The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or simply the Pakistani Taliban, is a Deobandi jihadist militant organisation that primarily operates along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. It is designated as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations and by the Government of Pakistan. Founded by Baitullah Mehsud in 2007, it has been led by Noor Wali Mehsud since 2018. The TTP has publicly pledged allegiance to and fought alongside the Taliban, which has governed Afghanistan since 2021, but it operates independently and does not share the Taliban's command structure. Like the Taliban, the TTP ascribes to Pashtunwali and a highly conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam.
In Pakistan, the TTP is particularly known for carrying out suicide bombings and other attacks against government targets, political opponents, and Pakistani civilians. The organisation frequently engages in sectarian violence, especially against Shia Muslims and other non-Sunni minorities. Most Islamist organisations in Pakistan coalesce under the TTP. As a leading militant faction in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa insurgency, the TTP has claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks on the Pakistan Armed Forces, ultimately seeking to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish an Islamic state in line with the organisation's Deobandi ideology. The TTP has also used Pashtun-centric narratives and often incited violence against non-Pashtun ethnicities, such as the Hazaras. The TTP depends on the tribal belt along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border, from which it draws its recruits. In 2019, there were around 3,000 to 4,000 TTP militants in Afghanistan, according to a report by the United States Department of Defense. Between July and November 2020, the Amjad Farouqi group, one faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Musa Shaheed Karwan group, Mehsud factions of the TTP, Mohmand Taliban, Bajaur Taliban, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, and Hizb-ul-Ahrar merged with TTP. This reorganisation made TTP more deadly and led to increased attacks.
The Pakistani Taliban have previously assisted the Afghan Taliban in the 2001–2021 war, however the two groups have separate ideologies and command structures.
In 2020, after years of factionalism and infighting, the TTP under the leadership of Noor Wali Mehsud underwent reorganisation and reunification. Mehsud has essentially steered the TTP in a new direction, sparing civilians and ordering assaults only on security and law enforcement personnel, in an attempt to rehabilitate the group's image and distance them from the Islamic State militant group's extremism.
After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistan was unable to persuade the Afghan Taliban to crack down on the TTP. The Afghan Taliban instead mediated talks between Pakistan and the TTP, leading to the release of dozens of TTP prisoners in Pakistan and a temporary ceasefire between the Pakistani government and the TTP. After the ceasefire expired on 10 December 2021, the TTP increased attacks on Pakistani security forces from sanctuaries inside Afghanistan. The Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan's Khost and Kunar provinces on 16 April 2022 appeared to have been conducted in retaliation to the surge in terror attacks in Pakistan.
In 2025, the Pakistani Taliban was labelled as Fitna al-Khawarij by the Government of Pakistan on orders on the Interior Ministry, thereby requiring all media outlets to refer to the TTP as Kharjites. According to them, this was done "in order to reveal to the people" what the Pakistani government considered as "the group's actual ideology".
Contents
History
Roots and development
The roots of the TTP as an organisation began in 2002 when the Pakistani military conducted incursions into the tribal areas to originally combat foreign (Afghan, Arab and Central Asian) militants fleeing from the war in Afghanistan into the neighbouring tribal areas of Pakistan. A 2004 article by the BBC explains:
The military offensive had been part of the overall war against al-Qaeda. ... Since the start of the operation, the [Pakistani] military authorities have firmly established that a large number of Uzbek, Chechen and Arab militants were in the area. ... It was in July 2002 that Pakistani troops, for the first time in 55 years, entered the Tirah Valley (Orakzai Agency) in Khyber tribal agency. Soon they were in Shawal valley of North Waziristan, and later in South Waziristan. ... This was made possible after long negotiations with various tribes, who reluctantly agreed to allow the military's presence on the assurance that it would bring in funds and development work. But once the military action started in South Waziristan a number of Waziri sub-tribes took it as an attempt to subjugate them. Attempts to persuade them into handing over the foreign militants failed, and with an apparently mishandling by the authorities, the security campaign against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen.
Many of the TTP's leaders are veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan and have supported the fight against the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force by providing soldiers, training, and logistics. In 2004 various tribal groups, as explained above, that would later form the TTP, effectively established their authority in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by concurrently engaging in military attacks and negotiating with Islamabad. By this time, the militants had killed around 200 rival tribal elders in the region to consolidate control. Several Pakistani analysts also cite the inception of U.S. missile strikes in the FATA as a catalyzing factor in the rise of tribal militancy in the area. More specifically they single out an October 2006 strike on a madrassah in Bajaur that was run by the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi as a turning point.
In December 2007, the existence of the TTP was officially announced under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. It was formed in response to Pakistan military operation against Al-Qaeda militants in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 2007.
Threats beyond Pakistan border
Qari Mehsud indicated in a video recorded in April 2010 the TTP would make cities in the United States a "main target" in response to U.S. drone attacks on TTP leaders. The TTP claimed responsibility for the December 2009 suicide attack on CIA facilities in Camp Chapman in Afghanistan, as well as the attempted bombing in Times Square in May 2010.
In July 2012, the TTP threatened to attack Myanmar in the wake of sectarian violence against Rohingya Muslims in the Arakan state. TTP spokesman Ehsanullah demanded the Pakistani government sever relations with Myanmar and close the Burmese embassy in Islamabad, and warned of attacks against Burmese interests if no action was taken. While the TTP has been conducting an insurgency in Pakistan, its ability to expand operations to other countries has been questioned. This was a rare occasion in which it warned of violence in another country.
Leadership crisis
In August 2009, a missile strike from a suspected U.S. drone killed Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP soon held a shura to appoint his successor. Government sources reported that fighting broke out during the shura between Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman. While Pakistani news channels reported that Hakimullah had been killed in the shooting, Interior Minister Rehman Malik could not confirm his death. On 18 August, Pakistani security officials announced the capture of Maulvi Omar, chief spokesperson of the TTP. Omar, who had denied the death of Baitullah, retracted his previous statements and confirmed the leader's death in the missile strike. He also acknowledged turmoil among TTP leadership following the killing.
After Omar's capture, Maulana Faqir Mohammed announced to the BBC that he would assume temporary leadership of the TTP and that Muslim Khan would serve as the organisation's primary spokesperson. He also maintained that Baitullah had not been killed, but rather was in bad health. Faqir further elaborated that decisions over leadership of the umbrella group would only be made in consultation and consensus with a variety of different TTP leaders. "The congregation of TTP leaders has 32 members and no important decision can be taken without their consultation," he told the BBC. He reported to the AFP that both Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman had approved his appointment as temporary leader of the militant group. Neither militant had publicly confirmed Faqir's statement, and analysts cited by Dawn News believed the assumption of leadership actually indicated a power struggle.
Two days later Faqir Mohammed retracted his claims of temporary leadership and said that Hakimullah Mehsud had been selected leader of the TTP. Faqir declared that the 42-member shura had also decided that Azam Tariq would serve as the TTP's primary spokesperson, rather than Muslim Khan.
Under the leadership of Hakimullah, the TTP intensified its suicide campaign against the Pakistani state and against civilian (particularly Shia, Qadiyani and Sufi) targets.
Designation as a terrorist organisation
On 1 September 2010, the United States designated the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and identified Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali ur-Rehman as specially designated global terrorists. The designation of the TTP as an FTO makes it a crime to provide support or to do business with the group and also allows the U.S. to freeze its assets. The U.S. State Department also issued a $5 million reward for information on the two individuals' locations.
In January 2011, the British government moved to classify the TTP as a banned terrorist organisation under its Terrorism Act 2000.
In July 2011, the Canadian government also added the TTP to its list of banned terrorist organisations.
Internal splits
In February 2014, a group of TTP terrorists under the lead of Maulana Umar Qasmi broke away from the organisation to form the Ahrar-ul-Hind, in protest against the TTP's negotiations with the Pakistan government.
In May 2014, the Mehsud faction of the TTP defected from the main group to form a breakaway unit called Tehreek-e-Taliban South Waziristan led by Khalid Mehsud. The breakaway group was unhappy with the various activities of the TTP, saying in a statement "We consider kidnapping for ransom, extortion, damage to public facilities and bombings to be un-Islamic. TTP Mehsud group believes in stopping the oppressor from cruelty, and supporting the oppressed." The Mehsuds were widely seen as the most important group in the TTP and their loss was regarded as a major blow. In February 2017, the TTP announced that the Mehsud faction had rejoined the group, following the "defection of the rogue elements to the rival parties".
In August 2014, hardline elements of the TTP from four of the seven tribal districts formed a separate group called Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, led by the Mohmand Agency commander Omar Khalid Khorosani, after disagreeing with Fazlullah's order to fight the Pakistani Army's Operation Zarb-e-Azb offensive in the Tribal Areas. However, in March 2015, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar's spokesman announced that they were rejoining the TTP.
Some Uzbek and Arab fighters previously working with the TTP reportedly began leaving Pakistan to go to Iraq to fight alongside the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. In the same month, Asmatullah Muawiya, the commander of the Punjabi Taliban, announced that his faction was ending their armed struggle against the Pakistani state.
In October 2014, the TTP's spokesman, Shahidullah Shahid, and the group's commanders in Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal regions and Peshawar and Hangu Districts defected from the TTP and pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS).
Organisational structure
Overview
The TTP differs in structure to the Afghan Taliban in that it lacks a strong central command and is a much looser coalition of various militant groups, united by hostility towards the central government in Islamabad.
In its original form, the TTP had Baitullah Mehsud as its amir. He was followed in the leadership hierarchy by Hafiz Gul Bahadur as naib amir, or deputy. Faqir Mohammed was the third most influential leader. The group contained members from all of FATA's seven tribal agencies as well as several districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), including Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand. Some 2008 estimates placed the total number of operatives at 30–35,000, although it is difficult to judge the reliability of such estimates.
In the aftermath of Baitullah Mehsud's death, the organisation experienced turmoil among its leading militants. By the end of August 2009, however, leading members in the TTP had confirmed Hakimullah Mehsud as its second amir. Government and some TTP sources told the media that Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in January 2010 by injuries sustained during a U.S. drone attack. Unconfirmed reports from Orakzai Agency stated, after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, Malik Noor Jamal, alias Maulana Toofan, had assumed leadership of the TTP until the group determined how to proceed.
Reuters indicated in July 2011 that Hakimullah Mehsud's grip on the TTP leadership was weakening after the defection of Fazal Saeed Haqqani, the TTP leader in the Kurram region, from the umbrella militant group. Haqqani cited disagreements over attacks on civilians as reason for the split. The paper quoted an associate of Mehsud's as saying that "it looks as though he is just a figurehead now... He can hardly communicate with his commanders in other parts of the tribal areas ... he is in total isolation. Only a few people within the TTP know where he is." A December 2011 report published in The Express Tribune further described the network as "crumbling" with "funds dwindling and infighting intensifying." According to various TTP operatives, the difficulties stemmed from differences of opinion within TTP leadership on pursuing peace talks with Islamabad. In December 2012 senior Pakistan military officials told Reuters that Hakimullah Mehsud had lost control of the group and that Wali-ur-Rehman was expected to be formally announced as the head of the TTP. However a video released later in the month showed Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman seated next to each other, with Mehsud calling reports of a split between the two as propaganda. Mehsud and Rahman were later killed in separate airstrikes in 2013.
Current leaders
Noor Wali Mehsud (alias Abu Mansoor Asim) – Emir (chief) of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.
Muzahim (alias Mufti Hazrat) – Naib emir (deputy chief) of TTP.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur – Powerful faction in North Waziristan.
Aleem Khan Khushali – Faction active in North Waziristan.
Muhammad Khurasani – Central spokesman of TTP.
Media
The TTP's "media arm" is "Umar Media". Umar Media provides a "behind the scenes" look at Taliban attacks. Video clips are made in Pashto with Urdu subtitles. Umar Media also reportedly operated a Facebook page which had been created in September 2012 and had a few "likes" and a "handful of messages written in English". According to then TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, the page was being "temporarily" used before the TTP would plan to launch its own website. SITE Intelligence Group described the Facebook page as a "recruitment centre" looking for people to edit the TTP's quarterly magazine and videos. The page was soon removed by Facebook and the account suspended.
Relationship with other militant groups
In a May 2010 interview, U.S. Gen. David Petraeus described the TTP's relationship with other militant groups as difficult to decipher: "There is clearly a symbiotic relationship between all of these different organizations: Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban, TNSM [Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi]. And it's very difficult to parse and to try to distinguish between them. They support each other, they coordinate with each other, sometimes they compete with each other, [and] sometimes they even fight each other. But at the end of the day, there is quite a relationship between them."
Director of National Intelligence and United States Navy Admiral, Dennis C. Blair, told U.S. senators that the Pakistani state and army meanwhile draw clear distinctions among different militant groups. While links exist between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, the two groups are distinct enough for the Pakistani military to be able to view them very differently. American officials said that the S Wing of the Pakistani ISI provided direct support to three major groups carrying out attacks in Afghanistan: the Afghan Taliban based in Quetta, Pakistan, commanded by Mullah Muhammad Omar; the militant network run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and a different group run by the guerrilla leader Jalaluddin Haqqani, all considered a strategic asset by Pakistan in contrast to the TTP run by Hakimullah Mehsud, which has engaged the Pakistani army in combat.
Afghan Taliban
The Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban share the same ideology and a dominant Pashtun ethnicity, but they are distinct movements, differing in their histories, structures and goals. The two groups frequently don't get along with each other. An Afghan Taliban spokesman told The New York Times: "We don't like to be involved with them, as we have rejected all affiliation with Pakistani Taliban fighters ... We have sympathy for them as Muslims, but beside that, there is nothing else between us." Peshawar-based security analyst Brigadier (retd) Muhamaad Saad believes the Taliban are not a monolithic entity. "They can be divided into three broad categories: Kandahari Taliban (Afghan Taliban), led by Mullah Omar; Paktia Taliban (Haqqani network), led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani; and Salfi Taliban (Pakistani Taliban)," he said. "It's the Salfi Taliban who pose a real threat to Pakistan. They may not be obeying the Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar." Some regional experts state that the common name "Taliban" may be more misleading than illuminating. Gilles Dorronsoro of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes that "the fact that they have the same name causes all kinds of confusion." As the Pakistani Army began offensives against the Pakistani Taliban, many unfamiliar with the region mistakenly thought that the assault was against the Afghan Taliban of Mullah Omar.
The TTP has almost exclusively targeted elements of the Pakistani state. The Afghan Taliban however have historically relied on support from the Pakistani army in their campaign to control Afghanistan. Regular Pakistani army troops fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in the War in Afghanistan (1996–2001). Major leaders of the Afghan Taliban including Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Siraj Haqqani are believed to have enjoyed safe haven in Pakistan. In 2006, Jalaluddin Haqqani was called a 'Pakistani asset' by a senior official of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. Pakistan regards the Haqqanis as an important force for protecting its interests in Afghanistan and therefore has been unwilling to move against them.
In 2007, Pakistani militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud created the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and killed around 200 rival Pakistani leaders. They officially defined goals to establish their rule over Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas subsequently engaging the Pakistani army in heavy combat operations. Intelligence analysts believe that these TTP's attacks on the Pakistani government, police and army strained relations between the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban. Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar asked the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 to stop attacks inside Pakistan.
Al-Qaeda
According to John Brennan, Barack Obama's chief counterterrorism adviser, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has close ties to al-Qaeda. In a 2009 interview with Fox News, Brennan said: "It's a group that is closely allied with al-Qaeda. They train together, they plan together, they plot together. They are almost indistinguishable." Ambassador-at-large Daniel Benjamin stated, "The TTP and Al Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship: TTP draws ideological guidance from Al Qaeda, while Al Qaeda relies on the TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border... This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to both Al Qaeda's global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, TTP is a force multiplier for al-Qaeda." Ayesha Siddiqa of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars describes the TTP as "a franchise of al Qaeda" and attributes strong ties to al-Qaeda's acquisition of "a more local character over the years." Since the days of the Soviet era, some al-Qaeda operatives have established themselves in Pashtun areas and enmeshed themselves in the local culture.
In 2008, Baitullah Mehsud met with Ayman al-Zawahiri in South Waziristan. Prior to this meeting the Pakistani Taliban answered to the Afghan Taliban and pro-Pakistan militant commanders. At the time Pakistani authorities believed that Mehsud was in fact an al-Qaeda operative. In February 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulavi Nazir released a statement in which they reaffirmed their allegiance to Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. In 2017, US Department of State alleged that TTP maintained operational ties with AQ, and that AQ members depended on TTP networks to obtain safe haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-KP) group was established by Hafiz Saeed Khan, a former commander of the Pakistani Taliban who pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in May 2013. With the support of several TTP defectors who opposed Mullah Fazlullah, he formed the 'Tehreek e-Khilafat Pakistan' (TKP) splinter group in July 2014. According to Taliban sources, Saeed Khan was a Wahhabi educated at a Saudi-funded madrasa and had been involved in sectarian attacks against Hanafi 'ulema in Orakzai in preceding years.
In January 2015, TKP merged with 'Tehrik-e Khilafat Khorasan' (TKK) and 'Khilafat Afghan' groups to form the IS-KP. Due to his close relations with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Hafiz Saeed Khan was appointed by the IS-central leadership as the governor of the Islamic State's Khorasan Province. Most IS-KP members were defectors from TTP, particularly from a dissident subgroup that was affiliated with the Salafist movement and opposed the Pakistani Taliban's leadership. According to a 2017 UN report, despite its open competition with the Pakistani Taliban, the Islamic State's core leadership attempted to collaborate with TTP and other militant factions in Afghanistan to "outsource" attacks due to its depleted manpower and lack of IS-KP's ground presence in Afghanistan. The report claimed that IS central sent funds to these groups and that IS-KP would have ceased to exist in Afghanistan without these funds.
According to Borhan Osman, a senior analyst at International Crisis Group (ICG), the Islamic State (IS) fighters who started the ISIS-K branch of ISIS were TTP militants who had long settled in Afghanistan. He claims that many members of the TTP fled Pakistan and went to seek refuge in Afghanistan as a result of military operations conducted by Pakistan security forces. In Afghanistan, National Directorate of Security (NDS) tried to persuade them to fight against Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. Initially, only few of them fought against Pakistan and Afghan Talibans. However, after that TTP members in Afghanistan changed their allegiance to ISIS-K. Initially, because of their good relations with Afghan armed forces, the locals in Afghanistan thought that they were pro-Afghan government forces based. They also claimed that they were there to fight Afghan Talibans and Pakistan. However, after series of events, ISIS-K also turned hostile towards to Afghan government and locals.
Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade
The Ghazi Abdul Rashid Shaheed Brigade, whose name is commonly shortened to Ghazi Brigade or Ghazi Force, emerged as a jihadi organisation after the Lal Masjid Operation of 2007. In 2009 the Ghazi Brigade worked closely with the TTP during military operations in the Swat Valley, and the two groups jointly planned attacks on western targets in Islamabad.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
The TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have a long history of collaboration. At one point prior to his appointment as TTP chief, Baitullah Mehsud lived with Tohir Yo'ldosh, the IMU's former leader, who became an ideological inspiration and offered the services of his 2,500 fighters to Mehsud. In April 2009 Muslim Khan listed the IMU among the TTP's allies in an interview with AP. The IMU posted a video online in September 2010 that featured footage of Yo'ldosh's successor, Abu Usman Adil, meeting with Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-Ur-Rahman Mehsud. On 8 June 2014, the TTP accepted responsibility for conducting the Jinnah International Airport attack. The militants who participated in the attack were Uzbeks belonging to the IMU, and the TTP described the attack as a joint operation between TTP and IMU.
Punjabi Taliban
The Punjabi Taliban reportedly developed strong connections with the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and various other groups based in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The TTP and the Punjabi Taliban both claimed the 2009 Lahore bombing shortly after the attack. On 24 August 2013, a spokesman for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed that the head of the Punjabi Taliban faction, Asmatullah Muawiya, had been stripped of his leadership for welcoming the Pakistani government's peace talks offer. Muawiya responded by saying that the Taliban central Shura (council) did not have the capacity to remove him because the Punjabi Taliban is a separate group. He added that his group has its own decision-making body to decide leadership and other matters. After a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan near Miranshah which killed 2 Punjabi Taliban members and interrupted a period of time with no drone strikes in which the Pakistani government held talks with the TTP and Punjabi Taliban, Muawiya announced that the Punjabi Taliban was ending their activities within Pakistan to focus on American soldiers in Afghanistan on 13 September 2014.
Other groups
US officials admitted to The New York Times that they found it increasingly difficult to separate the operations of the various Pakistani militant groups active in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Individuals and groups that are believed to have a supportive relationship with the TTP include:
Harkat-ul Jihad Islami (HuJI), an al-Qaeda-linked terror group
Ilyas Kashmiri – killed
Qari Saifullah Akhtar – killed
Jaish-e-Mohammed
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
Allegations of foreign involvement
The Pakistani military and civilian leadership have repeatedly alleged that the Indian intelligence agency RAW has been funding and training TTP members using a network of Indian consulates in Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. The allegations claim that when the TTP emerged, Afghan and Indian intelligence agencies were quick to seize the opportunity to infiltrate and utilise some of its elements, particularly Baitullah Mehsud's kin, against the Pakistani government and its armed forces. Pakistan claims that NDS (Afghanistan's intelligence agency) officials have openly admitted to their involvement with Tehreek-e-Taliban.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan has always been safe 'sanctuary' for Tehreek-e-Taliban. Mullah Fazlullah and his followers have been living in Afghanistan since 2009. In 2012, United States military and intelligence officials admitted that Mullah Fazlullah and his followers are living in Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan. However, the U.S. military claimed that they are not targeting Mullah Fazlullah because he is not their priority as he is not affiliated with Al-Qaeda or with the insurgents who target U.S. or Afghan interest. Moreover, the ISAF advisers believe that 'Afghan Army is allowing them to operate in Afghanistan'. Later on in 2017, Afghanistan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah admitted that Tehreek-e-Taliban have a foothold in Afghanistan. However, he claimed that Afghan Government is not supporting them. Head of National Directorate of security (NDS), Asadullah Khalid posted a tweet on Twitter where he claimed that Tehreek-e-Taliban attack on Pakistan air force Badaber Camp was tit for tat. His claim highlights NDS support to Tehreek-e-Taliban. In 2013, United States military captured senior Tehreek-e-Taliban leader, Latif Mehsud, from an Afghan army and intelligence convoy. The Afghan convoy was guarding Latif Mehsud and taking him to National Directorate of Security (NDS) headquarters. They were intercepted by U.S. military in Logar Province of Afghanistan.
Senior Afghan analyst Borhan Osman claims that the Pakistan military offensive against the Tehreek-i-Taliban in Federally Administered Tribal Areas forced many members of the TTP to flee Pakistan and seek shelter in Afghanistan. Tehreek-i-Talibans were welcomed in Afghanistan and were treated as 'guests' by the Afghan Government and by the local people. Apart from Tehreek-i-Talibans, many other militants groups like Lashkar-e-Islam and other factions of Tehreek-i-Talibans were allowed to live in Afghanistan. Tribal elders and locals from Achin, Nazin and Kot testify that the militants were allowed free movement in the province and treatment in Government run hospitals. When moving outside their hub, they would go unarmed. National Directorate of Security (NDS) wanted them to fight against the Pakistani government and the Afghan Talibans. Initially, only few of them fought against Pakistan and Afghan Talibans. However, that changed after TTP members in Afghanistan changed their allegiance to ISIS-K. Once they pledged allegiance to ISIS-K, they claimed that they were there to fight Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. Because of their Anti-Afghan Taliban and Anti-Pakistan attitude, many locals believed that ISIS-K were a pro-government forces.
Pakistan claims that Afghan intelligence agencies are also involved in the support of TTP. Notably in 2014, a major TTP leader, Latif Mehsud, was caught by U.S. troops in Afghanistan while he was in a convoy escorted by Afghan Intelligence. American forces captured the TTP leader and handed him over to Pakistani authorities. This angered the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, since Mehsud had been recruited for peace talks according to Afghan authorities.
India
In December 2014, after the Peshawar school massacre in which 132 children were killed, the Pakistani authorities again alleged that there was significant proof of Indian support of TTP to destabilise Pakistan and to counter Pakistan's Afghan policy. The Pakistan Army's official spokesman, Major General Asim Bajwa, said in the aftermath of the attack that, "India is funding Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan," adding that "...a banned outfit cannot function on such a big scale unless foreign powers are funding it."
In 2016, Latif Mehsud gave a public video confession during which he claimed that Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies were responsible for supporting the TTP and other militant groups against Pakistan.
The Sindh Home Ministry in November 2015, wrote a letter to the Rangers and Police claiming Taliban had funded terrorist activities in Karachi. According to the letter, RAW funded around Rs 20 million for terrorist activities in Karachi. "The funding has been provided to banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat," the letter claimed.
Claimed and alleged attacks
The Pakistani government implicated the network in the December 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto although the group denies the charge. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency also confirmed its belief of TTP's involvement in January 2008.
The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariate-Mohammadi (TNSM) claimed responsibility for a 23 December 2007 suicide bombing targeting a military convoy on behalf of the TTP. The blast in the Mingora area of the Swat Valley killed five soldiers and six civilians.
TTP spokesman Maulvi Umar claimed responsibility of 2008 Dera Ismail Khan suicide bombing.
TTP spokesman Maulvi Umar claimed that the group was responsible for 21 August 2008 suicide bomb attack on a military complex.
TTP claimed responsibility for the 23 August 2008 Swat Valley bombing.
Someone using the name Abdur Rehman claimed that the TTP was behind a 6 November 2008 suicide bombing that targeted tribal elders, who had gathered in the Bajaur tribal area to discuss efforts to coordinate with the government against the Pakistani Taliban. The blast took the lives of 16 and injured 31.
On 13 November 2008, the TTP intercepted a military convoy along the Khyber Pass bound for NATO troops in Afghanistan.
In telephone interviews with news media Mehsud claimed responsibility for the 30 March 2009 attack on the police training academy in Lahore. He told the BBC that the attack was in retaliation for continued missile strikes from American drones for which the Pakistani government shared responsibility. In the same interview Mehsud claimed two other attacks: a 25 March attack on an Islamabad police station and a 30 March suicide attack on a military convoy near Bannu.
Mehsud claimed responsibility for the Binghamton shooting, saying they were in retaliation for continued missile strikes from American drones. The FBI denied this claim and stated this had nothing to do with Mehsud.
Public opinion
Pakistan
According to a Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted in Pakistan in 2009, 85% of Pashtuns viewed the Pakistani Taliban as a serious threat to the country, compared to 80% of Muhajirs, 77% of Sindhis, and 71% of Punjabis. The survey highlighted that concerns about the Pakistani Taliban were more widespread than concerns about al-Qaeda. While 73% of respondents said the Pakistani Taliban posed a threat, only 61% thought al-Qaeda.
Regionally, people in Sindh and NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were the most concerned, with 85% in each province identifying the Pakistani Taliban as a major threat. Al-Qaeda was seen as more threatening in Sindh (71%) than in NWFP (63%) or Punjab (59%).
According to the 2011–12 Understanding FATA survey, 64.3% of respondents in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) held an unfavourable view of the Pakistani Taliban, while 15% viewed them favourably and 14.3% said they did not know.
When asked how they would describe the Pakistani Taliban, the largest group (27.4%) characterised them as terrorists, followed by 24.2% who described them as “uneducated youth.” Additionally, 18.2% believed the Pakistani Taliban were foreign fighters, 5.4% saw them as defenders of Islam, and 4.5% as defenders of tribal traditions. Only 1.4% called them freedom fighters, while 4.2% expressed no opinion, and 0.4% gave other responses.
Involvement in the Syrian Civil War
In July of 2013, the TTP's media wing, the Umar Media, had claimed to have set up training camps and to have sent hundreds of fighters to Syria to fight alongside the Syrian rebel groups and Islamist-Jihadist groups opposed to Bashar al-Assad such as the Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham and Ansar al-Tawhid in an effort to strengthen ties with Al Qaeda against the government of Pakistan in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Insurgency. These Reports were later verified and confirmed independently.
Post-Assad
After the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives and the fall of the Assad regime, many videos and pictures circulated online from Syria of Rebel/Jihadist fighters speaking Pashto congratulating the Syrian rebels in person. They were seen referring to the offensives as “jihad against the Rafidhis” and saying things such as “I will kill every Shia I find”. They also referred to Bashar al-Assad's regime as “Rafidhi” and “apostate". It is believed that these individuals are Afghans and Pakistanis who are part of the TTP and had been fighting against Assad and Iran-backed militias in Syria from as far back as 2013.




