The case concerned the tax depreciation basis for 18 ships that Waterman Steamship Corp. purchased from the U.S. Maritime Commission during World War II at prices later adjusted downward under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. The Act provided for a reduced statutory sales price and an unwinding of prior charter hire payments and related tax effects, resulting in a net credit to the government. The District Court ruled that the company's basis was the original price minus the net adjustment, while the Court of Appeals held it was the statutory sales price; the Supreme Court reviewed this dispute to determine the correct cost basis for post-1946 depreciation deductions.
This case involved the seizure of a 1958 Plymouth sedan by Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board officers who found untaxed liquor inside without a warrant. The state sought forfeiture of the vehicle under a statute prohibiting the transport of untaxed liquor. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding the search lacked probable cause and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture, ruling that the exclusionary rule applies only to criminal prosecutions and not to civil forfeiture proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule does apply to such forfeiture actions because they are criminal in nature and involve penalties akin to criminal sanctions.
The case concerned a railroad worker who filed a timely Federal Employers' Liability Act suit in Ohio state court within the three-year limitations period, but the action was dismissed for improper venue under state law; he then refiled an identical claim in federal district court after the period had expired. The Supreme Court held that the state court filing tolled the FELA statute of limitations, rendering the federal action timely. The Court reasoned that congressional intent behind the remedial FELA is served by tolling when a plaintiff commences a timely action in a court of competent jurisdiction with proper service, even if later dismissed for venue, because the defendant receives notice and the limitation is not inflexible under all circumstances.
This case involved the National Labor Relations Board certifying a union as the bargaining representative for debit insurance agents at a single district office of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, despite the company's objections to the unit's appropriateness. The company refused to bargain, leading to unfair labor practice charges, and the Board ordered it to bargain. The Court of Appeals declined to enforce the order, finding that the Board likely treated the extent of union organization as controlling in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court held that the Board's failure to articulate specific reasons for its unit determinations and distinctions among similar cases prevented proper judicial review, requiring the Board to disclose the basis of its decisions when exercising its discretion under the Act.
The case concerned petitioner Sansone, who was indicted under IRC § 7201 for willfully attempting to evade 1957 federal income taxes by failing to report gains from land sales, though he conceded the understatement but claimed it was not willful. At trial, he sought jury instructions allowing conviction on the lesser-included misdemeanors of willfully filing a false return (§ 7207) or willfully failing to pay taxes (§ 7203) if the jury acquitted on the felony, but these requests were denied and he was convicted. The Supreme Court analyzed whether § 7207 applies to income tax returns, observing that the 1954 Code's reorganization removed the statutory barriers identified in Achilli v. United States and that the lesser-included offense doctrine's applicability turns on whether the evidence could rationally support acquittal on the greater offense while convicting on the lesser. The Court granted certiorari specifically to address the doctrine's fit with these federal tax provisions.
The case involved whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant for an illegal distillery in Ventresca's home established probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. The district court upheld the warrant, but the court of appeals reversed the conviction, finding the affidavit insufficient because it did not explicitly state that the information came from personal knowledge rather than unreliable hearsay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit, when read as a whole in a commonsense manner, provided sufficient detail from investigators' observations to support probable cause, and emphasizing the preference for warrants issued by neutral magistrates over warrantless searches.
