Early wartime service
In the 1860 United States presidential election, a split in the Democratic Party assisted the victory of Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party. Southern political leaders known as Fire-Eaters expressed fears that the incoming Republican administration would restrict slavery and support for secession grew in the South. John J. Crittenden, who had developed a reputation during his decades of public service for assisting in compromises, submitted a group of constitutional amendments in December 1860 known as the Crittenden Compromise, but the compromise was not approved. The state of South Carolina seceded in December, and six other southern states followed in early 1861. The seceding states formed the Confederate States of America in February. On the morning of April 12, Confederate military forces opened fire on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor; the American Civil War had begun. Four more states soon joined the Confederacy; Kentucky remained on the fence. George incorrectly expected his father to support the Confederacy. John J. Crittenden asked George to "be true to the government that has trusted in you. And stand fast by your national Flag", but George resigned from the United States Army on June 10. His brother Thomas remained with the Union during the war, rising to the rank of major general; another brother, Eugene, was also a Union officer. George's cousin Thomas Turpin Crittenden was also a Union brigadier general. Prichard notes that some sources claim that George was part of a conspiracy to establish Confederate control over the southwestern United States and that he tried to get the men of his regiment to join the Confederacy.
Crittenden was appointed a colonel in the Confederate service, and was promoted to brigadier general on August 15. Six days later, he was assigned to the Confederate Army of the Potomac in Virginia, where he led a brigade. Davis, a friend of the Crittenden family, was now the Confederate president. In late October, Davis sent a letter to Crittenden stating that he was considering appointing him to command a Confederate force to claim Kentucky for the Confederacy. On November 9, Crittenden was promoted to major general and assigned to command the Eastern District of Kentucky, in hopes that the Kentuckian would be popular with the residents of his home state and wanting a more experienced officer in regional command than the area's previous commander, Brigadier General Felix Zollicoffer, who remained in the area as a subordinate officer. Zollicoffer was a Tennessee politician and newspaper editor who had originally been made a general with political considerations in mind. Crittenden's command was the eastern part of the region commanded by Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, which extended west to Missouri and the Indian Territory. Johnston defined Crittenden's command as encompassing eastern Tennessee and the portions of Kentucky that Crittenden's army could occupy. The population of east Tennessee was largely opposed to the Confederacy, creating a volatile political situation. Davis was not comfortable with Crittenden's ability to handle the political situation, or his early efforts to resolve the matter. One of his political missteps involved Unionist newspaper editor William G. Brownlow. Crittenden attempted to encourage Brownlow to leave the Confederacy, offering him a pass through the lines. When Brownlow did not appear at the appointed time, he was arrested.
Crittenden set up his headquarters at Knoxville, Tennessee, on December 1, but was ordered to Richmond, Virginia, on December 8, for a conference with the Confederate government. This meeting resulted in orders for Crittenden to command Zollicoffer's troops, but not to exercise command in east Tennessee unless explicitly ordered to do so by Johnston. Northeastern Kentucky was also removed from Crittenden's command in favor of Brigadier General Humphrey Marshall. Crittenden's command now consisted of Zollicoffer's troops and another brigade commanded by Brigadier General William Carroll. Crittenden did not return to Knoxville until December 15. Meanwhile, Zollicoffer had advanced his troops from the Cumberland Gap to Mill Springs, Kentucky, a position on the south side of the Cumberland River with defensive advantages. However, the Tennessean soon decided to move across the river with his men, wanting to take aggressive offensive action. The inexperienced Zollicoffer also thought that having his troops in a bend of a river with the river to his back would protect the flanks and rear of his command, but instead the position was a trap. Although the Cumberland River could not be forded at Zollicoffer's position, it could be elsewhere. This created a situation where Union troops could cross the river and get around the Confederate position, and retreat over the river would be difficult and likely to result in a disastrous situation if his men were attacked in the process of crossing. Zollicoffer hoped to take offensive action, but his plan was dependent upon reinforcements and swift action, with delay increasing the riskiness of his position across the river. Carroll's brigade had been ordered to leave to join Zollicoffer on December 10, but this was not feasible at the time as the brigade had insufficient weapons. On December 16, Crittenden informed Johnston that he planned to leave with Carroll to join Zollicoffer two days later, but this was delayed by the need to prepare the troops for active service. The movement began on December 24.
Zollicoffer had informed Johnston that he intended to cross the river by sending a letter on November 30; Johnston received this message on December 4. Zollicoffer did not learn that Crittenden had been made his superior officer until December 10, by which time the latter had left for Richmond. By the time Zollicoffer learned that Crittenden had gone to Richmond, Crittenden was back in Knoxville. After his return from Richmond, he ordered Zollicoffer back across the river, but the latter officer considered this impossible and did not comply with the order. Communication between the two officers was hampered by Crittenden remaining in Knoxville; the historian Steven E. Woodworth writes that Crittenden "could and should" have traveled to Zollicoffer's position to observe the situation in person. Woodworth attributes part of the failure to get Zollicoffer's troops back to a more tenable position to Crittenden's recall to Richmond, but criticizes Crittenden's handling of the situation, writing that he "ought to have known of the movement in advance and prevented it", stating that results were "a severe indictment of Crittenden's generalship". Johnston's command style gave both Crittenden and Zollicoffer discretion. Eubank believes that the situation could possibly have been salvaged if Crittenden had journeyed to Kentucky in mid-December. Prichard disagrees with this conclusion, pointing to the fact that Crittenden only remained in Knoxville for eight days after his return from Richmond, the lack of specific guidance given to him, the distance between Knoxville and Zollicoffer, and the difficulties encountered when moving Carroll's force from Knoxville to Mill Springs.
