Battle of Singapore

Background

Outbreak of war

In the interwar years, Britain had established a naval base in Singapore after the Anglo-Japanese alliance had lapsed in 1923. As part of the Singapore strategy, the base formed a key part of British interwar defence planning for the region. Financial constraints had hampered construction efforts during the intervening period and shifting strategic circumstances had largely undermined the key premises behind the strategy by the time war had broken out in the Pacific. During 1940 and 1941, the Allies imposed a trade embargo on Japan in response to its campaigns in China and its occupation of French Indochina. The basic plan for taking Singapore was worked out in July 1940. Intelligence gained in late 1940–early 1941 did not alter that plan but confirmed it in the minds of Japanese decision makers. On 11 November 1940, the German raider Atlantis captured the British steamer Automedon in the Indian Ocean, carrying papers meant for Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British commander in the Far East. The papers included information about the weakness of the Singapore base. In December 1940, the Germans handed over copies of the papers to the Japanese. The Japanese had broken the British Army's codes and in January 1941, the Second Department (the intelligence-gathering arm) of the Imperial Army interpreted and read a message from Singapore to London complaining in much detail about the weak state of "Fortress Singapore", a message so frank in its admission of weakness that the Japanese at first suspected it was a British plant, believing that no officer would be so open in admitting weaknesses to his superiors. Only after cross-checking the message with the Automedon papers did the Japanese accept it to be genuine.

Japanese oil reserves were rapidly being depleted because of its military operations in China and by industrial consumption. In the latter half of 1941, the Japanese began preparations for war to seize vital resources if peaceful efforts to buy them failed. Planners determined a broad scheme of manoeuvres that incorporated simultaneous attacks on the territories of Britain, The Netherlands and the United States. This would see landings in Malaya and Hong Kong as part of a general move south to secure Singapore, connected to Malaya by the Johor–Singapore Causeway and then an invasion of the oil-rich area of Borneo and Java in the Dutch East Indies. Attacks would be made against the American naval fleet at Pearl Harbor as well as landings in the Philippines and attacks on Guam, Wake Island and the Gilbert Islands. Following these attacks, a period of consolidation was planned, after which the Japanese planners intended to build up the defences of the captured territory by establishing a strong perimeter from the India–Burma frontier through to Wake Island and traversing Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea and New Britain, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. This perimeter would be used to block Allied attempts to regain the lost territory and defeat their will to fight.

Invasion of Malaya

The Japanese 25th Army invaded Malaya from Indochina, moving into northern Malaya and Thailand by amphibious assault on 8 December 1941. This was virtually simultaneous with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which precipitated the United States' entry into the war. Thailand resisted landings on its territory for about 5 to 8 hours; it then signed a ceasefire and a Treaty of Friendship with Japan, later declaring war on the UK and the US. The Japanese then proceeded overland across the Thai–Malayan border to attack Malaya. At this time, the Japanese began bombing Singapore.

The 25th Army was resisted in northern Malaya by III Corps of the British Indian Army. Although the 25th Army was outnumbered by Commonwealth forces in Malaya and Singapore, they did not take the initiative with their forces while Japanese commanders concentrated theirs. The Japanese were superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics and experience. Conventional British military thinking was that the Japanese forces were inferior and characterised the Malayan jungles as "impassable"; the Japanese were repeatedly able to use this to their advantage to outflank hastily established defensive lines. Prior to the Battle of Singapore the most resistance was met at the Battle of Muar which involved the 8th Australian Division and the 45th Indian Brigade. The British troops left in the city of Singapore were basically garrison troops.

At the start of the campaign, the Commonwealth forces had only 164 first-line aircraft in Malaya and Singapore and the only fighter type was the sub-standard Brewster 339E Buffalo. The Buffaloes were operated by one Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), two Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and two Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons. The aircraft were, according to historian Peter Dennis, "not considered good enough for use in Europe" and major shortcomings included a slow rate of climb and the fuel system, which required the pilot to hand-pump fuel if flying above 6,000 ft (1,800 m). The Imperial Japanese Army Air Force aircraft were more numerous and pilots better trained than the second-hand assortment of untrained pilots and inferior Commonwealth equipment remaining in Malaya, Borneo and Singapore. Japanese fighters were superior to the Commonwealth fighters, which helped the Japanese to gain air supremacy. Although outnumbered and outclassed, the Buffalos were able to provide some resistance, with RAAF pilots alone managing to shoot down at least 20 Japanese aircraft before the few survivors were withdrawn.

Force Z, consisting of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers, sailed north out of Singapore on 8 December to oppose expected Japanese landings along the coast of Malaya. Japanese land-based aircraft found and sank the two capital ships on 10 December, leaving the east coast of the Malayan Peninsula exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their amphibious landings. Japanese forces quickly isolated, surrounded and forced the surrender of Indian units defending the coast. Despite their numerical inferiority, they advanced down the Malayan Peninsula, overwhelming the defences. The Japanese forces also used bicycle infantry and light tanks, allowing swift movement through the jungle. The Commonwealth having thought the terrain made them impractical, had no tanks and only a few armoured vehicles, which put them at a severe disadvantage.

Prelude

During the weeks preceding the invasion, Commonwealth forces suffered a number of both subdued and openly disruptive disagreements amongst its senior commanders, as well as pressure from Australian Prime Minister John Curtin. Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, commander of the garrison, had 85,000 soldiers—the equivalent, on paper at least, of just over four divisions. Of this figure, 15,000 men were employed in supply, administrative, or other non-combatant roles. The remaining force was a mix of front-line and second-line troops. There were 49 infantry battalions—21 Indian, 13 British, six Australian, four Indian States Forces assigned to airfield defence, three Straits Settlements Volunteer Force, and two Malayan. In addition, there were two British machine-gun battalions, one Australian, and a British reconnaissance battalion. The newly arrived 18th Infantry Division (Major-General Merton Beckwith-Smith)—was at full strength but lacked experience and training. The rest of the force was of mixed quality, condition, training, equipment and morale. Lionel Wigmore, the Australian official historian of the Malayan campaign, wrote

Only one of the Indian battalions was up to numerical strength, three (in the 44th Brigade) had recently arrived in a semi-trained condition, nine had been hastily reorganised with a large intake of raw recruits, and four were being re-formed but were far from being fit for action. Six of the United Kingdom battalions (in the 54th and 55th Brigades of the British 18th Infantry Division) had only just landed in Malaya, and the other seven battalions were under-manned. Of the Australian battalions, three had drawn heavily upon undertrained recruits, new to the theatre. The Malay battalions had not been in action, and the Straits Settlements Volunteers were only sketchily trained. Further, losses on the mainland had resulted in a general shortage of equipment.

Percival gave Major-General Gordon Bennett's two brigades from the 8th Australian Division responsibility for the western side of Singapore, including the prime invasion points in the northwest of the island. This was mostly mangrove swamp and jungle, broken by rivers and creeks. In the heart of the "Western Area" was RAF Tengah, Singapore's largest airfield at the time. The Australian 22nd Brigade, under Brigadier Harold Taylor, was assigned a 10 mi (16 km) wide sector in the west, and the 27th Brigade, under Brigadier Duncan Maxwell, had responsibility for a 4,000 yd (3,700 m) zone just west of the Causeway. The infantry positions were reinforced by the recently arrived Australian 2/4th Machine-Gun Battalion. Also under Bennett's command was the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Battle

Japanese landings

Blowing up the causeway had delayed the Japanese attack for over a week. Prior to the main assault, the Australians were subjected to an intense artillery bombardment. Over a period of 15 hours, starting at 23:00 on 8 February 1942, Yamashita's heavy guns fired a bombardment of 88,000 shells (200 rounds per gun) along the straits, cutting telephone lines and isolating forward units. The British had the means to conduct counter-battery fire opposite the Australians that would have caused casualties and disruption among the Japanese assault troops. The bombardment of the Australians was not seen as a prelude to attack—Malaya Command believed that it would last several days and would later switch its focus to the north-east, despite its ferocity exceeding anything the Allies had experienced thus far in the campaign; no order was passed to the Commonwealth artillery units to bombard possible Japanese assembly areas.

Shortly before 20:30 on 8 February, the first wave of Japanese troops from the 5th Division and 18th Division began crossing the Johor Strait. The main weight of the Japanese force, about 13,000 men, from 16 assault battalions, with five in reserve, attacked the 22nd Australian Brigade. The assault was received by the 2/18th Battalion and the 2/20th Battalion. Each Japanese division had 150 barges and collapsible boats, sufficient for lifts of 4,000. During the first night 13,000 Japanese troops landed and were followed by another 10,000 after first light. The Australians numbered just 3,000 men and lacked any significant reserve.

As the landing craft closed on the Australian positions, machine gunners from the 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion, interspersed amongst the rifle companies, opened fire. Spotlights had been placed on the beaches by a British unit to illuminate an invasion force on the water but many had been damaged by the bombardment and no order was made to turn the others on. The initial wave was concentrated against the positions occupied by the 2/18th and 2/20th Battalions, around the Buloh River, as well as one company from the 2/19th Battalion. Over the course of an hour, intense fighting took place on the right flank of the 2/19th Battalion, until its positions were overrun, the Japanese then advanced inland concealed by the darkness and the vegetation. The resistance put up by the company from the 2/19th pushed the follow-on waves of Japanese craft to land around the mouth of Murai River, which resulted in them creating a gap between the 2/19th and 2/18th battalions. From there the Japanese launched two concerted attacks against the 2/18th, which were met with massed fire before they overwhelmed the Australians by weight of numbers. Urgent requests for fire support were made and the 2/15th Field Regiment responded to these requests with over 4,800 rounds.

Air operations

The air campaign for Singapore began during the invasion of Malaya. Early on 8 December 1941, Singapore was bombed for the first time by long-range Japanese aircraft, such as the Mitsubishi G3M2 "Nell" and the Mitsubishi G4M1 "Betty", based in Japanese-occupied Indochina. The bombers struck the city centre as well as the Sembawang Naval Base and the northern airfields. For the rest of December there were false alerts and several infrequent and sporadic hit-and-run attacks on outlying military installations such as the Naval Base but no raids on Singapore City. The situation had become so desperate that one British soldier took to the middle of a road to fire his Vickers machine gun at any aircraft that passed. He could only say "The bloody bastards will never think of looking for me in the open, and I want to see a bloody plane brought down". The next recorded raid on the city occurred on the night of 29/30 December, and nightly raids ensued for over a week, accompanied by daylight raids from 12 January 1942. As the Japanese army advanced towards Singapore Island, the day and night raids increased in frequency and intensity, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties, up to the time of the British surrender.

In December, 51 Hawker Hurricane Mk II fighters and 24 pilots were sent to Singapore, the nuclei of five squadrons. They arrived on 3 January 1942, by which stage the Buffalo squadrons had been overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron RAF was formed and No. 488 Squadron RNZAF, a Buffalo squadron, had converted to Hurricanes; 232 Squadron became operational on 20 January and destroyed three Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscars" that day, for the loss of three Hurricanes. Like the Buffalos the Hurricanes began to suffer severe losses in dogfights. From 27 to 30 January, another 48 Hurricanes arrived on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. Operated by the four squadrons of No. 226 Group RAF, they flew from an airfield code-named P1, near Palembang, Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies, while a flight was maintained in Singapore. Many of the Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground by air raids. The lack of an effective air early warning system throughout the campaign meant that many Commonwealth aircraft were lost in this manner during Japanese attacks against airfields.

By the time of the invasion, only ten Hurricanes of 232 Squadron, based at RAF Kallang, remained to provide air cover for the Commonwealth forces on Singapore. The airfields at Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery at Johor Bahru. RAF Kallang was the only operational airstrip left; the surviving squadrons and aircraft had withdrawn by January to reinforce the Dutch East Indies. On the morning of 9 February, dogfights took place over Sarimbun Beach and other western areas. In the first encounter, the last ten Hurricanes were scrambled from Kallang Airfield to intercept a Japanese formation of about 84 aircraft, flying from Johor to provide air cover for their invasion force. The Hurricanes shot down six Japanese aircraft and damaged 14 others for the loss of a Hurricane.

Second day

Believing that further landings would occur in the northeast, Percival did not reinforce the 22nd Brigade until the morning of 9 February, sending two half-strength battalions from the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. The Indians reached Bennett around noon. Shortly afterwards Percival allocated the composite 6th/15th Indian Infantry Brigade to reinforce the Australians from their position around the Singapore racecourse. Throughout the day, the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, still holding its position on the coast, began to feel pressure on its exposed flank and after discussions between Percival and Bennett, it was decided that they would have to retire eastwards to maintain the southern part of the Commonwealth line. Bennett decided to form a secondary defensive line, known as the "Kranji-Jurong Switch Line" facing west between the two rivers, with its centre around Bulim, east of Tengah Airfield—which subsequently came under Japanese control—and just north of Jurong.

To the north, the 27th Australian Brigade had not been engaged during the Japanese assaults on the first day. Possessing only the 2/26th and 2/30th, following the transfer of the 2/29th Battalion to the 22nd Brigade, Maxwell sought to reorganise his force to deal with the threat posed to the western flank. Late on 9 February, the Imperial Guards began assaulting the positions held by the 27th Brigade, concentrating on those held by the 2/26th Battalion. During the initial assault, the Japanese suffered severe casualties from Australian mortars and machine-guns and from burning oil which had been sluiced into the water following the demolition of several oil tanks by the Australians. Some of the Guards reached the shore and maintained a tenuous beachhead; at the height of the assault, it is reported that the Guards commander, Nishimura, requested permission to cancel the attack due to the many casualties his troops had suffered from the fire but Yamashita ordered them to press on.

Communication problems caused further cracks in the Commonwealth defence. Maxwell knew that the 22nd Brigade was under increasing pressure but was unable to contact Taylor and was wary of encirclement. As parties of Japanese troops began to infiltrate the brigade's positions from the west, exploiting the gap formed by the Kranji River, the 2/26th Battalion was forced to withdraw to a position east of the Bukit Timah Road; this move precipitated a sympathetic move by the 2/30th away from the causeway. The authority for this withdrawal would later be the subject of debate, with Bennett stating that he had not given Maxwell authorisation to do so. The result was that the Allies lost control of the beaches adjoining the west side of the causeway, the high ground overlooking the causeway and the left flank of the 11th Indian Division was exposed. The Japanese were given a firm foothold to "build up their force unopposed".

Japanese breakthrough

The opening at Kranji made it possible for Imperial Guards armoured units to land there unopposed, after which they were able to begin ferrying across their artillery and armour. After finding his left flank exposed by the withdrawal of the 27th Brigade, the commander of the 11th Indian Infantry Division, Key, dispatched the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade from reserve, to retake the high ground to the south of the Causeway. Throughout 10 February further fighting took place around along the Jurong Line, as orders were formulated to establish a secondary defensive line to the west of the Reformatory Road, with troops not then employed in the Jurong Line; misinterpretation of these orders resulted in Taylor, the commander of the 22nd Brigade, prematurely withdrawing his troops to the east, where they were joined by a 200-strong ad hoc battalion of Australian reinforcements, known as X Battalion. The Jurong Line eventually collapsed after the 12th Indian Brigade was withdrawn by its commander, Brigadier Archie Paris, to the road junction near Bukit Panjang, after he lost contact with the 27th Brigade on his right; the commander of the 44th Indian Brigade, Ballantine, commanding the extreme left of the line, also misinterpreted the orders in the same manner that Taylor had and withdrew. On the evening of 10 February, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, cabled Wavell

I think you ought to realise the way we view the situation in Singapore. It was reported to Cabinet by the CIGS [Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Alan Brooke] that Percival has over 100,000 [sic] men, of whom 33,000 are British and 17,000 Australian. It is doubtful whether the Japanese have as many in the whole Malay Peninsula ... In these circumstances the defenders must greatly outnumber Japanese forces who have crossed the straits, and in a well-contested battle they should destroy them. There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. The 18th Division has a chance to make its name in history. Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake. I rely on you to show no mercy to weakness in any form. With the Russians fighting as they are and the Americans so stubborn at Luzon, the whole reputation of our country and our race is involved. It is expected that every unit will be brought into close contact with the enemy and fight it out.

In the early afternoon of 10 February, on learning of the collapse of the Jurong Line, Wavell ordered Percival to launch a counter-attack to retake it. This order was passed on to Bennett, who allocated X Battalion. Percival made plans of his own for the counter-attack, detailing a three-phased operation that involved the majority of the 22nd Brigade, and he subsequently passed this on to Bennett, who began implementing the plan, but forgot to call X Battalion back. The battalion, consisting of poorly trained and equipped replacements, advanced to an assembly area near Bukit Timah. In the early hours of 11 February, the Japanese, who had concentrated significant forces around the Tengah airfield and on the Jurong Road, began further offensive operations: the 5th Division aimed its advance towards Bukit Panjang, while the 18th Division struck out towards Bukit Timah. They fell upon X Battalion, which had camped in its assembly area while waiting to launch its counter-attack, and two-thirds of the battalion was killed or wounded. After brushing aside elements of the 6th/15th Indian Brigade, the Japanese again began attacking the 22nd Australian Brigade around the Reformatory Road.

Alexandra Hospital massacre

On 14 February 1942, the Japanese renewed their assault on the western part of the Southern Area's defences near the area that the 1st Malayan Brigade had fought desperately to hold the previous day. At about 13:00, the Japanese broke through and advanced towards the Alexandra Barracks Hospital. A British lieutenant—acting as an envoy with a white flag—approached Japanese forces but was killed with a bayonet. After Japanese troops entered the hospital, they killed up to 50 soldiers, including some undergoing surgery. Doctors and nurses were also killed. The next day, about 200 male staff members and patients who had been assembled and bound the previous day, many of them walking wounded, were ordered to walk about 400 m (440 yd) to an industrial area. Those who fell on the way were bayoneted. The men were forced into a series of small, badly ventilated rooms where they were held overnight without water. Some died during the night as a result of their treatment. The remainder were bayoneted the following morning. Several survivors were identified after the war, some of whom had survived by pretending to be dead. One survivor, Private Arthur Haines from the Wiltshire Regiment, wrote a four-page account of the massacre that was sold by his daughter by private auction in 2008. Violet Maud Evelyn Jones, Royal Red Cross, SRN, SCM, was Principal Matron in the Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service (QAIMNS) in charge of the nursing staff at the British Military Hospital Singapore from 1940 - 1942. She organised the evacuation of nursing staff the day before the massacre on board three ships. Jones, together with about 500 adults and children, was evacuated aboard the SS Kuala. On 14 February 1942 the Japanese air force bombed the ship and Jones and many others were killed including Sister Marjorie Aizlewood Hodgson, Sister Margaret Raven Finlay and Matron Helen Montgomery.

Fall of Singapore

Throughout the night of 14/15 February, the Japanese continued to press against the Commonwealth perimeter, and though the line largely held, the military supply situation was rapidly deteriorating. The water system was badly damaged and supply was uncertain, rations were running low, petrol for military vehicles was all but exhausted, and there was little ammunition left for the field artillery and anti-aircraft guns, which were unable to disrupt the Japanese air attacks causing many casualties in the city centre. Little work had been done to build air raid shelters, and looting and desertion by Commonwealth troops further added to the chaos in the area. At 09:30, Percival held a conference at Fort Canning with his senior commanders. He proposed two options: an immediate counter-attack to regain the reservoirs and the military food depots around Bukit Timah, or surrender. After a full and frank exchange of views, all present agreed that no counter-attack was possible, and Percival opted for surrender. Post-war analysis has shown that a counter-attack might have succeeded. The Japanese were at the limit of their supply line and their artillery units were also running out of ammunition.

A delegation was selected to go to the Japanese headquarters. It consisted of a senior staff officer, the colonial secretary and an interpreter. The three set off in a motor car bearing a Union Jack and a white flag of truce toward the enemy lines to discuss a cessation of hostilities. They returned with orders that Percival himself proceed with staff officers to the Ford Motor Factory, where Yamashita would lay down the terms of surrender. A further requirement was that the Japanese Rising Sun Flag be hoisted over the Cathay Building, the tallest building in Singapore. Percival formally surrendered shortly after 17:15. Earlier that day, Percival had issued orders to destroy all secret and technical equipment, ciphers, codes, secret documents and heavy guns.

Under the terms of the surrender, hostilities were to cease at 20:30 that evening, all military forces in Singapore were to surrender unconditionally, all Commonwealth forces would remain in position and disarm themselves within an hour, and the British were allowed to maintain a force of 1,000 armed men to prevent looting until relieved by the Japanese. Yamashita also accepted full responsibility for the lives of the civilians in the city. Following the surrender, Bennett caused controversy when he decided to escape. After receiving news of the surrender, Bennett handed command of the 8th Australian Division to the divisional artillery commander, Brigadier Cecil Callaghan and—along with some of his staff officers—commandeered a small boat.

Aftermath

Analysis

The Japanese had advanced 650 mi (1,050 km) from Singora, Thailand, to the southern coast of Singapore at an average rate of 9 mi (14 km) a day. While impressed with Japan's quick succession of victories, German dictator Adolf Hitler reportedly forbade his foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop from issuing a congratulatory communique despite being allied with Japan, deeming it as a "setback" for the white race. Churchill called the fall of Singapore to the Japanese "the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history". Churchill's physician Lord Moran wrote:

The fall of Singapore on February 15 stupefied the Prime Minister. How came 100,000 men (half of them of our own race) to hold up their hands to inferior numbers of Japanese? Though his mind had been gradually prepared for its fall, the surrender of the fortress stunned him. He felt it was a disgrace. It left a scar on his mind. One evening, months later, when he was sitting in his bathroom enveloped in a towel, he stopped drying himself and gloomily surveyed the floor: 'I cannot get over Singapore', he said sadly.

The loss of Singapore, along with other defeats in Southeast Asia in 1942, reduced British prestige in the region. According to author Alan Warren, the Fall of Singapore shattered "the British Empire's illusion of permanence ... and strength", ultimately making "European empires in Asia unsustainable beyond the short term" and presaging the end of colonialism in the region in the post war period.

Casualties

Nearly 85,000 British, Indian and Commonwealth troops were captured, in addition to losses during the earlier fighting in Malaya. About 5,000 men were killed or wounded, a majority of whom were Australian. Japanese casualties during the fighting in Singapore amounted from 1,713 to 1,714 killed and from 2,772 to 3,378 wounded. During the 70-day campaign in Malaya and Singapore, total Commonwealth casualties amounted to 8,708 killed or wounded and 130,000 captured (38,496 United Kingdom, 18,490 Australian of whom 1,789 were killed and 1,306 wounded, 67,340 Indian and 14,382 local volunteer troops), against 9,824 Japanese casualties.

Subsequent events

The Japanese occupation of Singapore started after the British surrender. Japanese newspapers triumphantly declared the victory as deciding the general situation of the war. The city was renamed Syonan-to (昭南島 Shōnan-tō; literally: 'Southern Island gained in the age of Shōwa', or 'Light of the South'). Curtin compared the loss of Singapore to the Battle of Dunkirk. The Battle of Britain occurred after Dunkirk; "the fall of Singapore opens the Battle for Australia", Curtin said, which threatened the Commonwealth, the United States, and the entire English-speaking world.

The Japanese sought vengeance against the Chinese and anyone who held anti-Japanese sentiments. The Japanese authorities were suspicious of the Chinese because of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and murdered thousands of citizen "undesirables" (mostly ethnic Chinese) in the Sook Ching massacre. The other ethnic groups of Singapore—such as the Malays and Indians—were not spared. Residents suffered great hardships under Japanese rule over the following three-and-a-half years. Numerous British and Australian soldiers taken prisoner remained in Singapore's Changi Prison and many died in captivity. Thousands of others were transported by sea to other parts of Asia, including Japan, to be used as forced labour on projects such as the Siam–Burma Death Railway and Sandakan airfield in North Borneo. Many of those aboard the ships perished.

An Indian revolutionary, Rash Behari Bose, formed the pro-independence Indian National Army (INA) with the help of the Japanese, who were highly successful in recruiting Indian prisoners of war. In February 1942, out of approximately 40,000 Indian personnel in Singapore, about 30,000 joined the INA, of which about 7,000 fought Commonwealth forces in the Burma Campaign and in the northeast Indian regions of Kohima and Imphal; others became POW camp guards at Changi. An unknown number were taken to Japanese-occupied areas in the South Pacific as forced labour. Many of them suffered severe hardships and brutality similar to that experienced by other prisoners held by Japan during the war. About 6,000 survived until they could be liberated by Australian and US forces in 1943–1945, as the war in the Pacific turned in favour of the Allies.

A day after the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, the 25th Army crossed the Singapore Strait and landed on Batam Island without resistance. The Dutch KNIL garrisons stationed on Batam had already abandoned the island on 14 February 1942, after hearing reports of the impending total collapse of Singapore across the strait. Six days after the fall of Singapore, Japanese forces captured Tanjungpinang, marking the complete fall of the Riau Islands under Japanese control.

Commemoration

Since 1998, Singapore has observed Total Defence Day on 15 February each year, marking the anniversary of the surrender of Singapore. The concept of Total Defence as a national defence strategy was first introduced in 1984, which serves as a significant reminder that only Singaporeans with a stake in the country can effectively defend Singapore from future threats. Yearly observances on that day include:

Since 1967, a memorial service is held at the War Memorial Park to recognise civilians who had lost their lives during the Japanese occupation;

Since 1998, sirens on the Public Warning System are sounded throughout the country (initially at 12.05 p.m.), with the Singapore Civil Defence Force broadcasting an Important Message Signal through the sirens as well as local radio stations; and Singaporean schools conducting emergency preparedness drills, including food and electricity rationing exercises.

Since 2015, the timing for the sounding of the sirens has been shifted to 6.20 p.m., corresponding with the actual time of the surrender of Singapore in 1942.