Paul Gerhart Hatfield

The case involved plaintiff Sally Hannon's claims against Avis Rent A Car System and a regional manager for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with related Montana state-law claims for breach of the covenant of good faith, negligent supervision, and tortious interference. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Title VII claims, holding that Hannon was an independent contractor rather than an employee and thus not covered by the statute. Applying the multi-factor common-law agency test from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, the court found that the parties' agency operator agreement gave Hannon substantial discretion over operations, compensation structure, and work methods, with no control over hours or additional assignments. The court denied summary judgment on the state-law negligent-supervision claim, finding triable issues of fact, but granted it on the remaining contract and tort claims.

civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liability

This case involves a subrogation action by insurer St. Paul against a general contractor, architects, and related parties after a fire destroyed a home under construction, for which St. Paul had paid its insured homeowners over $1.1 million. St. Paul asserted claims for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty, alleging that negligent electrical work by an independent contractor caused the fire. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on issues of vicarious liability for the independent contractor's negligence, application of res ipsa loquitur to the negligence claim, and negligent design by the architects. The court denied all three motions, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the defendants' involvement under the design/build project structure and the applicability of exceptions to the independent contractor rule, as well as insufficient basis to dismiss the res ipsa loquitur and negligent design theories at this stage.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved plaintiffs Paladin Associates, Inc. and Marie Owens suing Montana Power Company, its subsidiary NARCO, and other natural gas marketers for alleged anti-competitive conduct in the intrastate and interstate transportation and sale of natural gas in and through Montana, asserting claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act along with related state law claims. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment and to exclude expert testimony. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the antitrust claims. The reasoning centered on the plaintiffs' failure to properly define the relevant product and geographic markets or to demonstrate that the defendants possessed monopoly power or engaged in prohibited conduct such as unlawful restraints of trade or essential facilities denial.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Bleek v. Supervalu, Inc., the plaintiff sued his former employer under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that his termination aggravated a pre-existing PTSD condition and caused him to become totally disabled on the same day. The court addressed several pretrial motions, including the employer's motion in limine to bar evidence or argument that the termination caused total disability, the employee's motion to reopen discovery to add a physician expert witness, and the employee's motion in limine on various evidentiary issues. The court granted the employer's motion in limine and denied the motion to reopen discovery, reasoning that the employee had not shown good cause or diligence in identifying an expert witness within the deadlines set by the scheduling order and that medical causation requires competent expert testimony. The court also granted in part the employee's motion in limine, holding that the employer was bound by the reasons for discharge communicated at the time and could not introduce contradictory evidence.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerns Glacier Electric Cooperative's federal lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the Blackfeet Tribal Court from exercising jurisdiction over a negligence action brought by non-tribal member Floyd Williams for injuries allegedly caused by the utility's conduct on reservation trust land leased to a nonmember. The district court granted Williams' motion to dismiss, denied the requested preliminary injunction, and dismissed the action without prejudice. The court reasoned that the tribal court was best positioned to develop the factual record needed to apply the jurisdictional tests from Montana v. United States and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, that the prior state-court deferral did not bar the federal action under res judicata, and that exhaustion principles favored allowing the tribal proceedings to continue.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a strict liability claim by the estate of Dr. Charles Sternhagen, who alleged that his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma resulted from teenage exposure to the herbicide 2,4-D while working with crop-dusting and spraying operations in Montana during 1948-1950. After Sternhagen's death, his wife as personal representative opposed summary judgment motions by defendants Stauffer and Chevron, which argued there was insufficient evidence linking the illness to their specific products. The court evaluated the admissibility of Sternhagen's pre-death sworn statement identifying the defendants' brands and an additional affidavit, finding the statement inadmissible under the residual hearsay exception due to insufficient trustworthiness and that the affidavit did not create a triable issue of fact on product identification or causation.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved James Van Gundy suing P.T. Freeport Indonesia for wrongful discharge under Montana’s Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act after his termination from a supervisory role at a copper mine in Indonesia. Freeport moved for summary judgment, citing a choice-of-law clause in the employment offer letter that Van Gundy accepted in New Orleans, which stated that Louisiana law would govern all issues arising from the employment relationship. The court analyzed the contract under conflict-of-laws principles, including the Restatement factors and the parties’ explicit selection of Louisiana law, and concluded that Louisiana law controlled rather than Montana’s statute.

labor & employment

The case involved a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit brought by the family of Leland Kicking Woman, who died from injuries sustained in a 1993 logging accident on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Plaintiffs alleged that the Bureau of Indian Affairs negligently failed to manage and supervise safety aspects of logging operations performed by an independent contractor under a BIA-approved timber contract. The court considered the government's motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, focusing on whether analogous liability existed under Montana law as required by the FTCA. It reasoned that the federal-tribal trust relationship is unique with no state-law counterpart, rendering the FTCA inapplicable, and that Montana law generally shields project owners from liability for independent contractors' negligence absent inherently dangerous work conditions.

torts & liabilityfederal power

The case concerned a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under an employer's commercial auto policy after Roy Georgeson fell from a utility pole and died when an uninsured vehicle caught a cable he and a coworker were installing using the employer's truck and trailer. The plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against the uninsured driver and sued Fidelity for coverage, but the insurer denied that Georgeson qualified as an insured because he was not occupying a covered auto or permissively using one at the time of the accident. The court reviewed the policy's uninsured motorist endorsement and liability provisions against Montana statutes requiring such coverage, considered whether the accident arose from the use of the covered vehicles in the course of the employer's cable-installation business, and analyzed precedents on permissive use and vehicle-related employment activities to determine eligibility for benefits on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved 346 farmers and two grain elevator companies from Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota suing the United States for monetary damages and declaratory relief after the Federal Grain Inspection Service adopted miscalibrated Near Infrared Transmittance instruments to measure wheat protein content from May 1993 to January 1994, which allegedly caused lower sale prices when private elevators adjusted their own instruments to match official readings. Plaintiffs premised claims on the Federal Tort Claims Act, Little Tucker Act, Grain Standards Act, and Administrative Procedure Act, while also seeking class certification for all U.S. wheat producers and elevators affected during that period. The court considered the government's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, sanctions, and class certification, focusing on FTCA administrative exhaustion prerequisites under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and class action requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Timothy Schmidt, an employee at Rhone-Poulenc's elemental phosphorus plant in Montana, who suffered injury from phosphine gas exposure during a furnace digout procedure in January 1995 after a mudball plug failed and released the gas. Schmidt sued his employer for damages, alleging that the company intentionally and maliciously exposed him to the hazard, which he claimed fell outside the exclusivity provision of Montana's Workers' Compensation Act. Rhone-Poulenc moved for summary judgment, contending that the Act barred the suit because the facts showed at most negligence rather than the intentional and malicious conduct required by the statutory exception in Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-413. The court reviewed the incident details, prior similar exposures, the company's response measures, and Montana case law interpreting malice, concluding that the resolution depended on whether the specific facts met the high threshold for the exception.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a rancher, John Shuler, who was assessed a $5,000 civil penalty by the Department of the Interior for killing a grizzly bear in violation of the Endangered Species Act after multiple bear attacks on his sheep in Montana. Shuler sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing self-defense, particularly regarding the incident the morning after the initial shooting when the wounded bear approached him. The Ad Hoc Board of Appeals rejected the self-defense claim, finding no imminent danger and that Shuler had provoked the conflict. The court reversed the penalty on summary judgment, concluding that the Board's determinations lacked substantial evidence because the facts showed Shuler faced imminent harm when the bear charged and that he had not acted as the aggressor while searching for the wounded animal to protect others.

environment

In Ruzicka v. First Healthcare Corp., a registered nurse sued her former employer after being terminated from a Montana nursing home and reported to the state Board of Nursing for allegedly instructing staff to withhold food from a resident, which the employer characterized as patient abuse. The plaintiff asserted claims for wrongful discharge under Montana’s Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act and for malicious damage to her professional reputation. The court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether good cause existed for the termination. It also held that the reputation claim was not preempted by the Act because it constituted a separate and independent tort rather than a claim arising from the discharge itself.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In this case, Glendale Colony and its employee Michael Hofer sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court to halt a tort lawsuit filed against them by Dawn Connell, a Blackfeet tribal member, in Blackfeet Tribal Court arising from a 1994 automobile collision on U.S. Highway 2 within the reservation. The plaintiffs argued that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants and requested a preliminary injunction to stop the tribal proceedings. The court denied the request for injunctive relief, holding that federal law requires non-Indian defendants to exhaust available remedies in tribal court before challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court. This exhaustion rule stems from Supreme Court precedents emphasizing comity, respect for tribal self-government, and the policy against placing federal courts in direct competition with tribal institutions, with no exceptions applying here such as bad faith or futility.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a challenge by environmental and sportsmen groups to the U.S. Forest Service's approval of a timber sale project involving road construction and harvesting in Montana's Lewis and Clark National Forest. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the project's environmental impact statement violated the National Forest Management Act, Clean Water Act, and National Environmental Policy Act by failing to adequately evaluate alternatives and environmental effects. The court considered the agency's motion for summary judgment under a rule-of-reason standard, reviewing whether the EIS provided a reasonably thorough discussion of probable impacts to support informed decision-making and public participation. Core reasoning focused on NEPA's procedural requirements, which mandate consideration of reasonable alternatives without dictating substantive outcomes, while also referencing NFMA's multiple-use planning obligations.

environmentfederal power

The case involved a declaratory judgment action to determine whether personal injury claims arising from a hunting accident, in which Jonathan Kayser was shot by Pierre Tibi, were covered by an Allstate automobile liability policy issued to the Colwells and a Fire Insurance Exchange homeowner’s policy issued to Tibi. The court had previously entered judgment finding coverage under both policies. Allstate then moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) to set aside the judgment, contending that the court erred in holding that the policy’s “employee” exclusion was void as applied. The court denied the motion, first because the pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit divested it of jurisdiction, and second because the exclusion exceeded the limitations permitted by Mont. Code Ann. § 61-6-103(5) and conflicted with Montana’s Mandatory Liability Act by barring coverage when the claimant sought recovery from a non-employer insured.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a 1986 car accident on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation that killed Christine Gilham; her estate sued the State of Montana in both state and tribal court, alleging negligence in highway design and maintenance, and obtained a damage award in tribal court. Montana challenged the Blackfeet Tribal Court's jurisdiction, arguing it retained sovereign immunity from suit in tribal court despite a provision in the Montana Constitution waiving immunity from tort suits. The federal district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether that constitutional waiver extended to tribal-court proceedings. It held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction because a state's waiver of immunity in its own courts does not constitute consent to suit in tribal courts under federal law precedents distinguishing waivers across different sovereign forums. The decision rested on principles of sovereign immunity and the requirement of a clear, express waiver for jurisdiction over a state in another tribunal.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Enron seeking a declaratory judgment on coverage under excess insurance policies for costs incurred in litigating and settling a lawsuit by Ashland Oil, which alleged that Enron had fraudulently injected a lower-value B-G mix into a crude oil pipeline in violation of tariffs and agreements, causing economic and property damage; Enron also pursued claims for breach of contract, negligence, and violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court addressed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings by the insurers and partial summary judgment by Enron. It held that the policies did not provide indemnity because the underlying claims centered on intentional fraudulent conduct. The reasoning relied on established public policy principles that bar insurance coverage for losses arising from an insured's willful, intentional, or fraudulent acts, as reflected in case law and treatises emphasizing that such coverage would be void.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Mary Jane Wilson, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, who obtained a negligence judgment in Blackfeet Tribal Court against non-tribal defendants for an accident on the reservation; the tribal supreme court affirmed the award of damages. Wilson then sought recognition and enforcement of that judgment in federal district court under diversity and federal question jurisdiction, invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The court had already determined that the tribal court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. It held that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does not extend statutory full faith and credit to tribal court judgments but that principles of comity require federal courts to recognize and enforce the judgment, consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.

procedurefederal power

This case involved former employees of Burlington Northern who sued the railroad after it closed its locomotive repair shop and terminal facilities in Livingston, Montana, and sold part of its line, claiming the closure constituted a "move" of a terminal under Mont. Code Ann. § 69-14-1002 and entitled them to compensation for diminished home values. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the closure qualified as such a move, along with Burlington Northern's arguments that the state statute was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Act and Railway Labor Act, violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause, and constituted improper special legislation. The court interpreted the statute using the principle of expressio unius est exclusius alterius, noting that it expressly covers only "terminals" and "division points" but not repair shops or other facilities, and therefore held that the closure did not trigger the statute's protections.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentfederal power