This case involved real estate brokers challenging an Illinois statute (720 ILCS 590/1 § 1(d)) that prohibited soliciting homeowners who had given notice they did not wish to be contacted about listing or selling their homes. The plaintiffs, prosecuted under the law for cold-calling, argued it violated their rights to free speech and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After multiple appeals and a remand from the Supreme Court for consideration under City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, the district court held a bench trial and ruled the statute unconstitutional. The court found that the law did not directly advance the state's interests in protecting residential privacy or preventing fraud and overreaching, was not narrowly tailored under the Central Hudson test for commercial speech restrictions, and lacked a compelling justification when compared to statutes upheld in cases like Rowan and Desnick that targeted uniquely vulnerable audiences.
This case concerns a motion by counsel for the Barnett plaintiff class in a civil action against the City of Chicago to require the presiding judge to recuse himself under the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), on grounds that prior adverse rulings and courtroom comments created an appearance of partiality. The court denied the motion. The decision rests on the Supreme Court's holding in Liteky v. United States that opinions or rulings formed during judicial proceedings do not support recusal unless they display deep-seated favoritism or antagonism making fair judgment impossible, and that any extrajudicial source of bias must be shown. The judge concluded that the challenged actions arose solely from the conduct of counsel during trial and did not meet this high threshold.
The case involved a Colombian bank that issued letters of credit to finance the purchase of buses from Navistar; Navistar presented documents describing the buses as new 1993 models, the bank paid based on those documents, and Colombian authorities later seized the buses because they were 1990 models prohibited under local import law. The bank sued Navistar on seven counts including breach of presentment warranty under UCC Section 5-111, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, breach of good faith, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The court granted Navistar's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all seven counts, finding that the UCC warranty claim did not cover the alleged misstatements, fraud and misrepresentation claims lacked particularity or duty, no direct contract existed between the parties, implied warranties did not apply, and the bank lacked standing under the Consumer Fraud Act because the conduct did not implicate consumer protection concerns or market-wide practices; the bank was granted leave to amend the fraud, contract, and good-faith counts.
The case involved plaintiff Allan Stevo suing his employer CSX Transportation in state court, alleging that the company violated the ADA by restricting his access to job information after a work-related back injury and that it retaliated against him for filing a prior FELA claim. The defendant removed the action to federal court on grounds of diversity of citizenship and federal question jurisdiction. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that concurrent state-court jurisdiction over ADA claims barred removal and that the Colorado River abstention doctrine required the federal court to defer due to parallel state litigation. The court denied the motion to remand, ruling that concurrent jurisdiction does not preclude removal and that the two actions were not sufficiently similar to justify abstention.
The case involved an appeal by Insure One Independent Insurance Agency from a bankruptcy court judgment finding it liable after firing employee Christopher Koestner. Koestner had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in July 1993 while subject to wage garnishment proceedings; Insure One continued the garnishments despite notice of the filing and then terminated Koestner shortly after he moved to enjoin the deductions. The bankruptcy court ruled that the discharge was retaliatory under 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) and Illinois common law, and that Insure One willfully violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362, awarding lost wages and attorney fees. The district court reviewed the factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, affirmed the liability determinations based on the plain language of the bankruptcy court's opinion, and upheld the damages award.
In this case, Nobelpharma AB sued Implant Innovations, Inc. for patent infringement related to dental implants with a micropitted surface, and Implant Innovations counterclaimed for antitrust violations. The court granted judgment as a matter of law to Implant Innovations on the patent claim, finding the patent invalid for failure to disclose the best mode of making the invention as required, based on inventor testimony that secret manufacturing details were not included in the patent specification. A jury found for Implant Innovations on the antitrust counterclaim. The court then denied Nobelpharma's post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, upholding the prior rulings on both claims after reviewing the evidence and applicable standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.