The case involved plaintiff Sally Hannon's claims against Avis Rent A Car System and a regional manager for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with related Montana state-law claims for breach of the covenant of good faith, negligent supervision, and tortious interference. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Title VII claims, holding that Hannon was an independent contractor rather than an employee and thus not covered by the statute. Applying the multi-factor common-law agency test from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the court found that the parties' agency operator agreement gave Hannon substantial discretion over operations, compensation structure, and work methods, with no control over hours or additional assignments. The court denied summary judgment on the state-law negligent-supervision claim, finding triable issues of fact, but granted it on the remaining contract and tort claims.
This case involves a subrogation action by insurer St. Paul against a general contractor, architects, and related parties after a fire destroyed a home under construction, for which St. Paul had paid its insured homeowners over $1.1 million. St. Paul asserted claims for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty, alleging that negligent electrical work by an independent contractor caused the fire. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on issues of vicarious liability for the independent contractor's negligence, application of res ipsa loquitur to the negligence claim, and negligent design by the architects. The court denied all three motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendants' involvement under the design/build project structure and the applicability of exceptions to the independent contractor rule, as well as insufficient basis to dismiss the res ipsa loquitur and negligent design theories at this stage.
The case involved plaintiffs Paladin Associates, Inc. and Marie Owens suing Montana Power Company, its subsidiary NARCO, and other natural gas marketers for alleged anti-competitive conduct in the intrastate and interstate transportation and sale of natural gas in and through Montana, asserting claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act along with related state law claims. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment and to exclude expert testimony. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the antitrust claims. The reasoning centered on the plaintiffs' failure to properly define the relevant product and geographic markets or to demonstrate that the defendants possessed monopoly power or engaged in prohibited conduct such as unlawful restraints of trade or essential facilities denial.
In Bleek v. Supervalu, Inc., the plaintiff sued his former employer under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that his termination aggravated a pre-existing PTSD condition and caused him to become totally disabled on the same day. The court addressed several pretrial motions, including the employer's motion in limine to bar evidence or argument that the termination caused total disability, the employee's motion to reopen discovery to add a physician expert witness, and the employee's motion in limine on various evidentiary issues. The court granted the employer's motion in limine and denied the motion to reopen discovery, reasoning that the employee had not shown good cause or diligence in identifying an expert witness within the deadlines set by the scheduling order and that medical causation requires competent expert testimony. The court also granted in part the employee's motion in limine, holding that the employer was bound by the reasons for discharge communicated at the time and could not introduce contradictory evidence.
The case concerns Glacier Electric Cooperative's federal lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the Blackfeet Tribal Court from exercising jurisdiction over a negligence action brought by non-tribal member Floyd Williams for injuries allegedly caused by the utility's conduct on reservation trust land leased to a nonmember. The district court granted Williams' motion to dismiss, denied the requested preliminary injunction, and dismissed the action without prejudice. The court reasoned that the tribal court was best positioned to develop the factual record needed to apply the jurisdictional tests from Montana v. United States and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, that the prior state-court deferral did not bar the federal action under res judicata, and that exhaustion principles favored allowing the tribal proceedings to continue.
The case involved a strict liability claim by the estate of Dr. Charles Sternhagen, who alleged that his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma resulted from teenage exposure to the herbicide 2,4-D while working with crop-dusting and spraying operations in Montana during 1948-1950. After Sternhagen's death, his wife as personal representative opposed summary judgment motions by defendants Stauffer and Chevron, which argued there was insufficient evidence linking the illness to their specific products. The court evaluated the admissibility of Sternhagen's pre-death sworn statement identifying the defendants' brands and an additional affidavit, finding the statement inadmissible under the residual hearsay exception due to insufficient trustworthiness and that the affidavit did not create a triable issue of fact on product identification or causation.
