This case involves former employees of Burford Equipment Company suing the company and its parent for continued pension benefits under an informal service retirement plan established through corporate resolutions in 1977 and 1978, after the company sold its assets in 1987 and ceased payments. The employees argued the plan was governed by ERISA, entitling them to accrued benefits, while the company contended it was a voluntary, gratuitous program with no ongoing obligation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that the plan was an ERISA-covered pension plan with enforceable accrued benefits calculated by present value, that the company could integrate Social Security payments and was not required to provide a subsidized joint and survivor annuity or IRS tax qualification, that the normal retirement age was 62 with optional early retirement at age 55, and that a third-party defendant was not a fiduciary. The rulings rested on ERISA's definitions of plans, accrued benefits protections under sections like 204(g), and factual findings from corporate records and payment history.
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition filed by George Daniel, who was convicted and sentenced to death in Alabama state court for murdering a police officer during an arrest attempt. The district court granted the petition and ordered a new trial within ninety days. The core reasoning was that Daniel's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a competency hearing or adequately pursue an insanity defense, despite their own doubts about his mental state, and by relying on an incomplete psychiatric evaluation from Bryce Hospital without further investigation or preparation.
This case involved an employee, Louis Stinson, who sued his employer, American Sterilizer Company, alleging that he was subjected to discriminatory treatment and ultimately fired because of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The complaint included a federal claim under § 1981 for wrongful discharge based on racial discrimination in contract formation, along with state-law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the § 1981 claim with prejudice, holding that the alleged conduct occurred after the employment contract was formed in 1976 and did not involve a refusal to make or enforce a contract. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, which limited § 1981 to the making and enforcement of contracts rather than post-formation discriminatory conditions or termination, the court found the claim fell outside the statute's scope. The remaining state claims were then remanded to state court for lack of pendant jurisdiction.
The case involves a commercial dispute in which Samson Plastic Conduit and Pipe Corporation sued Battenfeld Extrusionstechnik GMBH and its U.S. subsidiary BESI for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of warranty arising from the purchase of nine extruders and related equipment for manufacturing foam-core PVC pipe; BESI had filed a separate action for the purchase price that was consolidated in the Middle District of Alabama. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds including a contractual choice-of-forum clause designating West German courts and the existence of a settlement agreement that released the claims. After converting the motions to ones for summary judgment and reviewing extensive discovery, the court held that Samson failed to present evidence of fraudulent nondisclosure or concealment regarding the status of BESI, the negotiators, and legal counsel, but that material factual disputes remained over whether the parties intended a memorandum to be a binding release and whether any affirmative misrepresentations induced Samson’s signature. Accordingly, summary judgment was denied on those remaining issues.
The case involves a challenge by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and other plaintiffs to Alabama's system of at-large, numbered-place elections for state circuit and district judges, alleging that the method and related judicial circuit boundaries dilute black voting strength in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that section 2 does not apply to judicial elections, and for partial reconsideration of an earlier dismissal order. The court denied the summary judgment motion after examining precedents such as Dillard and Butts, reasoning that unlike single-member offices where vote dilution is not possible through at-large voting, multi-judge positions allow for potential dilution that can be remedied by districting, so section 2 covers these elections. The opinion also addresses the scope of remaining claims after partial dismissals and class certification.
The case involved Alabama Medicaid recipients suing to require the state program to cover and reimburse podiatrist services for foot care to the same extent as equivalent services provided by physicians. Plaintiffs relied on the federal "freedom of choice" provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23), arguing they should be able to select podiatrists. The defendant state contended that podiatric care is an optional service under federal Medicaid law (42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10) and 1396d), which Alabama had not elected to include. The court granted summary judgment to the state, holding that states have discretion not to cover podiatrists and that the freedom of choice provision applies only to already-covered providers and services.
