In this diversity case, Lee A. Donaldson sued Informatica Corporation under Pennsylvania law for wrongful discharge, alleging retaliation for filing an earlier lawsuit claiming violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Law over unpaid sales commissions. The U.S. District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment after reviewing undisputed facts about Donaldson's performance improvement plans and termination. The court held that Pennsylvania does not recognize a public-policy exception to at-will employment for such retaliation because the WPCL lacks an express prohibition on retaliatory discharge or a private right of action for it. The court further noted that creating such an exception is a matter for the legislature, not judicial expansion of common-law torts, and denied the motion to strike exhibits as moot.
In this case, hourly employees at a U.S. Steel coke plant brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act alleging that the company failed to compensate them for time spent walking to and from workstations after donning and before doffing required protective gear. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment dismissing claims for donning, doffing, and showering time but allowed the walking-time claims to proceed. Defendant moved to decertify the collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The court denied the motion, reasoning that a common company policy of non-compensation for these activities created sufficient similarity among plaintiffs for collective treatment, with individual differences in walking times and routes primarily affecting damages calculations rather than liability determinations, which could be addressed through representative evidence at later stages.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued her auto insurer, GEICO, after the company stopped paying first-party medical benefits following a car accident, alleging breach of contract, bad faith under Pennsylvania law, and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation and entering judgment for GEICO. The core reasoning was that GEICO properly relied on peer review reports finding further treatment unreasonable and unnecessary, the plaintiff presented no contrary medical evidence, the bad faith claim could not proceed without a contract breach, and the consumer protection claim was limited to nonfeasance with no private right of action.
In this case, Plaintiff Braden, who worked as a Paternity/IRS Coordinator in the Domestic Relations Section of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, sued the County for violating her FMLA rights by discharging her in retaliation for taking approved family and medical leave. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment, ruling the County was not a joint employer, and now addressed whether the County qualified as an integrated employer or if an employment relationship existed to support liability under the FMLA's retaliation provisions. The court granted the County's supplemental motion for summary judgment, concluding that no integrated employment relationship existed because the judicial system retained independent control over personnel matters, funding arrangements, and operations despite the County's provision of facilities and mandatory financial support. The court further clarified that the claim was based on retaliation for exercising FMLA rights rather than opposition to unlawful practices, requiring a direct employment relationship that was absent here.
This case involved an inmate plaintiff suing multiple prison and hospital officials, including Commonwealth Defendants and Dr. Petras, over alleged incidents during periods of incarceration at facilities like Mayview State Hospital, with claims centered on due process violations related to medical treatment. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report after de novo review, granting summary judgment to the Commonwealth Defendants, denying summary judgment to Dr. Petras, and denying the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the objections raised did not undermine the magistrate's findings on the absence of genuine issues of material fact for the Commonwealth Defendants, while disputes remained regarding Dr. Petras's actions under due process standards for non-emergency medication procedures. The decision followed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards, viewing facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party where appropriate.
Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, an energy company holding oil and gas leases in Blaine Township, Pennsylvania, sued the Township after it enacted the Corporate Rights Ordinance, which declared that corporations are not 'persons' under the U.S. or Pennsylvania Constitutions and denied them protections under the Commerce and Contracts Clauses. The Township moved to dismiss, contending that Range lacked standing and failed to state a viable claim. The court denied the motion in full, holding that Supreme Court precedent has long recognized corporations as persons entitled to constitutional protections and that a township lacks authority to override that precedent. The decision emphasized that only the Supreme Court may depart from its own rulings on corporate constitutional rights, and lower courts remain bound to follow them.
