Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

Background

The MMK is the work of Nāgārjuna, an Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher writing in Sanskrit. Very little is known about this figure, including exactly where he lived (somewhere in the Indian subcontinent), exactly what time (some time around the 2nd or 3rd century CE), and how many texts he composed. As with many early Indian historical figures, the biographical information which does exist is mainly hagiographical and from later periods. Most scholars agree that Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyāna Buddhist who believed all things (dharmas) to be empty, or without an intrinsic existence and nature (svabhāva). Beyond that, little can be said about him with certainty.

During the second and third centuries, Mahāyāna ideas were held by a minority of Buddhists in India who lived within the communities of Nikāya Buddhism (i.e. non-Mahāyāna Buddhism). Although all the major Buddhist schools at the time held that the person was empty of any eternal self or soul, some of the Abhidharma schools conceived of dharmas (transient phenomena, impermanent events) as ultimately real entities (dravyata) that had essences or "intrinsic natures" (svabhāva). These intrinsic natures were seen as an independent part of a phenomenon, an inherent self-sufficiency that was not caused by something else. Abhidharma schools like the Vaibhasikas accepted this doctrine and did not see it as conflicting with the idea of dependent origination.

In the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna sought to refute these essentialist ideas found in Buddhist traditions such as Vaibhasika and Pudgalavada, as well as in Brahmanical schools of thought like Nyaya who also defended an essence based metaphysics. As such, his philosophy is also often termed Niḥsvabhāvavāda (the no svabhāva doctrine).

Nāgārjuna's main contention with svabhāva theories was that they contradicted the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Furthermore, essence theories are not in agreement with the Mahāyāna sutras Nāgārjuna would have been familiar with. These sutras, particularly the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, teach a kind of comprehensive illusionist ontology that sees all dharmas, even nirvana and Buddhahood, as being empty and like an illusion. This illusionism was not totally new, since similar ideas about emptiness can be found in the early Buddhist texts (see: Samyutta Nikaya 22:95, as well as Samyukta Āgama 335 and 297). However, the Prajñāpāramitā texts are unique in seeing all dharmas, including nirvana, as empty and like illusions. The MMK cites the Kaccānagotta Sutta, an early Buddhist text, from which it draws one of its major ideas regarding the middle way: the explanation of "right-view" as being a middle way between saying that "everything exists" (referring to the view of permanent existence: Pali: atthitā, Skt. astitva) and saying that "everything does not exist" (non-existence; Pali: n'atthitā, Skt nāstitva). This middle way is then defined as the 12 principles (dvādaśāṅga) of dependent origination.

Content

The text is a series of 450 verses (karikas) organized into 27 chapters. The verses are aphoristic, often enigmatic, and extremely short. The text's arguments are presented in a highly compressed and concise form. This is because the text is a karika-style work. Such texts were meant to be memorized as an aid to learning by students. The text's arguments would be filled out through the oral commentary of a master. As such, the karikas are like a verse outline of the major philosophical arguments of an oral tradition.

The text seems to be mainly addressed to a Buddhist audience, particularly those who followed Abhidharma doctrines which held that dharmas are ultimately real and have svabhava (an intrinsic nature). The MMK takes up numerous Buddhist Abhidharma categories and ideas and examines them to show that they are empty and cannot have intrinsic nature. The MMK presents various arguments, mostly reductio in style, such as showing that an idea leads to an infinite regress.

The text begins with the following dedication verse:I salute the Fully Enlightened One, the best of orators, who taught the doctrine of dependent origination, according to which there is neither cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor the eternal, neither singularity nor plurality, neither the coming nor the going [of any dharma, for the purpose of nirvāṇa characterized by] the auspicious cessation of hypostatization.The dedication sets out the main goal of the MMK, to eliminate conceptual proliferation, reification and hypostatization (prapañca), which expresses itself in different philosophical concepts such as essentialism, eternalism and annihilationism.

The first chapter discusses causation. The main thesis to be defended is given in the first verse:Not from itself, not from another, not from both, nor without cause: Never in any way is there any existing thing that has arisen.To put it another way, the main thesis which Nāgārjuna will defend here is that phenomena (dharmas) do not come into being in any of the following four ways:

By being self-caused, or due to the fact that the effect was already present in the cause (hetu). This view was called satkāryavāda.

By being caused by something else (asatkāryavāda), the cause and the effect being distinct entities

Chapter overview

The 27 chapters of the MMK are as follows:

Pratyayaparīkṣā: Analysis of conditions

Gatāgataparīkṣā: Analysis of going and not going

Cakṣurādīndriyaparīkṣā: Analysis of the eye and the other sense-organs

Skandhaparīkṣā: Analysis of the skandhas ("aggregates")

Dhātuparīkṣā: Analysis of the dhatūs ("constituents")

Rāgaraktaparīkṣā: Analysis of desire and the desirous

Saṃskṛtaparīkṣā: Analysis of the constructed

Karmakārakaparīkṣā: Analysis of action and actor

Pūrvaparīkṣā: Analysis of the past

Agnīndhanaparīkṣā: Analysis of fire and fuel

Pūrvaparakoṭiparīkṣā: Analysis of initial and final limits

Duḥkhaparīkṣā: Analysis of suffering

Saṃskāraparīkṣā: Analysis of mental constructions

Saṃsargaparīkṣā: Analysis of admixture

Svabhāvaparīkṣā: Analysis of own-nature

Bandhanamokṣaparīkṣā: Analysis of bondage and liberation

Karmaphalaparīkṣa: Analysis of action (karma) and its fruit

Commentaries

As a kārikā-style text, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā presents only aphoristic, often enigmatic and extremely short verses, much like the sūtra works of the various Hindu philosophical schools. Since they served primarily as pedagogical or mnemonic aids for teachers, commentaries were required to make the meaning of this type of text more explicit to the uninitiated reader.

According to the Indian author Avalokitavrata, eight commentaries were written on the MMK: Nagarjuna's self-commentary, and those of Buddhapalita, Candrakirti, Devasharman, Gunashri, Gunamati, Sthiramati, and Bhavaviveka. Not all of these have survived in full or in the original. Devasharman and Gunamati's commentaries only survive in fragments and nothing is known of Gunashri's.

The Indian commentary called the Akutobhayā, whose authorship is unknown, though is attributed to Nagarjuna in the tradition, is held by Ames to be the earliest commentary on the MMK. C.W. Huntington has suggested that this commentary may not have been considered a separate text, but instead may have been a set of notes which may go back to oral explanations of the root text by Nāgārjuna himself.

The earliest known commentary on the MMK by another author is preserved within the first Chinese translation of the Kārikā, known as the "Middle Treatise" (中論 Zhong Lun), translated by Kumarajiva in 409. The author of this commentary is given as either "Blue Eyes" (青目; back translated as *Vimalākṣa) or *Piṅgala (賓伽羅). This is by far the best known commentary in the East Asian Mādhyamaka tradition, forming one of the three commentaries that make up the Sanlun ("Three Treatise") school. An influential figure of the Sanlun school is Jízàng (549–623), who wrote a commentary on the Middle Treatise in Chinese, the Zhongguanlun shu (中觀論疏).

Other surviving and influential Indian commentaries on the MMK include Buddhapālita's (c. 470–550) "Madhyamakvr̩tti" and Bhāviveka's (c. 500–578) "Prajñāpradīpa" (Lamp of Wisdom). These two survive in Tibetan translation.

The most influential commentary for Tibetan Buddhism is Candrakirti's (c. 7th century) Prasannapadā (Clear Words), which survives in Sanskrit and Tibetan translation.

Modern scholarly interpretations

As noted by Ruegg, Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka thought in the MMK, including: "nihilism, monism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism, scepticism, criticism, dialectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value".

Some of the main scholarly interpretations of Nagarjuna's MMK include the following:

The Kantian interpretation, exemplified by Theodore Stcherbatsky’s "The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna" (1927). This Kantian interpretation saw Nagarjuna as dividing the world into a realm of appearance or phenomenon (saṃsāra) and a realm of absolute reality or noumenon (nirvāṇa). This is also seen in T. R. V. Murti's 1955 "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism".

The Pyrrhonian skeptic interpretation. Some scholars, such as Thomas McEvilley, have either argued that Nagarjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonism or see Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka as similar to that of Pyrrhonist philosophers such as Sextus Empiricus.

The analytic interpretation, exemplified by Richard Robinson's 1957 article “Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna’s System”, sought to explain Madhyamaka using analytic philosophy's logical apparatus. Richard P. Hayes meanwhile, using analytical logic, critiques Nagarjuna as irrational and as relying on "fallacies and tricks".

The Pragmatist interpretation, exemplified by David Kalupahana's translation and commentary of the MMK.

The Wittgensteinian interpretation, exemplified by Frederick Streng's "Emptiness" and Chris Gudmunsen's "Wittgenstein and Buddhism", which stressed the similarities between Nāgārjuna and the later Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy.

American philosopher Mark Siderits has defended a svātantrika position.

Quotations

1:1

Neither from itself nor from another,

Nor from both,

Nor without a cause,

Does anything whatever, anywhere arise.

15:9

If intrinsic nature does not exist, of what will there be alteration?

If intrinsic nature does exist, of what will there be alteration?

15:10

अस्तीति शाश्वतग्राहो नास्तीत्युच्चेददर्शनं

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstītyuccedadarśanaṁ

To say "it is" is to grasp for permanence. To say "it is not" is to adopt the view of nihilism.

तस्माद् अस्तित्वनास्तित्वे नाश्रीयेत विचक्षणः।

tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ

Therefore a wise person does not say "exists" or "does not exist".

16:10

न निर्वाणसमारोपो न संसारापकषणम्

na nirvāṇasamāropo na saṁsārāpakaṣaṇam

यत्र कस्तत्र संसारो निर्वाणं किं विकल्प्यते

yatra kastatra saṁsāro nirvāṇaṁ kiṁ vikalpyate

Where there is neither an addition of nirvana nor a removal of samsara; There, what samsara is discriminated from what nirvana?

18:6–12

ātmetya api prajñapitam anātmetyapi deśitam

Although (the term) "self" is caused to be known (of, about), and although (a doctrine or teaching of) "no self" is taught,

buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaścid ity api deśitaṁ| 6

No "self" or any "nonself" whatsoever has been taught by the Buddhas.

nivṛtam abhidhātavyaṁ nivṛtte cittagocare

The designable is ceased when/where the range of thought is ceased,

anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā| 7

Nirvana is like phenomenality, unarisen and unstopping.

sarvaṁ tathyaṁ na vā tathyaṁ tathyaṁ cātathyam eva ca

Everything is actual, or not actual, or actual and not actual

naivātathyaṁ naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanaṁ| 8

Or neither actual nor not actual; this is the Buddha's teaching.

aparapratyayaṁ śāntaṁ prapañcair aprapañcitaṁ

Independent, peaceful, not delusionally diversified by delusional diversification

nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakśaṇaṁ| 9

Devoid of mental construction, without variation, this is the mark of thatness.

22:11

"Empty" should not be asserted."Nonempty" should not be asserted.

Neither both nor neither should be asserted. They are only used nominally.

22:16

तथागतो यत्स्वभावस्तत्स्वभावमिदं जगत्

tathāgato yat svabhāvas tat svabhāvam idam jagat

What is the nature of the thus-gone one (the Buddha), that is the nature of the world.

तथागतो निःस्वभावो निःस्वभावम् इदं जगत्। १६

tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idaṁ jagat| 16

The thus-gone one is devoid of nature; the world is devoid of nature.

24:18, 24:19

Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be emptiness.

That, being a dependent designation, / Is itself the middle way.

Something that is not dependently arisen / Such a thing does not exist.

Therefore a non-empty thing / Does not exist.

25:19–20

न संसारस्य निर्वाणात् किं चिद् अस्ति विशेषणं

na saṁsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṁ cid asti viśeṣaṇaṁ

There is nothing whatsoever of samsara distinguishing (it) from nirvana.

न निर्वाणस्य संसारात् किं चिद् अस्ति विशेषणं। १९

na nirvāṇasya saṁsārāt kiṁ cid asti viśeṣaṇaṁ| 19

There is nothing whatsoever of nirvana distinguishing it from samsara.

निर्वाणस्य च या कोटिः।कोटिः। संसरणस्य च

nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṁsaraṇasya ca

(That?) is the limit which is the limit of nirvana and the limit of samsara;

न तयोर् अन्तरं किंचित् सुसूक्ष्मम् अपि विद्यते। २०

na tayor antaraṁ kiñcit susūkśmam api vidyate| 20

Even a very subtle interval is not found of (between) them.

25:22–24

śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu kim anantaṁ kimantavat

kim anantam antavac ca nānantaṁ nāntavacca kiṁ| 22

kiṁ tad eva kim anyat kiṁ śāśvataṁ kim aśāśvataṁ

aśāśvataṁ śāśvataṁ ca kiṁ vā nobhayam apyataḥ 'tha| 23

sarvopalambhpaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ

na kva cit kasyacit kaścid dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ|

When all dharmas are empty, what is endless? What has an end?

What is endless and with an end? What is not endless and not with an end?

What is "it"? What is "other"? What is permanent? What is impermanent?

What is impermanent and permanent? What is neither?

Auspicious is the pacification of phenomenal metastasis, the pacification of all apprehending;

There is no dharma whatsoever taught by the Buddha to whomever whenever, wherever.