This case involves seven former female employees of Oxford Paper Company who sued the company and their union, Local 900, alleging sex discrimination in job bumping practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as breach of the collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on the Title VII claims against both parties and the Section 301 claim against the employer, but granted dismissal of the Section 301 claim against the union. On the Title VII counts, the court rejected procedural challenges regarding the timing of the lawsuit and EEOC filings, holding that the 30-day suit-filing period begins only upon notice from the Commission of failed conciliation and that the claims were timely. The Section 301 claim against the union was dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction, as the duty of fair representation did not provide an independent basis under the circumstances presented.
This case involves third-party contribution and indemnification claims brought by asbestos manufacturers against the United States in lawsuits filed by present and former employees of Bath Iron Works shipyard, alleging exposure to asbestos from approximately 1940 to 1980 and seeking relief under Maine tort law via the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court had previously denied the United States' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, finding material factual disputes over whether Navy personnel had nondiscretionary duties to enforce asbestos safety precautions at the shipyard or whether the discretionary function exception applied. On reconsideration, with additional declarations and evidence from both sides, the court determined that no genuine issues of material fact remained and that the government's decisions regarding workplace safety responsibilities were discretionary. The court granted the United States' motion for reconsideration, denied the defendants' motion, and entered summary judgment dismissing the claims against the United States under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
This case involves third-party complaints filed by asbestos manufacturers against the United States seeking contribution and indemnification in lawsuits by current and former Bath Iron Works shipyard employees (and their representatives) for asbestos-related injuries allegedly sustained while working on U.S. naval vessels. The United States moved for reconsideration of an earlier denial of its motion to dismiss Count VI of the model third-party complaint, which asserted claims against the government in its capacity as vessel owner under section 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as well as alternative claims under Maine tort law via the Federal Tort Claims Act. Relying on the First Circuit's intervening decision in Drake v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the court concluded that section 5(b) applies only to maritime torts and does not cover asbestos injuries to shipyard workers. The court further analyzed whether the remaining claims under Maine law were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
The case concerns Sierra Club's motions for attorneys' fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act after prevailing in two related lawsuits challenging federal agency approvals for a port, causeway, and access road project at Sears Island, Maine. In Sierra I, the court had initially upheld the agencies' decisions not to prepare an environmental impact statement, but the First Circuit reversed on NEPA grounds regarding secondary impacts; in Sierra II, the district court revoked a Coast Guard bridge permit, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The court grants Sierra Club's fee requests in both actions, finding that the government failed to demonstrate its position was substantially justified and awarding reduced amounts based on reviewed timesheets, applicable rates, and allowable expenses.
Eighteen defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to import large quantities of marijuana in violation of federal drug laws. The defendants filed motions to suppress evidence gathered through an investigation that included surveillance of a suspected mothership, consensual recordings of phone calls by a cooperating informant, warrantless entries into motel rooms, arrests, and searches of vehicles. The court denied the motions after an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the informant had consented to the recordings, that officers had probable cause for arrests and searches, and that any warrantless actions were justified by exigent circumstances or established exceptions to the warrant requirement. The opinion details the facts of the DEA and Coast Guard operation that led to the seizure of the vessel Adina and related land-based evidence.
This case was a class action brought by inmates at the Maine State Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging conditions in administrative segregation, protective custody, and the general population as violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with breaches of a prior consent decree. The underlying litigation culminated in the court's 1983 decision in Lovell v. Brennan, which found violations in assignment procedures and the use of restraint cells, issued an injunction, and noted that the suit had prompted substantial prison improvements. In this memorandum, the court ruled on plaintiffs' counsel's motions for attorneys' fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988), granting awards after calculating lodestar amounts based on hours worked and a stipulated rate, then adjusting for factors such as duplication, vague entries, and partial success.
