
Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-10-11 · cited 72×
The case concerned the tax depreciation basis for 18 ships that Waterman Steamship Corp. purchased from the U.S. Maritime Commission during World War II at prices later adjusted downward under the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946. The Act provided for a reduced statutory sales price and an unwinding of prior charter hire payments and related tax effects, resulting in a net credit to the government. The District Court ruled that the company's basis was the original price minus the net adjustment, while the Court of Appeals held it was the statutory sales price; the Supreme Court reviewed this dispute to determine the correct cost basis for post-1946 depreciation deductions.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-04-29 · cited 867×
This case involved the seizure of a 1958 Plymouth sedan by Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board officers who found untaxed liquor inside without a warrant. The state sought forfeiture of the vehicle under a statute prohibiting the transport of untaxed liquor. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding the search lacked probable cause and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture, ruling that the exclusionary rule applies only to criminal prosecutions and not to civil forfeiture proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule does apply to such forfeiture actions because they are criminal in nature and involve penalties akin to criminal sanctions.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedureproperty
Burnett v. New York Central Railroad
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-04-05 · cited 1036×
The case concerned a railroad worker who filed a timely Federal Employers' Liability Act suit in Ohio state court within the three-year limitations period, but the action was dismissed for improper venue under state law; he then refiled an identical claim in federal district court after the period had expired. The Supreme Court held that the state court filing tolled the FELA statute of limitations, rendering the federal action timely. The Court reasoned that congressional intent behind the remedial FELA is served by tolling when a plaintiff commences a timely action in a court of competent jurisdiction with proper service, even if later dismissed for venue, because the defendant receives notice and the limitation is not inflexible under all circumstances.
labor & employmentprocedurefederal power
National Labor Relations Board v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-04-05 · cited 264×
This case involved the National Labor Relations Board certifying a union as the bargaining representative for debit insurance agents at a single district office of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, despite the company's objections to the unit's appropriateness. The company refused to bargain, leading to unfair labor practice charges, and the Board ordered it to bargain. The Court of Appeals declined to enforce the order, finding that the Board likely treated the extent of union organization as controlling in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Supreme Court held that the Board's failure to articulate specific reasons for its unit determinations and distinctions among similar cases prevented proper judicial review, requiring the Board to disclose the basis of its decisions when exercising its discretion under the Act.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Sansone v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-03-29 · cited 851×
The case concerned petitioner Sansone, who was indicted under IRC § 7201 for willfully attempting to evade 1957 federal income taxes by failing to report gains from land sales, though he conceded the understatement but claimed it was not willful. At trial, he sought jury instructions allowing conviction on the lesser-included misdemeanors of willfully filing a false return (§ 7207) or willfully failing to pay taxes (§ 7203) if the jury acquitted on the felony, but these requests were denied and he was convicted. The Supreme Court analyzed whether § 7207 applies to income tax returns, observing that the 1954 Code's reorganization removed the statutory barriers identified in Achilli v. United States and that the lesser-included offense doctrine's applicability turns on whether the evidence could rationally support acquittal on the greater offense while convicting on the lesser. The Court granted certiorari specifically to address the doctrine's fit with these federal tax provisions.
criminal lawtaxes
United States v. Ventresca
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-03-01 · cited 4171×
The case involved whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant for an illegal distillery in Ventresca's home established probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. The district court upheld the warrant, but the court of appeals reversed the conviction, finding the affidavit insufficient because it did not explicitly state that the information came from personal knowledge rather than unreliable hearsay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavit, when read as a whole in a commonsense manner, provided sufficient detail from investigators' observations to support probable cause, and emphasizing the preference for warrants issued by neutral magistrates over warrantless searches.
criminal lawprocedure
Cox v. Louisiana
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-01-18 · cited 938×
The case concerned the conviction of a civil rights demonstrator under a Louisiana statute making it a crime to picket or parade near a courthouse with intent to interfere with the administration of justice or influence a judge, juror, or other court officer. The Supreme Court addressed whether the law was unconstitutional on its face or as applied, in light of the same underlying facts that also gave rise to related disturbing-the-peace and obstruction charges. The Court upheld the statute, explaining that it was a precise and narrowly drawn regulation targeting specific conduct in a limited location, that states have a compelling interest in shielding judicial proceedings from outside pressures to ensure fair and orderly justice, and that such a prohibition does not violate First Amendment protections for speech and assembly.
free speechcriminal lawcivil rights
Cox v. Louisiana
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-01-18 · cited 1449×
The case involved the convictions of Reverend B. Elton Cox, a civil rights leader, for disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse under Louisiana law after he led a demonstration protesting racial segregation and the arrests of student picketers. Cox had been acquitted of criminal conspiracy but was sentenced to cumulative jail terms and fines on the other charges, which the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the facts of the planned, orderly march by about 2,000 students, the group's interactions with police who initially directed them to one side of the street, and the subsequent arrests, while assessing challenges that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and as applied to protected speech and assembly. The opinion analyzed the demonstration's expressive elements, including speeches, prayers, and songs, and noted that a local parade permit ordinance was not at issue in the convictions.
civil rightsfree speechcriminal law
Schlagenhauf v. Holder
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-01-18 · cited 1194×
This case concerned the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), which authorizes a court to order a party to undergo physical or mental examinations when that party's condition is in controversy. The underlying dispute was a negligence action arising from a bus-truck collision, in which other defendants sought multiple examinations of bus driver Schlagenhauf based on allegations about his vision and fitness to drive. The Supreme Court held that Rule 35 applies to defendants as well as plaintiffs, but requires an affirmative showing that the condition is genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for the examinations; it reversed the denial of mandamus because those standards had not been met on the record presented. The Court emphasized that broad or multiple examinations demand particular justification tied to the pleadings and evidence.
proceduretorts & liability
Securities & Exchange Commission v. American Trailer Rentals Co.
Supreme Court of the United States · 1965-01-18 · cited 96×
The case concerned whether American Trailer Rentals Company could pursue corporate rehabilitation under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, which allows simpler arrangements, or whether the proceeding must instead proceed under Chapter X, which provides for more comprehensive reorganization. The Securities and Exchange Commission moved to dismiss or transfer the Chapter XI petition, arguing that the company's plan would materially affect the rights of numerous public investor-creditors who had purchased trailers under sale-and-leaseback arrangements that qualified as unregistered securities. The Court held that Chapter X proceedings were required, reasoning that the debtor's structure, history of losses, misappropriations, defective assets, and the plan's impact on widespread public investors necessitated the greater scrutiny and possible capital readjustments available only under Chapter X rather than a limited composition under Chapter XI.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Aptheker v. Secretary of State
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-06-22 · cited 709×
This case concerned the constitutionality of Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which made it unlawful for members of registered Communist organizations to apply for or use U.S. passports. The Supreme Court held that the provision violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by infringing on the protected liberty to travel abroad. The Court reasoned that the statute imposed an overly broad restriction based solely on organizational membership without individualized findings about whether a particular applicant's travel would harm national security, and without allowing for consideration of the purpose or circumstances of the travel. The decision noted that while the government has authority to regulate in this area, the law swept too widely and lacked sufficient procedural safeguards.
civil rightsfree speechfederal power
Escobedo v. Illinois
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-06-22 · cited 5250×
In Escobedo v. Illinois, the petitioner was arrested and interrogated by police regarding a murder; despite his repeated requests and those of his retained lawyer, police refused to allow any consultation during the questioning, and petitioner made incriminating statements. The Supreme Court held that the denial of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that statements elicited under these circumstances are inadmissible in a state criminal trial. The Court reasoned that when an investigation has focused on a specific suspect in custody who requests counsel, the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory, at which point the right to counsel attaches to safeguard the defendant's ability to exercise other constitutional protections such as against self-incrimination. The opinion noted that the petitioner was handcuffed, in custody, and not free to leave, with police having already received information implicating him.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-06-15 · cited 1503×
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, petitioners were subpoenaed to testify before a bistate commission about a work stoppage and, after receiving immunity from state prosecution, refused to answer on grounds that their testimony could incriminate them under federal law. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, bars one jurisdiction from compelling testimony that might be used against the witness in another jurisdiction absent immunity coextensive with the privilege. The core reasoning is that the privilege's policies—including protection from the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, and maintaining an accusatorial system—are defeated when witnesses can be compelled to incriminate themselves across federal-state lines, particularly given cooperative federalism in law enforcement, requiring reconsideration of prior precedents allowing such compulsion.
criminal lawfederal powercivil rights
Aguilar v. Texas
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-06-15 · cited 7289×
The case Aguilar v. Texas involved the validity of a search warrant issued based on an affidavit from police officers stating they had received reliable information from a credible person that narcotics were being kept at the petitioner's home. The Supreme Court held that the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment because the affidavit lacked sufficient underlying facts and circumstances to allow the magistrate to independently determine probable cause, relying instead on the officers' mere belief or suspicion. The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment requires that inferences about probable cause be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than by police officers, and mere affirmations of belief are inadequate as established in prior cases like Nathanson and Giordenello. This standard applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
criminal lawcivil rights
Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-06-01 · cited 56×
This case concerned whether the McGuire Act allows states like Ohio to enforce fair trade laws that permit manufacturers to set minimum resale prices for trademarked goods, even against retailers who did not sign agreements. The Supreme Court held that the Ohio Fair Trade Act's provisions were authorized by the McGuire Act and thus exempt from Sherman Act prohibitions on price fixing. The reasoning focused on the McGuire Act's explicit exemptions for intrastate contracts prescribing minimum prices that are lawful under state law, and for enforcement actions against nonsigners as defined by state statutes. The Court affirmed the Ohio Supreme Court's decision upholding the law's application to Hudson Distributors, which had sold Lilly products below the minimum prices.
business & regulatoryfederal power
United States v. Welden
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-04-20 · cited 125×
The case involved whether a defendant indicted for antitrust conspiracy under the Sherman Act could claim immunity from prosecution under the Act of February 25, 1903, based on prior testimony before a House subcommittee investigating small business matters. The district court dismissed the indictment, finding the immunity applied to congressional testimony, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the 1903 Act's immunity provision extends only to testimony in judicial proceedings, not congressional committee hearings. This conclusion rested on the statute's plain language, which refers to proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under the antitrust acts in the courts of the United States, as well as prior judicial interpretations limiting it to judicial inquiries.
criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryfederal power
Rabinowitz v. Kennedy
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-03-30 · cited 19×
The case involved attorneys retained by the Cuban government to represent it in U.S. legal matters, including litigation, who filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that they were exempt from registering under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended. The Supreme Court held that the Act plainly requires such attorneys to register because their representation does not qualify for the statutory exemption limited to persons engaging only in private and nonpolitical financial or mercantile activities furthering bona fide trade or commerce. The Court reasoned that the exemption's conditions must all be satisfied simultaneously, that legal services for a foreign government fall outside the narrow commercial categories, and that questions about the scope of required disclosures on registration forms were not ripe for review. It therefore affirmed dismissal of the complaint on statutory grounds.
federal powerbusiness & regulatory
Brooks v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-03-30 · cited 18×
This case involved a veteran who had been drafted while serving as an apprentice machinist for the Missouri Pacific Railroad and who sought a specific seniority date as a journeyman mechanic upon completing his apprenticeship after returning from military service. The District Court found that the transition from apprentice to mechanic was automatic in practice and that, but for his military service, the petitioner would have completed his training and been hired at the North Little Rock location in 1955, so it ordered the railroad to grant him that seniority date and location. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that uncertainties in future employment needs meant the advancement lacked the required predictability. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reasoning that the same types of contingencies discussed in the companion case Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. do not defeat a veteran's statutory seniority rights when the promotion would otherwise have occurred automatically through continued satisfactory employment.
labor & employment
Van Dusen v. Barrack
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-03-30 · cited 3077×
This case concerned the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which permits a federal district court to transfer a civil action to another district for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, provided the action might have been brought there. The underlying dispute arose from over 150 wrongful death and personal injury suits filed after a 1960 airplane crash in Boston Harbor, with 40 actions brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by representatives qualified under Pennsylvania law; defendants sought transfer to the District of Massachusetts, where most witnesses resided and over 100 similar actions were pending. The District Court granted the transfer, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that transfer was barred because the plaintiffs lacked capacity to sue under Massachusetts law at the time the suits were filed. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the "might have been brought" limitation concerns only jurisdiction and venue, not a plaintiff's capacity under the transferee state's law, and that the state law and choice-of-law rules of the transferor forum continue to govern after transfer.
proceduretorts & liability
United States v. Ward Baking Co.
Supreme Court of the United States · 1964-03-09 · cited 46×
This case concerned a civil antitrust action brought by the United States against five bakery companies under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging a conspiracy to allocate business and submit collusive bids for supplying bakery products to U.S. Naval installations in the Jacksonville area. After settlement negotiations, the companies proposed a consent judgment that the Government refused to accept because it omitted a general injunction against price-fixing with third parties and an injunction against suggesting prices to other sellers; the district court nevertheless entered the companies' proposed judgment without the Government's consent. The Supreme Court held that a district court may not enter a consent judgment in a civil antitrust suit without the actual consent of the Government when the Government seeks additional relief that has a reasonable basis under the circumstances. The Court reasoned that a full exploration of facts is needed to craft an effective decree preventing future violations and that the disputed provisions fell within the scope of relief requested in the complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
business & regulatoryprocedure