William Lee Dwyer

This case concerns conditions at Washington's Special Commitment Center, where individuals are civilly committed indefinitely as sexually violent predators after completing criminal sentences. Plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of mental health treatment provided, leading to a prior contempt finding against facility officials for failing to comply with a 1994 injunction requiring constitutionally adequate care. After a four-day evidentiary hearing in April 2000, the court evaluated whether defendants had achieved substantial compliance with the injunction before sanctions took effect. The core reasoning rests on Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements that civilly committed persons receive treatment offering a realistic opportunity for improvement, citing precedents like Youngberg v. Romeo, with the Washington statute also mandating adequate individualized care.

civil rightscriminal lawhealthcare

The case involved Ramiro Prado Hernandez, a Mexican citizen previously deported in 1992 who reentered the U.S. illegally, married a U.S. citizen, and applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) while the INS sought to reinstate his prior deportation order under INA § 241(a)(5) without a hearing or consideration of his application. The district court first determined it had habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to address the legal questions presented, rejecting the INS arguments that review was limited to the court of appeals. On the merits, the court held that § 241(a)(5) did not bar adjudication of the adjustment application because § 245(i), reenacted after IIRIRA, permits such relief for aliens who paid the required penalty and that the INS interpretation to the contrary was erroneous; accordingly, reinstatement of the deportation order was stayed pending decision on the adjustment application.

immigration

This case concerns a challenge by environmental organizations under the Administrative Procedure Act to the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management's approval of timber sales in the Pacific Northwest without conducting wildlife surveys required by the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan. Plaintiffs argued that interpretive memoranda issued by the agencies unlawfully exempted sales from survey requirements for certain species if environmental reviews occurred before specified cutoff dates, and that a supplemental environmental impact statement was needed due to new information. The court reviewed the plan's language and agency actions on motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the memoranda contradicted the plan's explicit requirements for surveys prior to ground-disturbing activities implemented after the deadlines, rendering the timber sale approvals arbitrary and capricious, with no deference owed to interpretations that conflict with the plan's clear terms.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved health and welfare trusts for union workers suing major tobacco companies, alleging they conspired to deceive the public and health providers about the addictiveness of cigarettes and to suppress safer alternatives, thereby causing the trusts to bear increased costs for treating smoking-related illnesses. After federal claims were dismissed, the remaining state-law claims under Washington law included unjust enrichment, violations of the Consumer Protection Act, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed all claims, reasoning that the plaintiffs' injuries were too remote and indirect to satisfy requirements of proximate cause or antitrust injury, that no evidence showed defendants knew of the trusts' contracts, and that the conspiracy claim lacked an underlying actionable tort; the court also denied the plaintiffs' renewed motion to certify questions to the Washington Supreme Court.

labor & employmenthealthcaretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Khamsaene Sivongxay, a Laotian citizen and lawful U.S. permanent resident convicted of a deportable offense, who had been held in INS custody for over two years after a final deportation order because Laos refused to issue travel documents. Sivongxay challenged his indefinite detention as violating statutory time limits on post-order detention and substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. The court first addressed jurisdiction, finding habeas review available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without an exhaustion requirement. It then held that pre-AEDPA/IIRIRA law applied due to non-retroactivity principles and limited detention to six months, and that continued indefinite detention was excessive relative to the government's interests in ensuring removal and protecting the public. The petition was granted, ordering Sivongxay's release under Attorney General supervision.

immigrationcivil rights

This case involves plaintiffs bringing federal securities claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against defendants including SunAmerica Securities, Inc., based on investments in promissory notes that were renewed over time. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims as time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations from discovery of the violation and the three-year statute of repose. The court denied the motion, holding that defendants had not shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on when plaintiffs were placed on inquiry notice. On the statute of repose, the court determined that each renewal constituted a new sale of a security because the investors had the option to reject the renewals, so the repose period began running from the date of each renewal rather than the original investment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is an appeal from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court order holding that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate owes no additional taxes, penalties, or interest on the sale of the debtor's residence. The district court affirmed, ruling that the estate properly excluded the gain from gross income under 26 U.S.C. § 121. The facts were undisputed: the debtor had lived in the property for at least two years before filing, and the trustee sold it after the petition. The core reasoning relied on 26 U.S.C. § 1398(c)(1) and (f)(1), which require the estate's taxable income to be computed like an individual's and treat the estate as succeeding to the debtor's tax attributes, including the property's character as a principal residence.

taxesproperty

The case involved an illegal alien petitioner with a prior heroin conviction who reentered the U.S. in 1986, lived with his U.S. citizen family, and was arrested by the INS in 1997; he challenged the denial of bond in his deportation proceedings under a transitional rule in IIRIRA § 303(b)(3), which the INS and BIA interpreted to require mandatory custody without regard to when he had been released from criminal incarceration years earlier. The court held that it had jurisdiction despite non-exhaustion of remedies and granted the habeas petition, remanding the matter to the agency for an individualized bond hearing within fourteen days. The core reasoning was that the statutory phrase "when the alien is released" plainly referred to release from incarceration on the underlying offense, as confirmed by the provision's context, structure, comparison to the permanent rule in INA § 236 and AEDPA § 440(c), and canons against surplusage, making the agency's broader interpretation arbitrary and capricious; constitutional claims were not reached.

immigrationcriminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved U.S. West Communications seeking federal court review of the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission's approval of an interconnection agreement under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with the suit brought against the commission's individual members. The commissioners moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds, while the United States and FCC sought to intervene. The court granted the United States' intervention, denied the FCC's, denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered the WUTC joined as a party. It reasoned that the state had waived immunity by participating in the federal regulatory program, which expressly provides for exclusive federal judicial review of state commission determinations under 47 U.S.C. § 252(e).

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involved former corrections officers from the King County jail who sued the county and officials after being terminated or separated from their positions due to permanent injuries that prevented them from having direct contact with inmates. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), and other laws, seeking reinstatement with permanent assignment to control room duties as an accommodation. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the ability to have direct contact with inmates was an essential function of the corrections officer job that could not be reasonably accommodated, meaning the plaintiffs were not qualified individuals under the ADA or WLAD. The court also dismissed the section 1983 claims as derivative and found insufficient evidence for the emotional distress claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a wrongful death claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by Daniel Hagy against the United States after his wife Tracia died from Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, which she allegedly contracted from contaminated human growth hormone treatments received as a child through a government-funded program operated by contractors and grantees. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the claims fell within exceptions to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion, holding that the government could not be held liable for the negligence of independent contractors or grantees who supplied and processed the hormone, and that any failure by the government to discover or warn about the risks was protected by the discretionary function exception because the decisions involved policy analysis and were not mandated by any specific directive.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

This case concerns a challenge by GTE Northwest under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to an arbitrator's order that was incorporated into an interconnection agreement submitted for approval to the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the Act requires court review only after the state commission issues a final decision on the agreement. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the statute's language, structure, and purpose show Congress's intent to defer judicial review until the agreement becomes final, and that alternative jurisdictional statutes do not apply when a specific review procedure is provided.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

In Doe v. Gregoire, a Washington state prisoner convicted of sex offenses in 1985 sought a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to prevent state and local officials from enforcing the Community Protection Act of 1990's registration and public notification requirements against him upon release. The court denied the motion as to the registration provisions and notification to law enforcement agencies but granted it as to public notification to community groups and the media. The decision turned on the Ex Post Facto Clause, with the court finding that registration and limited law enforcement notification are regulatory rather than punitive and thus may apply retroactively, while broader public notification provisions inflict additional punishment and cannot be enforced against offenders whose crimes predated the statute. The ruling was based on the distinction between punitive and non-punitive measures and did not address the plaintiff's other constitutional claims.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns whether the Environmental Protection Agency fulfilled its duties under the Clean Water Act to approve or disapprove Idaho's water quality standards submitted in 1994 as part of the required triennial review process. Environmental groups sued the EPA, claiming it had failed to issue timely approvals or disapprovals and, after disapproving portions of the standards, to promptly promulgate substitute federal standards. The court determined that a June 1996 letter from EPA Region 10, along with the parties' stipulation, constituted formal disapproval under 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3), triggering the agency's mandatory duty under § 1313(c)(4)(A) to prepare and publish new standards. The EPA's nearly two-year delay before disapproval plus additional months afterward violated this nondiscretionary obligation, leading the court to grant summary judgment for the plaintiffs and order promulgation within sixty days. The decision rested on the statute's plain language requiring notification of deficiencies within ninety days and prompt federal action thereafter, as well as precedent interpreting these provisions as mandatory.

environmentfederal power

The case was a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act and Administrative Procedure Act in which environmental groups sued the EPA to compel development of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants for hundreds of water quality limited segments in Idaho after earlier litigation had forced the EPA to list those impaired waters. The court denied the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the agency's approval of a proposed schedule extending TMDL development until at least 2021 failed to meet the statutory duty to establish a reasonable schedule in cooperation with the state. It granted plaintiffs' cross-motion in part, set aside the EPA's schedule as arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, and remanded the matter to the EPA with directions to file a complete and reasonable schedule within six months, while noting that a completion time of approximately five years would be reasonable and retaining jurisdiction.

environmentfederal power

This case involved real estate developers who sued a municipal water district after being denied water meters and connections for a residential project due to a 1994 moratorium on new connections enacted amid a water supply shortage. The developers had received an earlier certificate of water availability and built a system extension but did not pay connection fees in time to qualify as 'committed' users under the moratorium resolutions, which prioritized certain users and limited total new connections. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the two federal claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact. It held that the district's actions were legislative rather than targeted at the plaintiffs, satisfying procedural due process through standard legislative processes, and were not arbitrary or unrelated to public welfare, thus satisfying substantive due process. The court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and remanded them to state court.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether the City of Medina's six-month moratorium on issuing permits for new wireless communications facilities violated Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 or the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Sprint Spectrum, seeking to build facilities in the area, sued for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the moratorium unreasonably delayed its applications, discriminated against new providers, and improperly regulated market entry. The court denied the injunction, holding that the TCA preserves local zoning authority and permits reasonable moratoria for study and deliberation consistent with generally applicable time frames, that no discrimination among providers was shown, and that the moratorium did not amount to regulating entry under the 1993 Act.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Philips v. Perry, a U.S. Navy petty officer sued for an injunction to block his administrative discharge after he stated he was homosexual and had engaged in homosexual acts, which triggered proceedings under then-existing Department of Defense directives and a new federal statute. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiff's motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The ruling followed binding Ninth Circuit precedent in Meinhold and Beller/Selland v. Middendorf, which upheld the constitutionality of regulations targeting homosexual conduct rather than status or orientation alone, distinguishing this case from others barring discharge based solely on sexual orientation. The court noted the plaintiff's strong service record but concluded that established law required upholding the discharge based on acts and statements indicating future conduct.

civil rightsfederal power

This case concerns challenges to a 1994 forest management plan for approximately 24 million acres of federal lands in Washington, Oregon, and Northern California, adopted by the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management to address conservation of the northern spotted owl habitat following prior court orders. Environmental groups, including the Seattle Audubon Society, argued that the plan inadequately complied with environmental laws and sought further analysis and restrictions on timber sales, while the timber industry, represented by the Northwest Forest Resource Council, challenged the plan as overly restrictive. The court granted summary judgment to the federal defendants, holding that the plan was adopted within the agencies' lawful discretion and satisfied all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, including those under NEPA and the Endangered Species Act. The decision was based on the record showing that the plan provided for ecosystem preservation while allowing sustainable timber levels, and no additional environmental impact statement or remand was required.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In United States v. McCaslin, the defendant moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1991 conviction and sentence for manufacturing and distributing marijuana after the government had already forfeited his residential real property under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) in a separate civil proceeding. The court granted the motion and vacated both the conviction and sentence. It reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. United States established the forfeiture as a form of punishment rather than a remedial measure, and that imposing a subsequent criminal sentence in a separate proceeding therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition on multiple punishments for the same offense.

criminal lawprocedureproperty