Luther Boyd Eubanks

The case involved a plaintiff suing the Oklahoma Historical Society and one of its employees, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) along with a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims. It held that the § 1981 claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity because the Historical Society is a state agency whose funds are controlled by the state, that the Title VII claim could not proceed because the right-to-sue notice had been issued by the EEOC rather than the Attorney General as required for governmental defendants, and that the remaining state tort claim had to be dismissed for lack of ancillary jurisdiction.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs seeking treble damages under RICO against the FDIC as receiver for the failed Penn Square Bank. The court granted the FDIC's motion to strike the treble damages claim, holding that only actual damages would be recoverable if the plaintiffs prevailed. The core reasoning was that RICO treble damages, modeled on the Clayton Act, are penal in nature under a three-part test evaluating the statute's public purpose, who receives the recovery, and the disproportion to harm suffered; imposing them would unfairly punish innocent depositors and creditors rather than the wrongdoer.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In the consolidated securities litigation involving Longhorn Oil and Gas limited partnerships, the FDIC, as receiver for the failed Penn Square Bank, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the federal common law estoppel rule from D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC barred the claims. The court denied the motion, holding that the D’Oench, Duhme doctrine did not apply because the allegations did not involve secret agreements by the plaintiffs that would tend to deceive the FDIC or banking authorities. The court reasoned that the elements of D’Oench, Duhme estoppel were not met, particularly noting the independent nature of letter of credit contracts in the transactions at issue.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This multidistrict litigation consolidated securities cases originally filed in federal courts in Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, and Michigan, all involving claims against Penn Square Bank, N.A., a failed national bank. The FDIC, as receiver, moved to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule 12(b)(3), citing 12 U.S.C. § 94's requirement that actions against national banks be brought only in the district where the bank is established. The court converted the motions to requests under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and held that venue was improper in the transferor districts because the statute is mandatory and exclusive, even when the FDIC acts as receiver. It concluded that transfer to the Oklahoma district (where the bank was located) would serve the interests of justice by promoting judicial economy and uniform decisions, and it ordered most cases transferred to itself while severing and transferring part of one case. The ruling rested on the MDL transferee court's authority to handle venue transfers and the plain command of the National Bank Act venue provision.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved Equico Lessors, Inc. seeking a deficiency judgment against the Wetsel defendants under an equipment lease agreement and related guaranties after repossessing and selling computer equipment used in the defendants' business. The court examined whether the lease qualified as a security interest under Oklahoma's UCC, specifically 12A O.S. § 1-201(37), based on the transaction's economic realities such as payment terms, interest rate, and ownership intent. It concluded the agreement was a lease intended as security, triggering the notice requirements of 12A O.S. § 9-504(3) for the private sale, which the plaintiff did not meet. However, because the defendants presented no evidence of loss from the notice failure under § 9-507(1), the plaintiff remained entitled to recover the deficiency, which the court calculated at $16,103.80 after accounting for payments made, present value of remaining obligations, late charges, and sale proceeds.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved the FDIC, acting as receiver for the failed Penn Square Bank, seeking court approval under 12 U.S.C. § 192 to sell three tracts of real estate including a motor bank facility. Competing offers were presented, including a higher bid from Western Trust & Savings contingent on multiple regulatory approvals for a new bank charter, use of the facility, and deposit insurance, versus a lower but less conditional offer from M. Stanley Lee & Associates that was later amended to remove some contingencies. Other banks requested a continuance, which the court denied before authorizing the receiver to accept the Lee Group offer. The core reasoning was that the Western offer imposed excessive uncertainties and risks that the receiver should not have to speculate on, while the Lee offer provided greater certainty, immediate economic advantages including a favorable lease on the main bank building, and non-interruption of operations, making the receiver's actions neither arbitrary nor in bad faith.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved Sharp Drilling Company filing a complaint in federal district court seeking reversal of a July 1981 decision by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission that had been adverse to the company. The Secretary of Labor moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) vests exclusive authority to review such Commission orders in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The court granted the motion, holding that the statute plainly directs aggrieved parties to petition a court of appeals within sixty days and that special review statutes of this kind preclude original jurisdiction in district courts even when constitutional claims are asserted. The court further rejected the plaintiff's request to transfer the case with relation-back effect, noting that absence of jurisdiction left it powerless to grant any relief.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether a $60 filing fee should be charged for adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court, such as motions to lift the automatic stay or objections to discharge. The bankruptcy court ordered that no such fees be collected for these specific pleadings, and the district court affirmed this decision. The court reasoned that the new Bankruptcy Code finances bankruptcy courts from general federal revenues rather than through self-financing mechanisms like the old Referees’ Salary and Expense Fund, and that 28 U.S.C. § 1930(b) only authorizes fees similar to those in district courts. It further noted that requiring fees in these circumstances would improperly burden creditors who are compelled to litigate in bankruptcy court to protect their rights, unlike voluntary filings in other federal courts.

procedure

The case concerned a dispute over whether the bankruptcy court or the National Labor Relations Board had authority to resolve claims for backpay and unfair labor practices filed by the NLRB on behalf of approximately 400 employees of the debtor, Unit Parts Co., arising after the involuntary Chapter 11 filing. The bankruptcy court asserted concurrent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1471, elected not to abstain, and ruled it would determine the validity, amount, liquidation, and priority of the claims itself without being bound by any NLRB decisions. The NLRB applied to the district court for an emergency stay of those proceedings, arguing exclusive NLRB jurisdiction over National Labor Relations Act matters. The district court denied the application, holding that the bankruptcy court's non-abstention decision was unreviewable under § 1471(d) and that, as an appellate tribunal, it lacked jurisdiction to interfere absent an appealable order.

labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In this case, seven plaintiffs sued Western Electric Co. under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging they were not repromoted to Section Chief positions because of their ages after earlier demotions. A jury had already found the defendant liable for age discrimination and determined it was willful. In the damages phase tried to the court, the judge made findings on the plaintiffs' ages, service records, and the dates promotions resumed for younger employees, then concluded that damages should be calculated from October 1976 onward using each plaintiff's pre-demotion salary control percentage. The court awarded lost back wages, front wages in lieu of reinstatement, lost pension and Social Security benefits, inflation adjustments, tax losses from award bunching, and liquidated damages equal to the compensatory amounts, plus $175,000 in attorney fees, but denied prejudgment interest.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a Chapter IX bankruptcy petition filed by the Fort Cobb, Oklahoma, Irrigation Fuel Authority, which a bondholder (T.J. Raney & Sons) moved to dismiss on grounds that the entity was not validly formed under state law and thus ineligible for relief. The court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. It found that the Declaration of Trust had not been properly accepted by the beneficiary town of Eakly, as only one trustee signed and the action exceeded the town's authorized functions by planning to provide natural gas service across multiple counties. The court concluded that the Authority therefore was not a valid public trust or qualifying political subdivision under the Bankruptcy Act.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved the Secretary of Labor suing Arthur M. Kelly under ERISA for breaches of fiduciary duty as the sole trustee of his company's employee profit-sharing plan. The court found that Kelly had made multiple improper loans from the plan to his financially troubled company without adequate security or monitoring, and had authorized unauthorized payments from the plan to himself. The core reasoning was that these actions violated ERISA's requirements for prudent investment, loyalty to plan participants, and avoidance of conflicts of interest, as the loans jeopardized plan assets and the payments lacked any proper basis under the plan documents. The court ordered repayment of the loans and improper distributions with interest, removed Kelly as trustee, and appointed interim trustees to manage the plan.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved Bonray Oil Company challenging a Remedial Order from the Federal Energy Administration (FEA, predecessor to the Department of Energy) that required refunds plus interest for selling crude oil from certain leases as exempt "stripper well oil" in violation of price controls under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973. Bonray argued that the FEA lacked authority to order refunds or interest, and disputed the agency's definition of "preceding calendar year" as a full calendar year rather than any rolling 12-month period. The court granted summary judgment to the DOE, holding that the EPAA provided implied authority for refunds to achieve equitable pricing and that requiring interest was a reasonable way to compensate overcharged parties. The court also upheld the FEA's interpretation of the stripper well exemption timing.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved Grace Petroleum Corporation's challenge to the validity of the Department of Energy's Ruling 1974-29, which interpreted the stripper well exemption regulation under 10 C.F.R. § 212.54 to exclude non-producing wells when calculating average daily production for the exemption from federal crude oil price controls under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act. Grace sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the regulation as interpreted by the Ruling. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and vacated the existing temporary restraining order. It reasoned that Grace lacked a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because the Ruling was a valid interpretive statement consistent with the regulation's text, industry understanding, and congressional intent, and because granting relief would harm the public interest by risking unrecoverable oil price increases and undermining the statutory scheme for uniform review of agency rulings.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a corporation's claims that IRS agents wrongfully seized two vehicles it owned to collect unpaid taxes owed by its president and sole shareholder, with the plaintiff alleging violations of its Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and seeking return of the vehicles plus damages; an intervenor bank asserted security interests in the cars. The court granted motions to dismiss the intervention against the IRS and individual agents, and dismissed or granted summary judgment on the constitutional damages claim in Count II. It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred suits against the United States and the IRS absent statutory consent, while the agents were protected by qualified immunity because they executed the levy pursuant to a warrant, on supervisor instructions, and with advice from IRS counsel, acting reasonably and in good faith without bad faith or unreasonableness in the seizure itself.

taxesfederal powercivil rightsprocedure

This case is a wrongful death suit brought by Mary Burrell against electrical contractor Rodgers after her husband was electrocuted on a construction site, alleging negligence in failing to de-energize power sources. Rodgers filed a third-party complaint against the decedent's employer T&C seeking contribution or indemnification, claiming T&C controlled the site and was responsible for the electrical work. T&C moved for summary judgment on the ground that its payment of workers' compensation death benefits made its liability exclusive under Oklahoma law, barring further claims. The court granted the motion and dismissed the third-party complaint, relying on precedent holding that the workers' compensation exclusivity provision precludes contribution or indemnity absent an independent contractual or vicarious liability relationship between the parties, which was not present here as any negligence would be active rather than constructive.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves multiple plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination by Honeywell under Title VII and Section 1981 on behalf of blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans. The court granted defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the Title VII claims of plaintiffs Johnson, Fields, Dewberry, and Sharp. The court reasoned that only plaintiff Enriquez had obtained the required EEOC right-to-sue notice, and his charge of retaliation did not encompass the other plaintiffs' claims of discrimination in hiring, job assignments, and promotions, as Title VII mandates administrative processing to narrow issues for adjudication. Enriquez's Section 1981 claim based on national origin was taken under advisement pending further record development.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a challenge by existing banks to the Comptroller of the Currency's approval of an application for a new national bank in northwest Oklahoma City. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the service area could not sustain additional competition, that they were denied effective procedural due process due to late access to a feasibility study, and that an environmental impact statement should have been prepared. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Comptroller's finding of community need and ability to sustain the bank had a rational factual basis in evidence of population growth, income levels, commercial development, and existing bank performance. It further found no due process violation because the study was a public record before the hearing and the record remained open afterward, and that the Comptroller's negative EIS determination was sufficient and could relate back to the record.

business & regulatoryprocedureenvironment

In this wrongful death lawsuit stemming from the electrocution of a carpenter during building remodeling, the defendant issued a subpoena to OSHA seeking witness statements and photographs from the agency's investigation of the incident. The Secretary of Labor moved to quash the subpoena as to those materials. The court granted the motion, ruling that jurisdiction under the Freedom of Information Act to compel production of agency records requires the filing of a separate complaint, and that such a request cannot be litigated through a discovery subpoena in an existing private civil case.

procedurelabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case Ward v. Coleman arose after oil overflowed from an earth pit at a drilling site owned by L.O. Ward into Boggie Creek, prompting a $500 civil penalty assessment by the Coast Guard under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) following Ward's required self-report. Ward sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the self-reporting obligation violated the Fifth Amendment because the penalty was criminal or quasi-criminal in nature, that strict liability without fault offended due process, and that the regulatory "sheen" test exceeded statutory authority for defining harmful quantities. The court examined the statute's text, its separation from the explicitly criminal penalties in subsection (5), and congressional labeling to determine that the penalty is civil rather than criminal, allowing inquiry into constitutional claims while upholding the civil characterization based on statutory construction and administrative imposition procedures.

environmentcriminal lawbusiness & regulatoryfederal power