Edward Thaxter Gignoux

This case involves seven former female employees of Oxford Paper Company who sued the company and their union, Local 900, alleging sex discrimination in job bumping practices under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as breach of the collective bargaining agreement under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on the Title VII claims against both parties and the Section 301 claim against the employer, but granted dismissal of the Section 301 claim against the union. On the Title VII counts, the court rejected procedural challenges regarding the timing of the lawsuit and EEOC filings, holding that the 30-day suit-filing period begins only upon notice from the Commission of failed conciliation and that the claims were timely. The Section 301 claim against the union was dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction, as the duty of fair representation did not provide an independent basis under the circumstances presented.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves third-party contribution and indemnification claims brought by asbestos manufacturers against the United States in lawsuits filed by present and former employees of Bath Iron Works shipyard, alleging exposure to asbestos from approximately 1940 to 1980 and seeking relief under Maine tort law via the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court had previously denied the United States' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, finding material factual disputes over whether Navy personnel had nondiscretionary duties to enforce asbestos safety precautions at the shipyard or whether the discretionary function exception applied. On reconsideration, with additional declarations and evidence from both sides, the court determined that no genuine issues of material fact remained and that the government's decisions regarding workplace safety responsibilities were discretionary. The court granted the United States' motion for reconsideration, denied the defendants' motion, and entered summary judgment dismissing the claims against the United States under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.

torts & liabilityfederal power

This case involves third-party complaints filed by asbestos manufacturers against the United States seeking contribution and indemnification in lawsuits by current and former Bath Iron Works shipyard employees (and their representatives) for asbestos-related injuries allegedly sustained while working on U.S. naval vessels. The United States moved for reconsideration of an earlier denial of its motion to dismiss Count VI of the model third-party complaint, which asserted claims against the government in its capacity as vessel owner under section 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as well as alternative claims under Maine tort law via the Federal Tort Claims Act. Relying on the First Circuit's intervening decision in Drake v. Raymark Industries, Inc., the court concluded that section 5(b) applies only to maritime torts and does not cover asbestos injuries to shipyard workers. The court further analyzed whether the remaining claims under Maine law were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerns Sierra Club's motions for attorneys' fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act after prevailing in two related lawsuits challenging federal agency approvals for a port, causeway, and access road project at Sears Island, Maine. In Sierra I, the court had initially upheld the agencies' decisions not to prepare an environmental impact statement, but the First Circuit reversed on NEPA grounds regarding secondary impacts; in Sierra II, the district court revoked a Coast Guard bridge permit, a ruling affirmed on appeal. The court grants Sierra Club's fee requests in both actions, finding that the government failed to demonstrate its position was substantially justified and awarding reduced amounts based on reviewed timesheets, applicable rates, and allowable expenses.

environmentprocedure

Eighteen defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to import large quantities of marijuana in violation of federal drug laws. The defendants filed motions to suppress evidence gathered through an investigation that included surveillance of a suspected mothership, consensual recordings of phone calls by a cooperating informant, warrantless entries into motel rooms, arrests, and searches of vehicles. The court denied the motions after an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the informant had consented to the recordings, that officers had probable cause for arrests and searches, and that any warrantless actions were justified by exigent circumstances or established exceptions to the warrant requirement. The opinion details the facts of the DEA and Coast Guard operation that led to the seizure of the vessel Adina and related land-based evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a class action brought by inmates at the Maine State Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging conditions in administrative segregation, protective custody, and the general population as violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with breaches of a prior consent decree. The underlying litigation culminated in the court's 1983 decision in Lovell v. Brennan, which found violations in assignment procedures and the use of restraint cells, issued an injunction, and noted that the suit had prompted substantial prison improvements. In this memorandum, the court ruled on plaintiffs' counsel's motions for attorneys' fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988), granting awards after calculating lodestar amounts based on hours worked and a stipulated rate, then adjusting for factors such as duplication, vague entries, and partial success.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerns third-party claims for contribution and indemnification brought by asbestos product manufacturers against the United States in lawsuits filed by present and former Portsmouth Naval Shipyard employees (and their representatives) alleging asbestos-related injuries. The manufacturers asserted that the government, in its capacity as vessel owner, breached duties owed to the workers. The District Court denied the United States' motion to dismiss Count VI of the third-party complaints. It reasoned that FECA's exclusive-liability provision does not bar such claims under the Supreme Court's Lockheed decision, that the FTCA requires assessing whether a private shipyard employer in Maine would face liability in the same role under the LHWCA, and that resolution of whether Maine's workers' compensation statute shields an employer-vessel owner turns on the undecided dual-capacity doctrine, which the court reserved for possible certification to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court after a full record.

labor & employmentfederal powertorts & liability

This case involves approximately fifty lawsuits brought by current and former employees of Bath Iron Works (BIW), a Maine shipyard, against manufacturers of asbestos-containing products for injuries allegedly caused by workplace exposure. The manufacturers filed third-party claims against BIW seeking contribution, indemnity, and pro tanto relief for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as for loss of consortium. The court granted BIW's motion for summary judgment dismissing the contribution and indemnity claims under section 4 of the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act, which provides the exclusive remedy against employers, but denied dismissal of the pro tanto claims. The decision followed analysis of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) in light of the Supreme Court’s Lockheed ruling, which clarified that federal exclusive liability provisions do not bar third-party actions, while determining that Maine state law independently barred the contribution and indemnity claims without conflicting with the LHWCA.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentfederal power

This case involves approximately 225 asbestos personal injury lawsuits brought by current and former shipyard workers (and their estates) from Bath Iron Works and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos products, asserting negligence, strict liability, and warranty claims under diversity jurisdiction. The defendant manufacturers filed third-party complaints against the United States seeking contribution and indemnification under the FTCA, Tucker Act, and admiralty statutes, alleging the government acted as a seller of asbestos, controlled work sites, issued specifications, or owned the vessels. The court analyzed the government's motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on the model third-party complaints, accepting allegations as true for dismissal purposes and construing facts favorably for summary judgment. It dismissed Count I of the BIW complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under sovereign immunity principles, as the FTCA does not waive immunity for the asserted claims, and indicated similar analysis for remaining counts under statutes including the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedurelabor & employment

This case involved approximately 230 lawsuits filed by current and former employees (and representatives of deceased employees) of two shipyards against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos products. The plaintiffs alleged injuries from asbestos exposure during employment and asserted claims based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranties under diversity jurisdiction. Defendants raised an affirmative defense that they could not be held liable because their products complied with U.S. government specifications, known as the government contract defense. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike this defense, finding that Maine law was unsettled on its validity and applicability, and also denied the defendants' motion for a consolidated Phase I trial on the defense, concluding that such a trial would be overly complex, confusing, and intertwined with issues of liability and causation.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment

This case involves a declaratory judgment action by Honeycomb Systems, Inc. against Admiral Insurance Company to determine coverage under an umbrella liability policy for losses from the 1977 failure of a large dryer that Honeycomb built for Scott Paper Company. The court granted summary judgment to Honeycomb and denied Admiral's cross-motion, holding that the losses were covered. The core reasoning was that the 1977 hub crack constituted a separate "accident" under the policy because it resulted from distinct fabrication errors by a subcontractor (excessive boring and improper plate attachment) that caused sudden property damage, rather than cumulative exposure or the prior 1975 weld failures. The policy's definition of accident, which includes continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, supported this conclusion, and the damage was not excluded as a normal business risk.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

In Hall v. City of Auburn, plaintiffs Connie Hall and Marymay Bernard sought attorneys’ fees and costs under Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for legal services in state court proceedings where they alleged and prevailed on claims of sex discrimination in hiring for the Auburn police force. The district court granted the motions in part, finding both plaintiffs to be prevailing parties eligible for fees despite one not having been hired after failing an agility test. The court reasoned that Title VII authorizes fee awards to prevailing parties even when success occurs in a state forum, and that winning the right to nondiscriminatory hiring criteria sufficed to establish prevailing-party status.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case consists of consolidated class actions brought by inmates at the Maine State Prison challenging their conditions of confinement in administrative segregation, protective custody, and the general population. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, due process in assignment procedures, equal protection regarding access to facilities, Sixth Amendment access to courts, and other state law claims, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. After multiple evidentiary hearings, prison tours, and evidence of post-1980 lockdown improvements in facilities, staffing, and programs, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a) based on the record through late 1982. The opinion details current prison conditions, notes substantial improvements sparked by the litigation and agreements on the adequacy of services such as food and medical care, and addresses remaining issues like violence levels, training, and restraint cell use.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involved a breach of contract and tort action brought in Maine federal court by Cives Corporation, a Delaware company with operations in Maine, against out-of-state defendants American Electric Power Company, its subsidiaries, for work performed on a West Virginia power plant project. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing insufficient contacts with Maine. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. It held that the defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of Maine law or established minimum contacts there, as all contract negotiations occurred via mail and phone, the contract was governed by New York law, the work was performed entirely in West Virginia, and any in-state activities were unilateral actions by the plaintiff. The court concluded that exercising jurisdiction would violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

procedure

In this case, three plaintiffs sued asbestos product manufacturers and suppliers for injuries from workplace exposure at a privately-owned Maine shipyard, seeking damages under negligence, warranty, and strict liability theories. One defendant filed third-party complaints against the shipyard employer (BIW) for contribution and indemnity, including under a vessel owner negligence theory pursuant to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). The court granted BIW’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the claims were barred by the LHWCA’s exclusive liability provision in 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). The core reasoning was that BIW was not the owner pro hac vice of the Navy or commercial vessels at issue, given the detailed contractual oversight, access rights, and operational control retained by the Navy and other owners as shown in the record of contracts, affidavits, and practices.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case was a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by mentally retarded Maine citizens against state officials alleging violations of rights to be free from harm and receive habilitative services at Pineland Center. In 1978 the parties entered a consent decree for facility upgrades and community programs, with the court retaining jurisdiction and appointing a Special Master; later disputes led to a 1981 stipulation extending oversight. Plaintiffs' counsel then moved for attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for post-decree implementation work in 1979-1981. The court granted the motions in part, awarding $56,236.44 to attorneys Woodruff and Bailey and $22,563.97 to the Mental Health Law Project after reducing some hours as non-compensable and approving reasonable rates and expenses, on the ground that plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to fees for necessary enforcement efforts.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerned a federal income tax refund claim by Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation after the IRS disallowed most of a $1 million charitable deduction for land donated to Maine in 1969. The company valued the 207-acre parcel as a potential hydroelectric site, while the IRS valued it at $26,240 as timberland. The court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled only to the lower valuation and dismissed the action. It reasoned that there was no reasonable likelihood the parcel would be developed for hydroelectric power within a reasonable time, due to state legal restrictions prohibiting such development in the Allagash Wilderness Waterway, lack of demonstrated market demand, and difficulties in obtaining necessary permits and rights.

taxespropertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over the priority between a mechanic's lien filed by a subcontractor on a moderate-income housing project and a mortgage on the same property that was assigned to HUD after the developer defaulted. The court reconsidered its earlier decision in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., which addressed when federal courts should adopt state law as the rule of decision in lien priority cases involving federal programs. The court decided to apply Maine state lien priority law as the federal rule of decision and held that the mechanic's lien was superior to the mortgage. The core reasoning was that incorporating state commercial law would not disrupt significant federal interests or established commercial relationships in the Section 236 housing program, and Maine law clearly gave priority to the timely filed mechanic's lien based on work performed before the mortgage was recorded.

propertyfederal power

This case was a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a former half-time home economics teacher against a Maine school district board and officials, alleging that the non-renewal of her one-year contract for the 1976-77 school year denied her procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. After a bench trial, the court made detailed findings on the superintendent's and principal's evaluations of the teacher's performance, multiple meetings to discuss deficiencies and improvement expectations, and the board's consideration of those concerns before deciding not to renew. The court concluded that Maine statutes governing teacher contracts (such as 20 M.R.S.A. § 161(5)) provide only limited procedural protections for nonrenewal and do not create a property interest requiring just cause or tenure-like safeguards, in contrast to dismissal provisions, and that the district's process satisfied any applicable requirements; judgment was therefore directed for the defendants. The court further noted the Maine legislature's repeated rejection of bills that would have imposed just-cause standards for nonrenewal.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case was a lawsuit brought by a trade association representing sellers of items that could qualify as drug paraphernalia, along with distributors and retailers, against Maine state and local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought to have the Maine Drug Paraphernalia Act declared unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined, arguing that the law was impermissibly vague and overbroad in violation of due process, created an unlawful presumption regarding listed items, and infringed on First Amendment free speech rights through its advertising restrictions. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in full and rejected all challenges. Its reasoning was that the statute, closely patterned on the federal Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, supplied adequate notice of prohibited conduct and enforcement standards, and aligned with decisions from other courts sustaining similar laws.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rights