David Eady, an African-American bus driver promoted over time to Operations Manager at Veolia Transportation Services (formerly ATC), sued his former employer after his termination, claiming race discrimination under Title VII, discrimination under the FMLA, and state-law wrongful termination and breach of contract. The defendant moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence of performance concerns, assigned action steps for a 2005 expansion, and a title change that did not alter duties or compensation. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, concluding that Eady had not produced evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on discriminatory motive, protected activity under the FMLA, or breach of any contractual obligation.
The case involved Beverly Mahomes, an African-American U.S. Postal Service employee, who sued Postmaster General John E. Potter alleging that her 2006 termination constituted racial discrimination and retaliation for prior EEOC charges and union grievances under Title VII. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which a magistrate judge recommended granting after finding that the termination resulted from repeated safety violations and failure to immediately report an on-the-job fall, consistent with progressive discipline policy, and that Mahomes could not demonstrate pretext or exhaustion of remedies for the retaliation claim. After de novo review of the record, the district court adopted the report and recommendation in full and entered summary judgment for the defendant.
The case involved James Jeffers suing his former employer Lafarge North America, Inc. for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after a thirty-year career at the Harleyville cement plant in positions including Shift Supervisor, Plant Relief Foreman, Special Projects Supervisor, and Maintenance Supervisor/Coordinator. The matter came before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court reviewed the plaintiff's work history, a reduction in force, and the applicable legal standards, including the definition of direct evidence of discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test as adapted for ADEA claims in a RIF context.
This case involved claims by Ashley River Industries and Coastal Marine Enterprises against Mobil Oil and related entities for fraud, negligence, negligence per se, money had and received, nuisance, and declaratory relief arising from lead and arsenic contamination on 9.65 acres of industrial property along the Ashley River in North Charleston, South Carolina, which the plaintiffs purchased from Mobil in 1973 after Mobil and its predecessors had operated a sulfuric acid and fertilizer plant there. The plaintiffs sought to develop the site into a marina and RV park/campground in the 1980s but encountered permitting issues with state environmental agencies due to potential hazardous materials. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the undisputed facts showed the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that no reasonable jury could find the defendants liable on the remaining theories.
This case involves the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) suing fourteen companies under CERCLA and the state Hazardous Waste Management Act for response costs related to hazardous substance releases at a former fertilizer site and nearby areas. DHEC reached a settlement with the defendants and sought court approval, but several other potentially responsible parties moved to intervene, arguing the agreement was unfair and its supporting administrative record unreliable. The court permitted limited discovery into the record and ultimately denied approval of the settlement. It reasoned that the record was tainted because attorneys for the settling defendants played a central role in drafting key elements, including the liability allocation, undermining the presumption of reliability that attaches to agency-prepared records.
The case concerned Shannon Faulkner's challenge to The Citadel's male-only admissions policy for its Corps of Cadets, which rejected her application solely on the basis of sex, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the United States intervened as a plaintiff raising the same claim. Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in the related VMI case, which held that single-sex education at VMI was not justified by an important state policy and required a remedial plan, the court here tried only the issues of whether South Carolina could articulate a sufficient justification for its parallel policy and what remedy would apply if it could not. The court found that South Carolina had not provided a justification distinct from the one rejected in VMI, that the policy therefore violated equal protection, and that the appropriate remedy was to admit Faulkner to the Corps of Cadets, with further proceedings to detail implementation.