim. The court reasoned that the FTCA claims against the United States were not barred by the statute of limitations or other jurisdictional issues, that the Bivens false arrest claim failed due to the grand jury indictment establishing probable cause, and that the malicious prosecution allegations were too vague to state a claim but could potentially be cured by amendment.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Vertrue Inc. v. Meshkin, the plaintiff company sued an individual defendant for fraudulently inducing it to enter a marketing agreement and advance $1.25 million by misrepresenting his companies' financial condition, capabilities, and affiliations. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and Rule 19 for failure to join necessary parties, or alternatively to stay the action pending arbitration. The court denied the motion in full, finding that the defendant's in-person meetings and business dealings in Connecticut established personal jurisdiction over him individually, that the complaint adequately alleged his personal liability as an alter ego of the companies, and that the companies were not indispensable parties since relief could be obtained from the defendant directly.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a Colombian native and U.S. permanent resident who faced deportation after a 1993 drug conviction, despite her later cooperation as a government informant against drug cartels; she sought habeas corpus relief in district court to block removal under the Convention Against Torture and former INA § 212(c), arguing government protection was required due to risks of torture upon return. The Immigration Judge had denied her CAT claim and untimely motion to reopen, findings upheld by the BIA. Respondent moved to transfer the habeas petition under the REAL ID Act of 2005. The court granted the transfer to the Second Circuit, holding that the Act strips district courts of habeas jurisdiction over final removal orders and requires such pending cases to be transferred, with any constitutional claims to be addressed by the appellate court.

immigrationcriminal lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a breach of contract dispute between Orthodontic Centers of America (OCA) and its Connecticut subsidiary on one side and orthodontist Dr. Thomas Christie and his professional corporation on the other. The plaintiffs sought to enforce a Stock Purchase Agreement and a 25-year Business Services Agreement under which OCA would provide non-clinical management, administrative, leasing, and support services to Christie's practice in exchange for acquiring assets and receiving fees. Defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the agreements were illegal and unenforceable because they allegedly violated Connecticut statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of dentistry, such as by employing staff or operating a dental office. The court denied the motion, holding that the contracts did not require OCA to engage in the practice of dentistry, that Connecticut law and an Attorney General opinion permit such management arrangements when clinical control remains with the licensed dentist, and that factual disputes precluded a finding of illegality as a matter of law.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

This case arose from allegations by a former Yale medical professor that Yale-New Haven Hospital violated the False Claims Act by submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid for radiological services that were not properly reviewed or supervised by qualified physicians, along with related retaliation and defamation claims. The court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety. The decision rested on the relator's failure to plead the alleged fraudulent billing schemes with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), as well as insufficient factual allegations to support the retaliation and defamation counts under Rules 12(b)(6) and related standards.

healthcareprocedure

The case was a civil forfeiture action in which the United States sought to forfeit 74.05 acres of land in Canton, Connecticut, under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) on the ground that it had been acquired with proceeds from mail fraud and investment adviser fraud committed by Dale Martin. The Canton Land Conservation Trust filed a claim asserting an interest in the property based on a 1999 purchase-and-sale agreement (later amended) under which it was to acquire the land. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss the Trust's claim for lack of standing, holding that any interest the Trust possessed had expired under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-33a because the Trust neither re-executed the agreement nor brought an enforcement action within one year of the scheduled closing date.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which the relator, a former radiology professor and department chief at Yale-New Haven Hospital, alleged that the hospital and related entities knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare and Medicaid by billing for radiological studies that were either never interpreted by qualified physicians, never used for patient diagnosis or treatment, or never performed at all. Yale-New Haven Hospital moved to dismiss the claims against it under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, holding that the action was barred by the FCA's first-to-file rule because the relator had already initiated a prior, related qui tam suit asserting substantially the same allegations of improper billing practices dating back to the 1980s.

healthcarecriminal lawprocedure

The case arose after plaintiff Clifton Freedman, a local Republican activist, sent an anonymous email with the subject "The End is Near" to political opponents during a contentious Fairfield, Connecticut election campaign; recipients reported it as threatening, leading police officers to fax an unapproved search warrant application to AOL and obtain Freedman's subscriber information without a judicial warrant. Freedman sued the officers, the town, and AOL under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Connecticut Constitution, free speech, and related tort and privacy claims. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on Counts Four through Nine and Eleven. It reasoned that qualified immunity shielded the individual officers on some federal claims, that the town could face liability under certain failure-to-train or supervise theories, and that state constitutional search-and-seizure claims required further factual development.

civil rightsfree speechcriminal lawelections