CHUCK DEVORE: China, Russia, War, Peace, And Trump

While China rapidly expands its navy and nuclear weapons arsenal, and Russia remorselessly converts its economy to a wartime footing as it ramps up efforts to conquer Ukraine, events appear destined to come to a head—before the year’s end.

America, under President Donald J. Trump and his national security team, is finally emerging out of a 35-year break from great power competition, its depreciating Cold War-era legacy weapons systems worn down from 20 years of counterinsurgency warfare and futile nation-building.

But it has emerged onto a rapidly shifting strategic playing field.

The U.S. and its allies, mainly Israel, have enjoyed a remarkable string of successes, culminating in operation Midnight Hammer, America’s globe-spanning bomber raid on Iran’s underground nuclear weapons complexes. Remarkably, Iran’s two most powerful allies—Russia and China—did nothing for Iran. Thus, Israel, with America’s backing, seized the initiative, destroying Hamas as a military force, degrading Hezbollah in Lebanon, such that its vaunted missile arsenal—Iran’s de facto deterrent against Israeli action—was neutralized, and inflicting terrible punishment on Yemen’s Houthi rebels. This, after the Assad regime in Syria came to a bloody end in December at the hands of rebels, eliminating a Russian/Iranian client state. Thus, Iran lost four key proxies that it has spent billions to equip and support with one purpose—paralyzing Israel into inaction long enough to deploy nuclear weapons.

But Israel outmaneuvered and outfought Iran and its proxies, allowing America to deal the coup de main on Iran’s nuclear ambitions—and Russia and China are the weaker for it.

The Middle East’s shift to a post-conflict period heightens the focus on Europe and the Indo-Pacific with two paths coming sharply into view, one of which is likely to crystalize by year-end.

The first path continues the national security wins seen under Trump’s leadership, with events happening in Russia at a rapid pace—but not to Putin’s liking. Trump, his patience with Putin’s bad faith at an end, has set the clock ticking on secondary sanctions on Russia’s extensive oil tanker ghost fleet—that nation’s most important tool to generate money for war. Trump is also opening the spigots of arm sales to NATO, allowing NATO to forward existing stockpiles to Ukraine. Combined with the failure of Russia’s increasingly bloody and futile “meat” attacks in Ukraine, it looks like there may actually be a viable plan to force Russia to the peace table.

But there’s a rather large complication in this comparatively rosy picture: China.

On July 2, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the EU’s top diplomat that Beijing cannot accept a Russian loss against Ukraine. If this statement—a public contradiction of China’s official neutrality—wasn’t big enough, the foreign minister’s comments darkly suggested that Russia’s loss would allow America to shift its gaze to China. This begs the question: For what? Why would China pursue a strategy to prolong Russia’s war on Ukraine to distract the U.S.?

The obvious reason is Taiwan. Thus, the second, far more ominous path, is that China takes its long-intended steps to invade Taiwan. China sees the current depletion of Western munitions in Ukraine and other conflicts as a strategic window. In this scenario, every missile and bomb sent to Ukraine or Israel reduces the West’s ability to respond to a Chinese invasion, potentially emboldening Beijing. This path is particularly concerning, given China’s economic challenges, which might push the Chinese Communist Party toward conquest to distract from internal decline.

Heightening the concern, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth warned at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May that a Chinese military attack on Taiwan “could be imminent.”

The weather has a say in all of this, as well.

Storms, fog, and fast currents in the Taiwan Strait are notoriously bad, with not-quite-as-bad weather occurring in two windows: April and October.

With America under Trump rapidly working to redress its military shortcomings, and China’s economy appearing increasingly troubled, it may be that Beijing sees its chance slipping away. This October may be now—or never.

These paths present a dilemma for policy planners. Preventing Russia’s victory and ending the war is clearly not in China’s interests, and would simultaneously boost American credibility, and with it, deterrence; on the other hand, helping Ukraine depletes the very stockpiles the U.S. requires to present a credible deterrence to China.

That understood, stockpiles of highly complex and costly missile systems were rarely large, even during the Cold War. Wartime consumption rates mean that our stockpiles could face exhaustion after weeks or even days of conflict.

What’s more, modern systems grow obsolete and often have short shelf lives compared to other stocks, such as artillery shells. What matters most is production rates and the ability to rapidly expand production. Thus, perhaps paradoxically, selling weapons to NATO may serve as an incentive for defense companies to boost production lines with the enhanced capacity to stay in the fight, further strengthening deterrence.

There’s a fine line between peace and war. America can no longer live off its Cold War investment, lending even greater weight on Trump’s leadership. For its part, Congress would be well-advised to allocate the necessary resources to reconstitute America’s defense.

Chuck DeVore is Chief National Initiatives officer at the Texas Public Policy Foundation. He served in the California State Assembly and is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He’s the author of “Crisis of the House Never United.”

 The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Daily Caller News Foundation.

(Featured Image Media Credit: Ermell / Wikimedia Commons)