Robert Morton Duncan

This case involves a former Ohio Department of Youth Services employee with epilepsy who sued the agency, its officials, and the governor alleging his termination violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses, federal civil rights statutes including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), and state tort law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted dismissal of the state agency and back-pay claims on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds but permitted damages claims against officials in their individual capacities and prospective injunctive relief such as reinstatement for federal claims under the Ex parte Young exception. It denied qualified immunity at the pleading stage and ruled that handicapped persons constitute a protected class under § 1985(3), allowing those claims to proceed. The core reasoning relied on Supreme Court precedents limiting state immunity for prospective federal relief and recognizing broad coverage of Reconstruction-era civil rights laws beyond racial discrimination.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by black officers in the Columbus Division of Police against the City of Columbus and various officials, alleging racial discrimination in employment under Title VII, Title VI, and related civil rights statutes. The court determined that the defendants had intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs. Its core reasoning drew on historical evidence of past discriminatory practices, extensive statistical data showing disparities, and analysis of Title VII and Title VI precedents establishing liability for pattern-and-practice discrimination in hiring, promotions, and other employment decisions.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a police officer hired in 1967 who was injured during military training, temporarily reassigned to airport police duties in 1968, and later returned to the police division, but was denied full seniority credit on the administrative list for purposes of benefits like vacation time, days off, and pensions. Plaintiff sued the City of Columbus under the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, alleging violation of reemployment rights by failing to treat his service as continuous from his original hire date. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the city's practice of distinguishing active service from continuous service reduced protected benefits and was preempted by federal law. It ordered the city to credit the plaintiff with continuous active service from May 1, 1967, and to compensate him for resulting losses in pay and benefits.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case arose from the 1982 crash of a Piper Cherokee aircraft that killed passenger Howard R. Brown. The plaintiff sued the aircraft manufacturer, Piper, asserting federal jurisdiction under the Federal Aviation Act and seeking to imply a private right of action for damages based on alleged violations of the Act's safety provisions, along with pendent state-law claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Piper moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Act creates neither an express nor implied private cause of action. Applying the four-factor test from Cort v. Ash, the court found that the Act's text and legislative history show no congressional intent to create a federal remedy for crash victims, that Congress had considered and rejected bills establishing such a right, and that traditional state-law remedies remain available under the Act's savings clause. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss, holding that no federal question jurisdiction existed.

procedurefederal power

This case involved a mother's lawsuit against the United States and the Army under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Army wrongfully altered her deceased son's military records to recognize an illegitimate daughter as a beneficiary entitled to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance proceeds. The court had previously dismissed the FTCA claims, and on remand the issue was whether the plaintiff had satisfied the Act's requirement to first present an administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The court found that the plaintiff never filed such a claim, that Army personnel's statements did not create a valid estoppel preventing the government from raising the defect, and that filing a claim would not have been futile. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

This case involved a candidate for judge in Ohio seeking a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of Canon 7 B(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and related rules, which prohibit judicial candidates from making pledges or promises of conduct in office beyond faithful and impartial performance of duties or from announcing views on disputed legal or political issues. The plaintiff claimed these restrictions violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights and equal protection by preventing him from publicly discussing reforms in domestic relations court practices. The district court denied the injunction after examining standing, abstention, and the merits, finding no substantial likelihood of success because the state has a compelling interest in protecting judicial integrity and impartiality that justifies the limits on campaign speech for judicial candidates. The court further held that the canon does not violate equal protection by treating judicial races differently from legislative or executive ones.

free speechelectionscivil rights

This case involved plaintiffs Jorge Gonzales and Michael McDonald challenging pretrial driver's license suspensions imposed under Ohio Revised Code 4511.191(K) after they were charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence and failed chemical tests. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it imposed penalties before adjudication, lacked adequate notice and hearing procedures, was vague, and violated due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. It reasoned that the statute's requirement of an initial appearance within five days, combined with the opportunity to respond to the evidence relied upon (including reliable hearsay), satisfied procedural due process, and that the statute was not shown to be unconstitutional as applied in the plaintiffs' cases.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case was a class action by Ohio pharmaceutical providers against state welfare and budget officials, challenging delays in Medicaid reimbursement payments during cash flow crises and the adequacy of the dispensing fee under the state's Medicaid program. The court ruled that the state's prioritization scheme, which delayed payments to pharmacy providers while favoring other obligations, violated federal timely payment rules in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37) and 42 C.F.R. § 447.45. It further held that the $2.60 dispensing fee was reasonable because it was set based on required surveys of pharmacy costs under 42 C.F.R. § 447.333. The decision rested on stipulated facts about the payment system and fee methodology, with the court noting the claims were not moot due to the potential for recurring crises.

healthcarefederal power

The case involved a worker who was injured on the job when his welding line unhooked, leading him to receive workers' compensation benefits after the Industrial Commission found the injury compensable under Ohio law. He then sued his employer in civil court, alleging the injury resulted from the employer's knowing failure to correct unsafe conditions that violated safety regulations. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that workers' compensation serves as the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of employment, and an award of such benefits necessarily establishes that the injury occurred in the course of employment, precluding a separate claim for intentional tort under the rule from Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case concerned a taxpayer's petition to quash an IRS summons to a bank seeking financial records for a tax investigation covering 1978-1981 under 26 U.S.C. § 7609. After the IRS issued a second, narrower summons and then withdrew the first, the government moved to dismiss the petition as moot. The court granted the motion, holding that withdrawal of the first summons eliminated any live controversy and that the second summons did not violate statutory limits on record examination or demonstrate bad faith by the IRS, as the records remained sealed and the summons was more limited in scope.

taxesprocedure

This case involved a permanent resident alien who was denied appointment as a notary public in Ohio because state law required U.S. citizenship. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and injunction declaring R.C. 147.02 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding the citizenship requirement invalid. It reasoned that notaries perform only ministerial functions rather than governmental ones, and the state failed to show any rational basis for the restriction under precedents like Sugarman and Cabell.

civil rightsimmigration

This case was a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act in which Wendy’s International challenged a Big Bite television commercial that parodied Wendy’s mascot and slogan. The court granted Wendy’s motion for a preliminary injunction, barring Big Bite from airing the commercial in its existing form or any version employing Wendy’s marks. The decision rested on findings that Big Bite intentionally used the marks in a manner likely to cause consumer confusion, that Wendy’s showed probable success on the merits, and that irreparable harm would otherwise result.

business & regulatory

This case involves a patent infringement lawsuit brought by James Dragani against Eastman Kodak Co., alleging that Kodak's microfilming equipment infringed on Dragani's '560 patent for a method of selective blipping and numbering documents for retrieval. The court also considered related claims of deceptive trade practices under Ohio law. The court granted Kodak's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims. The core reasoning was that undisputed facts established the patented method had been in public use and offered for sale more than one year before the patent application date, based on prior implementations observed by the plaintiff and a 1975 purchase order, while the trade practices claims lacked any factual support.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Hunter v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., three female plaintiffs sued their former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for alleged sex discrimination in their September 1969 terminations after an illegal work stoppage, retaliation for prior complaints about working conditions, and disparities in promotions, pay, and overtime; they also named their union and a corporate successor as defendants. The district court dismissed the claims against the successor company and all but one retaliation allegation, then conducted a bench trial on the remaining issues. After reviewing evidence including the plaintiffs' clean disciplinary records, the employer's job classification and bidding system that resulted in no women holding positions above grade 4, and statistical patterns of sex-based job assignments, the court found intentional discrimination on the basis of sex and awarded back pay plus prejudgment interest.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved defendants Milton Hairston and Emory J. Ware, who were sentenced to three years' imprisonment for unauthorized acquisition of food stamp cards. Their presentence reports had estimated parole eligibility within 14-20 months based on Parole Commission guidelines, but the Commission later determined they must serve the full terms. The defendants moved for sentence reduction or modification outside the 120-day period under Rule 35(b), arguing the discrepancy rendered their sentences improper. The court denied the motions, holding it lacked jurisdiction under Rule 35(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because the sentences were not illegal, and challenges to parole guidelines belong in habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of incarceration. The reasoning emphasized the narrow scope of Rule 35(a) for correcting only illegal sentences and the separation of sentencing and parole functions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns whether a Chapter 13 debtor can cure a default on a mortgage for their principal residence after the lender has accelerated the loan and initiated foreclosure proceedings. The State Teachers Retirement Board, as mortgage holder, objected to the debtor's plan to pay arrears over time, arguing that acceleration made the entire balance due immediately. The District Court, on rehearing, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation of the plan, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) permits curing such defaults. The court reasoned that Chapter 13's policy of debtor rehabilitation, supported by legislative history and analogous provisions in Chapter 11, allows debtors to cure defaults on accelerated mortgages despite contrary state law.

propertyprocedure

In this case, employees of Dayton Malleable, Inc. sued the company under Section 301 of the LMRA for allegedly violating a collective bargaining agreement by closing its Columbus foundry, along with related state claims of fraud and conspiracy; they also sued their union for breaching the duty of fair representation and related contract and conspiracy claims arising from negotiations over plant concessions and closure. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the undisputed facts entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the motions, finding that the company had properly notified the union of financial losses and closure plans, that proposed contract modifications were necessary to attempt keeping the plant open, and that the union had not acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in its negotiations, recommendations to members, or handling of the plant closing agreement.

labor & employment

This case involves plaintiffs who sued Quickprint of America for breach of franchise agreements, misrepresentation, fraud, unfair and deceptive practices under Ohio law, and later added federal antitrust claims after amending their complaint to include additional defendants. The court considered multiple pretrial motions, including one to amend the complaint, one to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party, and one to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The court granted the motion to amend and an extension of time to answer, rendering some dismissal motions moot. It granted the motion to stay the action pending arbitration of all claims except the antitrust allegations, based on the broad mandatory arbitration clauses in the franchise agreements that required arbitration of disputes arising from the contracts' interpretation, performance, or breach, while finding the antitrust claims separate and ancillary.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a labor union (IBFO) suing a railroad company (Conrail) under the Railway Labor Act, alleging that the company unilaterally abolished certain union positions and reassigned the work to non-union employees without first following the mandatory Section 6 procedures for changing terms of employment. The union sought a preliminary injunction to restore the prior status quo and back pay. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction but classified the dispute as a 'minor' one under the RLA because it centered on the interpretation and application of the existing collective bargaining agreement rather than an attempt to create new contractual rights. Accordingly, the court denied injunctive relief, stayed further proceedings, and directed the parties to pursue resolution before the appropriate administrative board.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case is a civil action by the United States to recover unpaid civil penalties assessed against Crooksville Coal Co. under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 for two notices of violation at its Ohio mining operation. The company received proposed assessments, participated in a settlement conference that reduced one penalty, but failed to pay either amount or deposit them in escrow as required, and raised a due process challenge to the Act's enforcement provisions. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, holding that the statutory scheme—allowing conferences, evidentiary hearings after prepayment or escrow, and prompt review—provides adequate process under the Fifth Amendment and that waiver of contest rights upon nonpayment is enforceable, while noting potential unresolved factual issues regarding state enforcement proceedings.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure