In this case, plaintiff Daniel Hill, a seaman employed by Hornbeck Offshore entities, sued for negligence and unseaworthiness after alleged injuries aboard vessels in 2008 and 2009, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on agreements contained in electronic incentive contracts (restricted stock units and cash payments) that Hill had signed between 2007 and 2010. The court granted the motion, finding that the agreements were valid under the Federal Arbitration Act and Louisiana contract law, that the dispute fell within their scope, and that they were not part of an exempt seaman employment contract because acceptance was not a condition of continued employment. The court rejected arguments based on timeliness, electronic formation, and public policy, noting the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
This case involves a dispute between North American Catastrophe Services, Inc. (NACS) and its insurer Northfield Insurance Company over whether Northfield had a duty to defend NACS in lawsuits alleging damages from formaldehyde exposure in emergency housing units procured for FEMA. NACS sought a declaratory judgment that Northfield must provide a defense under its commercial general liability policy, while Northfield argued that a total pollution exclusion barred coverage. The court determined that Florida law governs the insurance contract and that the pollution exclusion unambiguously applies to the claims of bodily injury from formaldehyde fumes. Accordingly, the court denied NACS's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Northfield's cross-motion, ruling that Northfield has no duty to defend.
This case arose from claims by Mississippi plaintiffs who received emergency housing units from FEMA after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and alleged injuries from formaldehyde exposure in those units, suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence in providing, maintaining, and warning about the housing. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss all remaining FTCA claims by these plaintiffs for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that the FTCA requires the government's liability to be measured by the analogous liability of a private person under Mississippi law, where a statute abrogates tort liability for the gratuitous provision of emergency shelter to disaster victims, and FEMA's actions were deemed equivalent to such voluntary, non-contractual aid rather than a paid rental arrangement.
The case involved plaintiff Battaglia suing Fluor Enterprises, Inc. and related entities for negligence and claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act after he fell through the floor of a FEMA travel trailer on two occasions in 2007, alleging that Fluor failed to properly install, inspect, maintain, or repair the trailer provided after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Fluor moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no ongoing duties after its contractual obligations ended on June 30, 2006, that its subcontractor’s installation did not involve the flooring, and that it was not a manufacturer under the LPLA. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims against Fluor. The core reasoning was that plaintiff presented no evidence of deficient installation or inspection that would have revealed the defect, Fluor had no responsibility for repairs or maintenance at the time of the falls, and plaintiff failed to show any basis for LPLA liability.
In Hinson v. M/V Chimera, various plaintiffs who provided goods and services to the vessel between 2006 and 2007 sought partial summary judgment establishing maritime liens against the Chimera under the Maritime Commercial Instruments and Liens Act (MCILA), 46 U.S.C. § 31301 et seq., after they were not paid by Grande Rouge Charters, LLC (GRC). The district court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to liens for necessaries supplied on the order of the vessel owner or an authorized person. The core reasoning was that the key facts were undisputed, the statutory presumption of authority applied to GRC, and the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for lien creation, with any separate ownership disputes between GRC and other defendants not precluding the liens.
This multi-district litigation involves individuals who lived in FEMA-provided emergency housing units (mobile homes) after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and allege injuries from high formaldehyde levels and inadequate warnings. The manufacturing defendants moved to dismiss the state tort claims under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards Act and HUD regulations expressly and impliedly preempt those claims under the Supremacy Clause. The court accepted the well-pleaded facts as true and examined the MHA's preemption provision (42 U.S.C. § 5403(d)), which bars non-identical state standards on the same aspects of construction or safety, along with related HUD Code sections on formaldehyde emissions and notices. It concluded that the federal scheme requires broad preemption to maintain uniform national standards and that allowing state common-law claims would conflict with that objective by imposing different substantive requirements. Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims against the manufacturers are preempted and subject to dismissal.
