Charles Weston Houck

David Eady, an African-American bus driver promoted over time to Operations Manager at Veolia Transportation Services (formerly ATC), sued his former employer after his termination, claiming race discrimination under Title VII, discrimination under the FMLA, and state-law wrongful termination and breach of contract. The defendant moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence of performance concerns, assigned action steps for a 2005 expansion, and a title change that did not alter duties or compensation. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on all claims, concluding that Eady had not produced evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on discriminatory motive, protected activity under the FMLA, or breach of any contractual obligation.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Beverly Mahomes, an African-American U.S. Postal Service employee, who sued Postmaster General John E. Potter alleging that her 2006 termination constituted racial discrimination and retaliation for prior EEOC charges and union grievances under Title VII. The defendant moved for summary judgment, which a magistrate judge recommended granting after finding that the termination resulted from repeated safety violations and failure to immediately report an on-the-job fall, consistent with progressive discipline policy, and that Mahomes could not demonstrate pretext or exhaustion of remedies for the retaliation claim. After de novo review of the record, the district court adopted the report and recommendation in full and entered summary judgment for the defendant.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved James Jeffers suing his former employer Lafarge North America, Inc. for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after a thirty-year career at the Harleyville cement plant in positions including Shift Supervisor, Plant Relief Foreman, Special Projects Supervisor, and Maintenance Supervisor/Coordinator. The matter came before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court reviewed the plaintiff's work history, a reduction in force, and the applicable legal standards, including the definition of direct evidence of discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test as adapted for ADEA claims in a RIF context.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved claims by Ashley River Industries and Coastal Marine Enterprises against Mobil Oil and related entities for fraud, negligence, negligence per se, money had and received, nuisance, and declaratory relief arising from lead and arsenic contamination on 9.65 acres of industrial property along the Ashley River in North Charleston, South Carolina, which the plaintiffs purchased from Mobil in 1973 after Mobil and its predecessors had operated a sulfuric acid and fertilizer plant there. The plaintiffs sought to develop the site into a marina and RV park/campground in the 1980s but encountered permitting issues with state environmental agencies due to potential hazardous materials. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the undisputed facts showed the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that no reasonable jury could find the defendants liable on the remaining theories.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

This case involves the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) suing fourteen companies under CERCLA and the state Hazardous Waste Management Act for response costs related to hazardous substance releases at a former fertilizer site and nearby areas. DHEC reached a settlement with the defendants and sought court approval, but several other potentially responsible parties moved to intervene, arguing the agreement was unfair and its supporting administrative record unreliable. The court permitted limited discovery into the record and ultimately denied approval of the settlement. It reasoned that the record was tainted because attorneys for the settling defendants played a central role in drafting key elements, including the liability allocation, undermining the presumption of reliability that attaches to agency-prepared records.

environmentprocedure

The case concerned Shannon Faulkner's challenge to The Citadel's male-only admissions policy for its Corps of Cadets, which rejected her application solely on the basis of sex, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the United States intervened as a plaintiff raising the same claim. Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in the related VMI case, which held that single-sex education at VMI was not justified by an important state policy and required a remedial plan, the court here tried only the issues of whether South Carolina could articulate a sufficient justification for its parallel policy and what remedy would apply if it could not. The court found that South Carolina had not provided a justification distinct from the one rejected in VMI, that the policy therefore violated equal protection, and that the appropriate remedy was to admit Faulkner to the Corps of Cadets, with further proceedings to detail implementation.

civil rights

This case involved a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization filed by farmer Wendell H. Blanton, who remained in possession of real property securing a loan from the Federal Land Bank. After the bank moved for adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) or relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), the parties agreed to a consent order requiring specific payments on set dates, with an automatic lifting of the stay if any payment was missed. The debtor made the August and September payments on time but tendered the October payment two days late, prompting the bank to refuse it and proceed with foreclosure; the bankruptcy court denied the debtor's motion for a finding of substantial compliance. The district court affirmed, holding that the consent order's unambiguous language required payment on or before the due dates and that, as with contracts, its plain terms must be enforced without adding missing conditions like "time is of the essence." The court noted the surrounding circumstances, including the urgency of Chapter 11 proceedings, made the importance of timely payments clear.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court's dismissal of debtor E.J. McIver's second Chapter 13 petition, filed 76 days after dismissal of his first case. The bankruptcy court found McIver ineligible to be a debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 109(f)(1) because the prior dismissal resulted from his willful failure to comply with court orders on plan payments and confirmation, and it barred him from refiling under Title 11 for 180 days from the date of the second dismissal. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that McIver's repeated noncompliance demonstrated intentional disregard rather than circumstances beyond his control, and that allowing the second filing would undermine the purpose of the 180-day bar by permitting him to benefit from the automatic stay. The court independently reviewed the legal issues and found the facts supported a finding of willfulness under the statute's ordinary meaning.

procedure